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International investment and related disputes are on the rise. With
national courts generally unavailable and difficulties resolving disputes
through diplomacy, investment treaties give investors a right to seek
redress and arbitrate directly with states. The costs of these investment
treaty arbitrations-includingthe costs of lawyers for both sides, as well
as administrative and tribunal expenses-are arguably substantial. This
Article offers empirical research indicating that even partial costs could
represent more than 10% of an average award The data set from the pre2007 population suggested a lack of certainty about total costs, which
parties had ultimate liabilityfor costs, and the justificationfor those cost
decisions. Although there were signs of balance and a preference for
parties to be responsiblefor their own costs, there was neither a universal
approach to cost allocation nor a reliable relationship between cost shifts
and losing. Awards typically lacked citation to legal authority and
provided minimal rationale, and the justifications for cost decisions
exhibited broad variation. Small pockets of coherence existed. Tribunals
typically decided costs only in the final award; and as the amount
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investors claimed increased, tribunal costs also increased Such a
combination of variability and convergence can disrupt the value of
arbitrationfor investors and states. In light of the data, but recognizing
the need for additionalresearch to replicate and expand upon the initial
findings, this Article recommends states consider implementing measures
that encourage arbitratorsto consider specif1c factors when making cost
decisions, obligate investors to particularizetheir claimed damages at an
early stage, andfacilitate the use of other Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) strategies. Establishing such procedural safeguards can aid the
legitimacy of a dispute resolution mechanism with criticalimplicationsfor
the internationalpolitical economy.
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The number of investment treaty arbitrations has nearly quintupled.'
Billions of dollars-by virtue of cases like the 2002 Argentine currency
crisis 2 or the Yukos Oil debacle 3-are at stake. With global supply chains,
5
massive investment flows, 4 and a network of 2600 treaties, governments

1. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), IIA ISSUES

NOTE No. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ININVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20103 en.pdf; see
LATEST
also UNCTAD, HA MONITOR NO. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Revl,
DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 2-4 (2009), available at http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20096 en.pdf [hereinafter 2009 IIA MONITOR] (describing the increase
in claims and asserting there were 317 known disputes at the end of 2008); UNCTAD,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES: A
REVIEw 1, 3-5 (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD, ISDS]; Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating
Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2007) [hereinafter Franck,
Evaluating Claims] (describing the increase in claims).
2. Luke Eric Peterson, Round- Up: Where Things Stand with Argentina and its Many Investment
Treaty Arbitrations, INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (2008), http://www.iareporter. com/Archive/IAR-12-1708.pdf.
3. Alex Spence, Former Yukos Owners Begin $50bn Claim Against Russia, TIMES (London),
Nov. 17, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5172520.ece; see also Press
Release, Gold Reserve Inc., Gold Reserve Inc. Submits $1.928 Billion Arbitration Claim to World
Bank's ICSID (Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201009
28005541/en/Gold-Reserve-Submits-1.928-Billion-Arbitration-Claim (articulating claim for nearly
US$2 billion for a dispute under the Canada-Venezuela investment treaty).
4. See UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/3, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS ON GLOBAL FDI FLOWS (2009) (discussing foreign investment

flows); see also Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor
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are at risk for treaty arbitration when their regulatory measures, like
legislation to redress global economic crises, adversely impact foreign
investment. 6 Investment treaty arbitration has largely, but not exclusively,
been a welcome advance. For foreign investors affected by government
conduct, treaty arbitration offers a direct opportunity to sue states and
receive damages, whereas alternative venues such as national courts are
unavailable or undesirable. Meanwhile, states have an opportunity to
protect their investors abroad, vindicate their policy choices, and receive
the benefit of increased investment arguably flowing from their investment
treaties.' Nevertheless, there is a latent problem with investment treaty
arbitration, namely, ambiguity about arbitration costs. The scope for cost
liability includes: (1) the expenses of both parties' lawyers, (2) the costs of
the tribunal and expenses related to administration, and (3) which party
will bear these two expenses given the possibility of cost shifting. 9 The
scope of cost liability may contribute to concerns about the international
investment regime.' 0 The lack of certainty and predictability about total

Conductin Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 730-41 (2009) (discussing
global supply chains, particularly as regards China); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart
Effect: The Role of Private Contractingin Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916-17, 92641 (2007) (discussing the incorporation of environmental obligations into contracts that are part of the
global supply chain).
5. See UNCTAD, IIA MONITOR No. 3, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8,
RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (2008-JUNE 2009), at 2-6 (2009),

availableat http://www.unctad.org/eng/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf (discussing the treaty network).
6. See Luke Eric Peterson, Whither the New Financial Crisis Claims?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG
(Feb. 5, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/02/05/whither-the-new-financial-crisisclaims/ ("[It is entirely possible that the cataclysmic events of the last few months-including the
sometimes haphazard crisis-management by governments-might give rise to treaty-claims against
states.").
7. National courts may be unavailable, given sovereign immunity, or undesirable, given
problems with the enforceability ofjudgments or concerns related to the integrity of domestic rule-oflaw institutions. Espousal requires lobbying an investor's home state to act on its behalf before the
International Court of Justice and will not result in an award payable to the investor. Diplomacy can be
untenable as it politicizes commercial disputes and can result in inaction. Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public InternationalLaw Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1536-38 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy
Crisis].
8. See Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and InternationalLaw: Insights for Investment Treaty
Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 793 n. 116 (2008) [hereinafter Franck, Empiricism]
(gathering sources debating the benefits of investment treaties). See generally THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION

TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (suggesting that
treaties signal to investors that investments will be protected under international law but also
suggesting the effect on foreign investment is debatable).
9. See infra Part I.C (defining "cost," including the Tribunal's Costs and Expenses and Parties'
Legal Costs and Expenses); infra Part HA, C (exploring the law applicable to costs and cost shifting).
10. Other variables may contribute to the current discontent. See, e.g., Ilija Mitrev Penuliski, A
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costs, which party will have liability for which costs, and the justification
for those cost decisions diminishes the effectiveness of investment treaty
arbitration. 1
2
for example, a Dutch investor sued the Republic
In Eureko v. Poland,1
of Poland under a bilateral investment treaty for problems with the
US$1.34 billion insurance privatization.13 The arbitration made headlines
in the international financial news' 4 and featured an internationally
prominent tribunal.' 5 The eighty-six-page award held Poland liable and
required Poland to pay the fees of the tribunal and Eureko's lawyers. The
arbitrators' full decision on costs was contained in two sentences:
"Claimant has prevailed. Consequently, its costs and those of the Tribunal
shall be borne by the Respondent." 6 The controlling treaty language
prohibited this approach.' 7 While the legal error makes it an arguable
outlier and a subsequent decision redressed this error,' 8 data nevertheless

Dispute Systems Design Diagnosis ofICSID, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

507-08 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (suggesting that there are concerns of "favoring capitalexporting countries, lacking legal consistency, regulating types of government conduct which states
have not agreed to submit to review, being opaque, and lacking legitimacy due to conflicts of interest
among individuals who provide dispute resolution services").
11. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1895, 1942-44, 1954 (2010) (suggesting that arbitrators in investment treaty disputes
"bear the primary responsibility for lending certainty and predictability to investment transactions" and
that "a more 'legitimate' body of law" can promote the integrity of arbitration).
12. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005),
reprinted in 12 ICSID REP. 335 (2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EurekoPartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf.
13. Arbitration Scorecard 2007: Top 50 Treaty Disputes, AM. LAW., June 13, 2007,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 181639136817#.
14. See, e.g., Jan Cienski, Poland in Deal with Eureko over Stake in PZU, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2009, at I1; Marek Strzelecki & Marynia Kruk, Polandand Eureko Settle Dispute, WALL ST. J., Oct.
5, 2009, at C6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125469684214462753.html.
15. The tribunal included Stephen Schwebel (former president of the International Court of
Justice) and Yves Fortier (former president of the London Court of International Arbitration, member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Canadian representative to the United Nations,
and president of the Security Council). Eureko, supra note 12, at II.
16. Id 261.
17. See Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland on
encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments, Neth.-Pol., art. 12(9), Sept. 24, 1996,
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/netherlands poland.pdf ("Each Party
shall bear the cost of the arbitrator appointed by itself and its representation. The cost of the chairman
as well as the other costs will be bome in equal parts by the Parties."); see also id. art. 8(2) (mandating
investor-state arbitration pursuant to Article 12(3-9)).
18. See infra note 307 (discussing the retraction of aspects of the Eureka award). The case may
also be an outlier as the test of the relevant treaty specifically addressing the treatment of costs. While
the author is unaware of empirical research that descriptively assesses whether and how IIAs address
the costs of dispute resolution, doctrinal legal research suggested that addressing costs expressly in the
text of treaties was somewhat unusual, but it was normal to include arbitration rules that impliedly
addressed costs. See infra Part II.C. See generally Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating
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suggests that Eureko's failure to cite any legal authority and the reliance
on a single rationale was typical. 9
Investment arbitration costs are called "a hot issue" 20 and "the sting in
the tail." 2 1 Concerns about the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration,
and incoherency in areas such as costs, may cause states to reevaluate the
value of investment treaties. The United States 22 and Norway 23 are
reconsidering their model treaties. Meanwhile, Russia withdrew from the
Energy Charter Treaty,24 and Ecuador 25 and Bolivia26 withdrew from the

Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54
INT'L STUD. 1 (2010) (analyzing different dispute resolution delegations in investment treaties).
19. See infra Part Uf.D.
20. Walid Ben Hamida, Cost Issues in Investor-State Arbitration Decisions RenderedAgainst the
Investor: A Synthetic Table, in TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 2 (2005), available at
http://www. transnational-dispute-management.com.
21. Klaus Reichert & James Hope, Costs-The Sting in the Tail, I GLOBAL ARB. REV. 30, 30
(2006); see also Chiara Giorgetti, Costs and Their Apportionment in International Investment
Arbitration, INT'L Disp. Q., Fall 2009, at 6, available at http://www.whitecase.com/idq/fall_2009 4/
("The extent and eventual apportionment of arbitration costs constitute important considerations when
parties explore the possibility of resolving a dispute through international investment arbitration.").
22. Hearing on Investment Protections in U.S. Trade and Investment Agreements Before
Subcomm. on Trade of the H Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings/transcript.aspx?NewslD=10394; House Looks To Finish
Supplemental As Senate Begins Credit Card Debate, CONG. DAILY, May 8, 2009, available at 2009

WLNR 8967848.
23. Luke Eric Peterson, Norway ProposesSignificant Reforms to its Investment Treaty Practices,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn-mar27 2008.pdf;
Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Proposed Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS, June 8, 2009, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/06/08/
norway-shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty.aspx.
24. Emmanuel Gaillard, Letter, Russia Cannot Walk Away from its Legal Obligations, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at 6; Alison Ross, Russia withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty, GLOBAL
ARB. REV., Aug. 7, 2009, available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/18495/
russia-withdraws-energy-charter-treaty/.
25. See News Release, ICSID, Ecuador's Notification under Article 25(4) of the ICSID
Convention (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServletrequestType
-CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&p
ageName-Announcement9 (providing Ecuador's decision to withdraw from ICSID on disputes related
to oil, gas and minerals); News Release, ICSID, Ecuador Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the
ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Annou
ncements&pageName=Announcement20 ("[T]he World Bank received a written notice of
denunciation of the [ICSID Convention] from the Republic of Ecuador."); see also Ecuador Says
Won't Extend US. Investment Treaty, REUTERS, May 6, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/politics
News/idUSN062642352 0070507 (discussing how Ecuadorian Foreign Affairs Minister stated that the
U.S.-Ecuador treaty "'has caused our country a lot of problems' and that "'this treaty doesn't
represent our national interests').
26. News Release, ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention
(May 16, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/lCSID/StaticFiles/Announcement3.html.
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World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).27
Better information about investment arbitration costs is necessary.
Claims that costs are "no small matter" 28 or may range from US$1-21
million29 require analysis. Objections that arbitrators "give cursory
attention to fixing arbitration costs" 3 0 require assessment of what
justifications tribunals do offer for cost decisions, particularly in the
context of investment arbitration. Critiques that cost decisions are
"arbitrary"'3 1 or "unpredictable" 32 necessitate analysis of what variables (if
any) are reliably linked to cost decisions. While research in this Article is
neither a predictive nor causal model of future outcomes, cost information
has the power to (1) aid parties in understanding their arbitration risks and
managing their investment treaty disputes, including using Alternative

27. See also Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty
Regime: A Grand BilateralBargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 457, 495
n. 197 (2009) ("In the end of April 2007 the leaders of Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua have agreed
to withdraw from the ICSID mechanism.").
28. Noah D. Rubins, The Allocation of Costs and Attorney's Fees in Investor-State Arbitration,
18 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 109, 124 (2003) [hereinafter Rubins, Allocation ofCosts].
29. See infra notes 74-81, 215-16 (providing examples of total cost awards).
30. Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, Assessing Costs in InternationalArbitration,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 2010, at 2; see also infra notes 235-36 (critiquing the absence of costs
justification).
31. See infra notes 237-38 (critiquing costs awards as arbitrary and unpredictable).
32. Lester Nurick, Costs in InternationalArbitration, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 57
(1992); see also Ank A. Santens, Costs in InternationalArbitration: A Pleafor a Debate on Early
Guidance by the Arbitral Tribunal on the Principles it Will Apply when Deciding on Costs, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (June 10, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/06/10/costs-in-internationalarbitration-a-plea-for-a-debate-on-early-guidance-by-the-arbitral-tribunal-on-the-principles-it-will-apply-

when-deciding-on-costs/ ("Whereas the outcome on costs is often almost as important as the outcome
on the merits, this is an area where uncertainty reigns.").
33. Commentators suggest that costs influence parties' decisions to bring claims. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 584-93 (6th ed. 2003); John J. Donohue I, Optingfor the
British Rule, or if Posnerand Shavell Can't Remember the Case Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 1093, 1095-96, 1116-18 (1991); Stephan W. Schill, ArbitrationRisk and Effective Compliance:
Cost-Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 653, 654-55
(2006) [hereinafter Schill, Cost-Shifting]. See generally THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III,
FED. JUD. CENTER, INTHEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEwS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL
CIVIL LITIGATION 9 (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdfnsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/
$file/costciv3.pdf [hereinafter WILLGING & LEE, WORDS] (referring to remarks by an employment
lawyer that "she had potential clients who could not afford to pay the fee for filing a case in federal
court. She could not represent such clients because they would not be able to pay for other discovery
expenses."). The generalization to investment arbitration is unclear given the lack of data related to
cost assessments and decisions to arbitrate. Although appealing, it presumes that investors are rational
actors, costs of ITA are reasonably predictable, and costs affect decisions to bring claims. This may
not be the case. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008). But see Ian A. Laird, NAFTA
ChapterII Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 228-29 (2001) (suggesting investors consider
"real risk that such an investor would be obliged to pay the substantial costs" of treaty arbitration).
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Dispute Resolution (ADR)34 to facilitate settlement;3 5 (2) guide tribunals
seeking descriptive data about costs;36 (3) permit states to design better
investment treaties in light of their normative policy choices; 37 and (4)
inform the debate about the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration.38
Despite the need for reliable information on investment treaty costs,
empirical analysis is just beginning. 9 This Article is the first empirical
analysis of investment arbitration costs that recommends potential reforms
based upon available data and appropriate norms. Part I of the Article
provides a background on investment agreements, treaty arbitration, and
costs. Part II explores the doctrinal and normative bases for cost shifting

34. UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/1 1, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND

ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20091l1
en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, ADR 1]; UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and
Alternatives to Arbitration 11 (Sept. 3, 2010) (working draft) (on file with author) [hereinafter
UNCTAD, ADR II].
35. Information gaps undermine the value of interest-based dispute resolution methods that
require assessments about best and worst alternatives to negotiated agreements. See generally ROGER
FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (1991); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM

CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION (1991). The uncertainty creates challenges for distributive
negotiation and understanding the zones of possible agreement. See generally ROBERT MNOOKIN ET
AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); MICHAEL
WATKINS & SUSAN ROSEGRANT, BREAKTHROUGH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: How GREAT
NEGOTIATORS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD'S TOUGHEST POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTS 26-35 (2001).

36. Tembec, for example, referred to information about a contemporary trend in investment
arbitration to justify its cost decision. Tembec v. United States, Joint Order on the Costs of Arbitration
and for the Termination of Certain Arbitral Proceedings, 139 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Consolidation Trib.
2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/90177.pdf. Data suggested that
reference to stare decisis was unusual. Infra note 283. Arbitral tribunals are not the only adjudicators
interested in arbitration costs; national courts may likewise be interested. See Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm
Trading Co. v. Mayne Pharma Inc., 560 F.3d 935, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the cost
implications of arbitration and citing the scholarship of Dean John Gotanda: '"[iun international
commercial arbitrations, the fees of the arbitral tribunal can be considerable' (alteration in original)).
37. This presumes the use of rational cost benefit analysis. Cognitive biases and heuristics may
prevent stakeholders from engaging in informed or rational decisions. See generally ARIELY, supra
note 33 (discussing reaction to information in predictably irrational patterns). See also Zachary Elkins
et al., Competingfor Capital: The Diffusion of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. 265, 279-82 (considering the utility of investment treaties via a cost/benefit matrix); Gus Van
Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law,
17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 124 (2006) [hereinafter Global AdministrativeLaw] ("[T]he wider costs and
benefits of investment treaties for states, have been the subject of some debate . . . .").
38.

See, e.g., Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007);

Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided InternationalInvestment Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future
ofInvestor-State Arbitration,47 VA. J. INT'L L. 953, 956-57 (2007).
39. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 70 (calling for expanded empirical research on
costs); John Y. Gotanda, Attorneys' Fees Agonistes: The Implications ofInconsistency in the Awarding
ofFees and Costs in InternationalArbitrations 10 (Villanova Univ. School of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 2010-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1491755
[hereinafter Gotanda, Fees].
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and its application to investment treaty arbitration. Part III describes the
methodology, hypotheses, and results of the research.
The results suggested that cost was a key risk in investment treaty
arbitration. Even limited data suggested that reported costs represented
more than 10% of an average award (i.e., over US$1.2 million). As the
data only measured the portion of one party's legal fees that was shifted
(and tribunal costs where it was available), it necessarily omitted the full
scope of both parties' legal costs; net costs could have been much larger
and therefore a more substantial aspect of the amount awarded.40
Regarding allocation of the risk of liability for arbitration costs, the data
showed that costs exhibited a degree of incoherence buttressed by small
pockets of coherence. There was no universal approach for how tribunals
addressed costs; although tribunals most frequently required parties to
share tribunal and administrative costs equally and absorb their own legal
fees, there were a mix of approaches and outcomes.
Yet within the variance, the overall experiences of investors and states
were relatively equivalent, with (1) parties often responsible for equal
costs, or (2) rough parity between investors and states when tribunals did
shift costs. There was, however, a lack of justification for these results.
Although guidance or decisions on costs could be made at earlier phases,
such as in preliminary questions,41 tribunals typically waited until the end
to make decisions. This meant that information, which was possibly vital
to strategic settlement opportunities, was unavailable to the parties. When
tribunals did make decisions, they did not regularly cite to any legal
authority (i.e., citing less than one authority on average) and used minimal
justifications (i.e., one to two on average) to justify the result. Where
tribunals offered reasons, justifications diverged across categories.
Although the literature suggests cost decisions are often based upon a pure
"loser-pays" approach or a desire to punish inappropriate behavior, these
were not the most frequent rationales; and there was no reliable statistical

40. See, e.g., Giorgetti, supra note 21 ("The cost of counsel and associated expenses represent
the most substantial expense in intemational arbitration. A recent Report by the Commission on
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce found that legal costs amounted to an average
of 82 percent of the total arbitration costs. This finding can be used as a proxy for a discussion of costs
in investment arbitration as well." (footnote omitted)). This Article does not address the issues of
optimal settlement rates or the optimal fee structures of tribunals or parties' legal fees. Future research
might develop these points. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods
ofAlternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 388 (1986)
(suggesting that there is an optimal settlement rate).
41. See infra notes 336, 358 (discussing opportunities to raise preliminary questions).
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relationship between losing and cost shifting, either for parties' own legal
fees or the tribunal and related administrative costs. 4 2
There were other key commonalities. Tribunals were most likely to
rationalize 43 their decisions using the parties' relative success and
equitable considerations. They were unlikely to base their decisions
expressly on concerns related to the public interest, party equality, stare
decisis, or settlement efforts. A few remaining areas exhibited a degree of
coherence. There was a link between an award's cost decisions, whereby if
tribunals shifted attorney's fees onto another party, the same party was
also liable for more than 50% of tribunal fees. Finally, there was a reliable
relationship between the amounts investors claimed and the tribunal's total
costs. If investors made low damage claims, tribunal costs were low; if
damage claims were high, tribunal costs were high. As international
arbitration has no equivalent to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
requiring good-faith pleadings, the relationship has implications for using
cost shifting in arbitration-perhaps even in domestic litigation--to
create incentives that promote efficient and fair dispute resolution.
Overall, while there were pockets of rough coherence and parity, the larger
picture suggests that costs exhibited a degree of uncertainty. The question

42. See infra notes 294, 312.
43. For the purposes of this Article, the terms "rationalize" or "rationalization" primarily refer to
the processes of explaining, justifying, and streamlining the reasoning of the adjudicative outcomes in
the cost decisions of investment treaty arbitration awards. These explanations may, in tum, benefit
from a more economics-based approach to "rationalization" that is focused upon transitioning
preexisting ad hoc systems into ones based upon sets of published and predictable rules.
44. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1925,
1953-56, 1972 (2009) (discussing the impact of fee shifting on litigation and analyzing the role of
settlement); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 545, 567-68
(2004) (discussing the demand curve for litigation and considering the impact of alternative dispute
resolution methods); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 554-59 (2009) (proposing cost shifting in litigation to promote
freedom for parties to adopt procedural laws in public adjudication); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting
the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 159 (1984) ("[T]he possibility
of a fee shift against individual litigants relying on their own resources might well result in a greater
tendency to settle claims . . . ."); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 72 (1983) (describing litigation as investment and analyzing the implications of investing time
and money into dispute resolution); see also EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD.
CENTER, LITIGATION COSTS INCIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2010), availableat http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/costcivl.pdf/5file/costcivl.pdf (conducting a quantitative analysis of costs and finding
that variables related to higher monetary stakes, longer processing times, case complexity, electronic
discovery, summary judgment, and representation by large law firms, among others, were associated
with higher litigation costs); WILLGING & LEE, WORDS, supra note 33 (describing interviews and
potential variables affecting the efficacy of civil procedure in the federal courts in light of concerns
related to costs and administrative efficiency).
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is whether that is a desirable normative output from a system of justice for
international economic law.
In light of these findings and the limitations inherent in the data,
measures, and empirical models, Part IV argues that the system could
nevertheless benefit from targeted modification. In an effort to promote
norms of predictability, fairness, and efficiency, the Article recommends
(1) addressing costs at an early stage; (2) encouraging tribunals to make
transparent cost decisions with dollar values, legal authorities, and
rationales; (3) articulating rules that offer arbitrators an express set of
factors to use when making cost decisions; (4) implementing a pleading
system that requires claimants to particularize their claimed damages; and
(5) considering the use of legal expense insurance to defray arbitration
risk. This Article concludes that, based upon the current evidence,
investment treaty arbitration arguably remains a useful tool for resolving
investment disputes, but issues of cost, should they continue in their
present state, could create difficulties for the effective use of investment
arbitration. Focused attention to matters of cost-by parties, arbitrators,
policy makers, and scholars-is a desirable outcome for improving the
legitimacy of treaty-based dispute resolution during a time of transition in
the international economic framework.
I. A PRIMER ON HAS, ITA, AND RELATED COSTS
A. InternationalInvestment Agreements (IIAs)
An international investment agreement (IIA) is a treaty made between
two or more governments that safeguards investments made by qualifying
investors in the territory of other signatories.45 Countries might sign a
regional trade agreement, such as the Dominican Republic-Central
American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).46 The theoretical
justification for these agreements is that, on balance, the benefits flowing
from signing IIAs-including increased investment flows, signaling that a

45. Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92
MINN. L. REV. 161, 171 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Dispute Systems Design].
46. Multilateral agreements, like DR-CAFTA and NAFTA, provide investment protection on a
multilateral basis, and perhaps in conjunction with other international economic law rights. Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462,
availableat http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republiccentral-america-fta/final-text [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Can.-Mex. ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605; see also Antonio R. Parra, Provisions
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties
and MultilateralInstrumentson Investment, 12 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 287 (1997).
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state is willing to provide a stable investment regime (whether based on
international law, domestic regulation, or a hybrid), partitioning aspects of
domestic policy space, and providing protection to its own outward bound
investorS47 -outweigh the costs and related risks of creating international
economic law obligations. 4 8
As a doctrinal matter, IIAs grant reciprocal investment rights, both
procedural and substantive, to private investors from the signatory
countries. Substantively, governments guarantee investors certain
treatment, such as freedom from unlawful expropriation, freedom from
discrimination, and the right to fair and equitable treatment.49
Procedurally, an IIA permits investors who believe their substantive rights
have been violated to seek direct redress against the host state through the
treaty's dispute resolution mechanism. The objective is to move
politicized forms of dispute resolution toward a neutral and rule-based
forum.50 Investors then have an opportunity to engage in non-adjudicative
dispute resolution, and, if necessary, to resolve disputes finally through an
enforceable arbitration proceeding.'
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA)
Some investment conflicts involve overtly political elements.5 2 Other
treaty disputes appear more private, such as the revocation of a banking
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (outlining benefits related to IlAs).
48. See generally Anne van Aaken, InternationalInvestment Law Between Commitment and
Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 507 (2009) (analyzing IIAs under
contract theory given factors related to uncertainty, information asymmetry, and optimization of joint
benefits).
49. UNCTAD, ISDS, supra note 1, at 31-47; Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at
172.
50. HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT

5-6 (1999); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the
InternationalRule ofLaw Under NAFTA Chapter11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 196 (2001); Catherine A.
Rogers, The Arrival of the "Have-Nots" in InternationalArbitration, 8 NEv. L.J. 341, 356-57 (2007)
[hereinafter Rogers, Have-Nots]; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution ofDispute
Resolution Regimes in InternationalTrade Organizations,20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 717 (1999).
51. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at 172-73, 192-94; W. Michael Reisman,
InternationalArbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST.
L.J. 185 (2009).
52. See, e.g., Bemardus Henricus Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/6, Award (Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ZimbabweAward.pdf
(deciding claim against Zimbabwe for repossession of land from white farmers); Canadian Cattlemen
for Fair Trade v. United States, Award on Jurisdiction (NAFTA/UNCITRAL 2008), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/CCFT-USAAward_001.pdf (deciding whether Canadian ranchers
could sue the U.S. for restrictions put in place related to concerns about Bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (i.e., Mad Cow disease)).
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license or a breach of contract. A cause of action under an IA generally
involves (1) a foreign investor asserting that a host state violated the treaty
and damaged the investment, and (2) if the dispute is not otherwise
resolved, the investor seeking redress by requiring the state to arbitrate.
While treaties vary, investors can generally elect to arbitrate before: (1) an
ad hoc tribunal organized under the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, (2) the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and (3) a tribunal organized
through the World Bank's ICSID.5 4
Arbitration mechanics are relatively straightforward. After complying
with jurisdictional prerequisites, an investor initiates arbitration by
submitting an arbitration request to its selected forum. 5 Then, the process
of selecting a tribunal begins. Typically, panels of three arbitrators resolve
investment disputes5 6 in an impartial manner.57 Parties then marshal their
facts and legal arguments to address different phases of the dispute,
namely, jurisdiction, merits, quantum, and costs. The investor must first
establish that it meets the jurisdictional thresholds, namely, that there is a
qualifying investor and investment brought under a qualifying treaty
within a proper time frame. If this is not established, the case terminates.
Otherwise, the dispute continues. The merits phase involves a tribunal's
determination of whether the respondent breached the treaty's substantive
obligations. If there is no substantive breach, the case terminates;
otherwise, the dispute continues. At the quantum phase, the parties
establish the value of the substantive treaty breach. Decisions related to
costs can occur at any or all of these substantive phases, and tribunals

53. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at 185-86; Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra
note 1, at 10.
54. Parra, supra note 46, at 288. But see Agreement Between the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Government of Ghana Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments art. 10, Oct. 12, 1989, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iia/docsfbits/china ghana.pdf (providing that certain investment disputes are subject to ad hoc
arbitration, SCC is the default appointing authority, and the tribunal can use either SCC or ICSID rules
"as guidance"). Another prevalent arbitral institution is the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC). Aaken, supranote 48, at 3.
55. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45. But see Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the
BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVEST. &
TRADE 231, 234 (2004) (suggesting that, irrespective of whether the substantive prerequisites are
established, investors may proceed with arbitration).
56.

RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 124 (1995);

Franck, EvaluatingClaims, supranote 1, at 77.
57. Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal, 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45,
52-53 (1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-AppointedArbitratorin InternationalControversies:
Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 65 (1995); Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International
Arbitrator:Five Factors to Consider, 17 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. No. 10, 2, 3 (2002).
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sometimes render a separate substantive award to assess and allocate
arbitration costs. The final award is enforceable worldwide.
C. Costs of ITA
For the purposes of this section, the Article defines costs broadly, but
then particularizes "costs" for the remainder of the Article as a more
narrow fiscal measure to conduct empirical analyses. It then discusses the
critical nature of ITA costs and explains what is currently known about the
more narrow fiscal costs of ITA.
1. Defining Costs
As a general matter, costs related to investment treaty disputes can take
many forms. 59 Social costs involve unrest or other social considerations
that arise as a result of the sensitive issues sometimes involved in ITA.60
Political costs involve the value of sacrificing aspects of sovereignty, the
58. Franck, Dispute Systems Design, supra note 45, at 193-94. There is doctrinal variation.
ICSID Convention arbitrations issue one final "award"; earlier decisions are not awards for
enforcement purposes. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524, 541 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]. But see Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1547-57 (comparing enforcement
under ICSID and New York Conventions).
59. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based,
Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 138, 145-46 (2007) ("The potential costs
of an investor-State arbitration are basically threefold. First, as indicated above, a host country faces
the risk of having to pay awards that, in relation to its budget and financial resources, may prove
extremely burdensome. Second, the host country must bear the substantial costs, both direct and
indirect, of conducting the arbitration itself. Third, the 'policy cost' of investor-State arbitration is that
a substantial award to the investor may require the host country to repeal or modify measures that were
implemented for the public good."); see also Jennifer A. Heindl, Toward A History of NAFTA s
Chapter Eleven, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 672, 686 (2006) (referring to the "political and financial
costs" of ITA); Abba Kolo, Tax "Veto" as a Special Jurisdictionaland Substantive Issue in InvestorState Arbitration: Needfor Reassessment?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 475, 478, 492 (2009)
(considering political and economic costs of tax-related investment disputes).
60. Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia provoked riots, deaths, a state of emergency, and ITA. See
generally OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, iCOCHABAMBA!

WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA (2004).

Argentina's currency crisis created public upheaval. Mary Helen Mourra, Privatization of Water
Management in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE

CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 83, 88-89 (Thomas E. Carbanneau & Mary H. Mourra eds., 2008);
Alan Ciblis, ICSID Bleeds Argentina, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, July 1, 2005, http://www.multi
nationalmonitor.org/mm2005/072005/front.html; see also David Collins, Reliance Remedies at the
InternationalCenterfor the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 195, 211-12
(2009) (discussing the social costs of awards).
61. The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement does not permit ITA and instead requires all
investment conflict to be resolved in national courts, suggesting a concern about affronting national
courts. William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries:
Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. I
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63
need to raise domestic taxes,62 or the procurement of international aid.
There are also economic costs, including opportunity costs from sinking
resources (whether commercial or governmental) into ITA,M reputational
6
costs that may impact the credit rating of sovereign debt, and
transactional costs related to paying lawyers, arbitrators, institutions, and
their related expenses. The last set of dispute resolution costs are fiscal,
tangible, and presumably easier to quantify. Although arguably not the
most normatively important aspect of "cost" to measure, and although
other variables are worthy of operationalizing to assess net costs, these
fiscal elements are a tangible place to start and worthy of analysis.
As regards the quantifiable fiscal costs, there are several variables that
67
contribute to the scope of fiscal exposure in investment treaty arbitration.

(2006). Pakistan has refused to sign an IIA with the United States. Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen &
Damon Vis-Dunbar, Reflections on Pakistan 's Investment-treaty Program after 50 Years: An
TREATY
Interview with the former Attorney General of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan, INVESTMENT
2009 3
/0 /16/pakistansNEWS, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/
standstill-in-investment-treaty-making-an-interview-with-the-former-attorey-general-of-pakistan-mak
hdoom-ali-khan.aspx; see also Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 436-37 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development] (discussing
reactions to allegations that ITA is unfair or improperly infringes upon sovereignty); La ALBA Quiere
Crear un Tribunal de Arbitraje Paralelo al Ciadi, HOY BOLIVIA, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.hoy
bolivia.com/Noticia.php?IdEdicion=519&IdSeccion=3&IdNoticia=21205 (discussing denunciation of
ICSID and advocating ALBA's creation of a parallel regional arbitration institution).
62. Luke Eric Peterson, Czech Republic Hit with Massive Compensation Bill in Investment
Treaty Dispute, INVEST. L. & SUSTAINABLE DEV. WKLY. NEWS BULL. (Mar. 21, 2003), http://www.
iisd.org/pdfl2003/investmentinvestsd march_2003.pdf ("[Olne proposal mooted by some officials is
for an increase in value-added tax on goods and services which would see all taxpayers absorbing the
cost of the investment treaty arbitration.").
63. See Susan D. Franck, InternationalDecisions, Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v.
Republic of Ecuador, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 681 (2005) (discussing the implications of foreign aid to
Ecuador after the adverse award in Occidental).
64. Don Peters, Can We Talk? Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private Transborder
Commercial Disputes in the Americas, 41 VAND. J. TRANAT'L L. 1251, 1259-60 (2008)
("[Arbitration] diverts time, money, and energy to ancillary procedural quarrels .... [S]ubstantial time
and money is often spent selecting arbitrators and wrangling about information gathering." (footnote
omitted)); Salacuse, Is There a Better Way?, supranote 59, at 142 (referring to "indirect costs such as
the time of the government officials and corporate executives devoted to preparing and participating
in" arbitration).
65. See Salacuse, supra note 59, at 146; see also Schill, Cost-Shiing, supra note 33, at 682
(suggesting there are costs related to state compliance with international legal obligations). Reputation
costs may also have economic implications, such as investors' decisions about the utility of investing,
future investors' assessment of the pricing of investment risk, and the price premium later investors
may extract.
66. See infra notes 68-73.
67. The overall dispute resolution risk calculus is likely a function of: (1) amount claimed, (2)
amount likely to be awarded, (3) amount actually awarded, (4) amount of interest on any award, (5)
TCE, (6) PLC, and (7) tribunal allocation of TCE and PLC. See Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note
1, at 57-70 (discussing various arbitration risks); see also J. Gillis Wetter & Charl Priem, Costs and
Their Allocation in InternationalCommercial Arbitrations, 2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 249, 253-54
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For the purposes of the remainder of this Article, the relevant variables
relate to (1) amounts claimed, (2) damages awarded, (3) tribunal costs and
related administrative expenses for conducting the arbitration (TCE), 8 (4)
the parties' own legal costs and expenses for their lawyers and related
expenses (PLC), 69 and (5) tribunal decisions allocating TCE and PLC to
affect the parties' ultimate fiscal liability.70 As these different cost
elements can involve different legal rules,7 this research demarcates
between TCE and PLC decisions.72

(1991) (mentioning interest as a cost). Interest impacts liability and would be worthy of a separate,
future analysis to assess the scope of net fiscal risk.
68. Arbitration is an ad hoc, non-publicly funded process requiring payment of fees and expenses
of arbitrators, administrative charges of any arbitral institution, costs associated with renting facilities,
fees of transcription services, interpreters, and other costs. Micha Bfihler, Awarding Costs in
International Commercial Arbitration: an Overview, 22 ASA BULL. 249, 249 (2004); see MAURO
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW & PRACTICE 812-14 (2d ed. 2001); see
also FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 684-85

(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999). TCE consists of administrative charges, arbitrators'
fees, arbitrators' expenses (hotel, typists, etc.), expert costs (retained by tribunal), secretaries' costs
(retained by tribunal), and other costs that may occur for the tribunal or its work. Salacuse, supra note
59, at 142 (defining costs in connection with the charges of the arbitral tribunal and institution); Wetter
& Priem, supranote 67, at 253-54 (same).
69. PLC consists of administrative costs (research, legal, processing, witnesses, etc.), outside
legal costs, and costs in connection with resolving the dispute. See Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at
254; see also Salacuse, supra note 59, at 142 (defining costs related to parties' legal costs and
expenses in connection with preparation and conduct of the arbitration). While some countries permit
shifting of PLC, other jurisdictions may prohibit it. John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and
Attorneys' Fees in International Commercial Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1999)
[hereinafter Gotanda, Awarding Costs]. National law may be irrelevant for cost shifting. Infra notes
136-39.
70. Other commentators demarcate TCE and PLC. Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30; see
Bilhler, supra note 68, at 250; see also Eric Gottwald, Leveling The Playing Field: Is It Time ForA
Legal Assistance CenterFor Developing Nations In Investment Treaty Arbitration?,22 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 237, 250-51 (2007) (identifying various costs associated with ITA).
71. See U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art.
40(l)-(2), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglish/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf
[hereinafter
1976
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] (providing that procedural costs are "borne by the unsuccessful party,"
but, for legal costs, the tribunal is "free to determine which party shall bear such costs or may
apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable").
72. The distinction permits stakeholders to differentiate among cost elements. Different
elements-and their allocation-may reflect different normative objectives. Costs may have different
magnitudes. Predicting cost liability enables parties to assess the benefit of arbitration. If "the worst
thing a client can ever be is surprised," precision permits better management of stakeholder
expectations, encourages realistic views about possible outcomes, and minimizes outcries of unfair
surprise at the end of the process. Susan D. Franck, Considering Recalibration of International
Investment Agreements: EmpiricalInsights, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME:
EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS (Jos6 E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant eds., forthcoming 2011)
(referring to observations by Sherry Williams).
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2. Why Costs Matter
Commentators sometimes make observations about ITA costs that are
not based upon evidence from systematic reserach, which presumably
mimic an intuitive understanding based upon personal experience.n There
are at least five major reasons to take cost allocation seriously and offer
careful, systematic analyses.
First, there is significant financial exposure at stake given the risk of
being liable for TCE, PLC, or both. Commentators observe that costs in
international arbitration could be enormous, possibly in the millions of
dollars. 74 UNCTAD suggests that "costs involved in investor-State
arbitrationhave skyrocketed in recent years."7 s UNCTAD then cites cases
where the net result involved (1) a losing investor having to pay
approximately US$12.7 million in costs, 76 (2) a losing state having to pay
US$9 million in costs," (3) a losing state being required to pay US$7.7
million in costs, 78 and (4) a losing state being required to pay US$10.1
73. That even includes the present author. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1592
("International arbitration tribunals are not shy about making costs orders. Cost sanctions can be
applied either during a case or after an award to discourage vexatious [arbitration]." (footnote
omitted)); see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State
Disputes-A PreliminarySketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 10 n.8 (2005) (observing that
NAFTA tribunals "have been disinclined, for various reasons, to award costs"); Jonathan L. Frank &
Julie B6dard, Electronic Discovery in InternationalArbitration: Where Neither the IBA Rules nor U.S.
Litigation Principlesare Enough, 62 DisP. RESOL. J. 62, 68 (2008) ("In international arbitration, the
rule is not 'each party bears its own costs.' The arbitral tribunal generally will make a discretionary
determination of the allocation of arbitration costs. It could allow the winning party to recover, and
require the losing party to bear the costs of arbitration in whole or in part . . . ."); Stephen W. Schill,
Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International
Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 46 (2009) [hereinafter Schill, EnablingPrivate Ordering]
("[W]hat seems fully sufficient to serve as a filter for access to investment treaty arbitration is the cost
risk connected to potential claims. Only when a dispute is sufficiently economically valuable will an
investor chose to initiate arbitration and incur the cost risk. This should effectively bar trivial disputes
from investment treaty arbitration." (footnote omitted)).
74. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2-3 (stating, "It is not uncommon for such
costs to run into the millions of dollars, sometimes even exceeding the amount in dispute" and
describing possibly unrepresentative cost allocations of US$14.5 million, US$5 million, and US$8.1
billion); see also infra notes 212-16 (providing anecdotal data about the scope of costs).
75. UNCTAD, ADR I, supra note 34, at 16-18 (emphasis in original).
76. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, % 310,
312, 322-24 (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf,
(identifying investor PLC as around US$4.7 million, respondent PLC was allocated at USS7 million,
and TCE was nearly US$1 million).
77. Casado v. Republic of Chile, ICSID ARB/98/2, T 723-24, 730-31 (May 8, 2008), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PeyLAUDO.pdf (explaining that Chile's PLC was approximately
US$4.3 million, finding investor's reasonable PLC to be paid by Chile was US$2 million, and
allocating 75% (approximately US$3 million) of TCE to Chile).
78. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, 1543 (Oct.
2, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf ("Respondent shall
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million in costs. 79 It failed, however, to refer to other cases around the
same time frame, such as Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada, where the
tribunal only cost around US$1 million, and the parties split those fees
evenly and internalized their own legal fees.so Other unpublished research
from UNCTAD for the legal fees in ITA for a limited group of states (i.e.,
a limited sample with arguable case selection bias) provided limited data
that also suggested legal fees were not trivial. One country had ITA
disputes where its legal fees were in the order of US$2.5 million and
US$1.95 million; another country had estimates of its own PLC in the
order of US$1 million for a dispute; and a third state experienced PLC in
the order of US$1.2 million, US$1 million, and US$12 million."
Meanwhile, Professor Peters asserts, "several transborder investment
arbitrations conducted pursuant to NAFTA and bilateral investment
treaties required four years to conclude and cost millions of U.S. dollars"
and explains that these "direct costs of international arbitration are often
significant and sometimes wind up exceeding actual amounts gained." 82 It
is one thing to spend millions of dollars in legal fees, but it is another to
learn that one is also required to pay the award, pay for one's own lawyers,
pay for the entirety of the tribunal's costs, and then pay for its opponent's
lawyers.

pay to the Claimants the sum of US$7,623,693 in full satisfaction of both Claimants' claims for costs
and expenses of this arbitration.").
79. Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, T 604-05, 611-12,
631 (June 1, 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/WaguihElieGeorgeSiag-Awardand
DissentingOpinion_002.pdf (investors' PLC of US$6 million, respondent's PLC around US$3.5
million, and approximate TCE of US$600,000).
80. Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada (NAFTA Ch. 11 Consolidation Trib. 2010), at 107,
available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/MerrillAward.pdf.
81.
JNCTAD, Inciativa de un Centro de Asesoria Legal Sobre Derecho Internacional en
Inversidn y Controversias Invesionista-Estado(May 26-27, 2009) (on file with author). It is unclear,
however, how the data are collected and how replicable the results are. Meanwhile, there is a critical
case selection bias as the data only focus on the lawyer fees of respondent states; this does not consider
the lawyers' fees of investors, which may be of a different magnitude. While an interesting starting
place, the research requires systemic analysis and replication. Moreover, it is not clear whether these
same fees were ultimately bome by the state or whether they were paid (in part or in total) by the
investor. Likewise, it is not clear whether the state may have also been responsible for the PLC of the
investor. None of the data appeared to address costs related to TCE.
82. Peters, supra note 64, at 1260, 1285; see also Luke Eric Peterson & Nick Gallus,
InternationalInvestment Treaty Protection of Not-for-Profit Organizations, 10 INT'L J. NOT-FORPROFIT L. 47, 72 (2007) ("[E]ach of the three arbitration tribunal members will charge hundreds of
dollars an hour for their time. BIT disputes often last several years, in which time, lawyer, arbitrator
and institution fees can amount to several million dollars. Losing claimants are sometimes ordered to
pay the entire fees of the winning respondent state. Even 'victorious' claimants are not always
awarded their legal costs, which may diminish the attraction of arbitration over smaller claims."
(footnotes omitted)).
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Second, managing costs and related expectations can affect
stakeholders' satisfaction with ITA and aid in the consideration of the net
benefit of entering into an IIA. Offering greater guidance about likely cost
outcomes helps prepare stakeholders and permits them to manage their
expectations and resources more effectively than in the absence of data.
Without proper planning, parties may find themselves in a worse position
than anticipated. "Such uncertainty is clearly undesirable in terms of
foreseeability and legal certainty and compromises the calculability of risk
and potential liability for an investor who decides to bring an action under
an international investment treaty." 8 3 A loss on the merits of a dispute may
be upsetting, but parties consent to the theoretical possibility of a "loss"
when they choose arbitration as their adjudicative form of dispute
resolution. Cost shifting, by contrast, could be more unanticipated. Parties
could complain that they should have made an advance agreement on
costs, yet this approach appears rare. 84 As states may not have been fully
cognizant of their potential arbitration risks at the time an IIA was
signed, they may likewise not have anticipated the complete scope of
arbitration costs and related risk. Such informational deficits may in part
explain why, up to now, parties have not opted to address cost allocation
ex ante. This research, with all its limitations, provides stakeholders with
an opportunity to re-assess that choice on the basis of data.
Third, being able to assess arbitration costs reliably could permit
stakeholders to weigh the value of arbitration during the entire life cycle of
the dispute resolution process. Costs could be leveraged to influence the
parties' incentive structures. 86 In effect, costs could streamline arbitration

83. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 656.
84. See id. at 658 n.28 ("Only occasionally do bilateral investment treaties expressly address the
allocation of costs in investor-State disputes.... Even more uncommon are arrangementsbetween the
foreign investor and the host State prior or subsequent to the initiation of an investment treaty
dispute." (emphasis added)). The author is unaware of empirical research on precisely this point.
85. See Jose E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 26 (2009)
(suggesting that some argue "like consumers hoodwinked by an unscrupulous car dealer, that what it
actually accomplished through conclusion of a BIT is greater exposure to unexpected financial
liabilities").
86. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of
the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 820
n.329 (2008) ("[H]igh costs and risks associated with initiating an investment arbitration . .. [prevent]
a 'race to the courthouse."'); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock ofNAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An
Interim Sketch ofSelected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1400-01
(2003) [hereinafter Coe, Taking Stock] (discussing NAFTA settlements, the presence of entities with
"adequate funding contemplate a vigorous, protracted campaign" and tribunals having "exhibited a
disinclination to award costs"); Salacuse, supranote 59, at 165 ("One way for arbitrators to dissuade
such frivolous cases is to allocate all or a substantial portion of the arbitration costs to such claimants
if they lose their case."); William Schreiber, Realizing the Right to Water in InternationalInvestment
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efficiency by creating incentives for party decisions to initiate or defend
claims, bring particular motions, and engage in delay tactics.
Fourth, costs may have a disparate effect on economically
disadvantaged stakeholders. Smaller investors may not be able to access
justice in the same manner if the cost of bringing claims makes it
economically untenable. Likewise, countries with limited resources may
end up having to allocate scarce public funds to shoulder arbitration
costs." Professor Salacuse discusses the particular cost for the developing
world and explains, "the costs of an investor-State arbitration . . . may
prove to be a significant burden for developing countries." 8 9 Economically
disadvantaged stakeholders may therefore need more information about
what to expect from adjudication and how to plan for costs related to ITA
in order to promote equality of arms and basic access to justice. 90
Fifth, the legitimacy of dispute resolution depends on creating a system
that is seen to-and actually does-provide a level playing field that
permits stakeholders to understand their risk and make economic, legal,
and political plans accordingly. A process that appears arbitrary or
unpredictable91 may generate concerns and sustainability issues.92 Yet a

Law: An InterdisciplinaryApproach to BIT Obligations,48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 431, 473 (2008) ("If
more judgments are to be released penalizing claimants to such an extent, it may be possible to avert
further arbitration threats from investors as their penalty for losing such a case may be more damaging
than the possible outcome.").
87. See Coe, Taking Stock, supra note 86, at 1401 (describing arbitration's "elite" nature);
Lindsay C. Nash & Adam McBeth, Crushed by an Anvil: A Case Study on Responsibilityfor Human
Rights in the Extractive Sector, II YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 167, 174 (2008) ("Initial requests for
arbitration cost U.S. $ 25,000, which is far from the total costs of the proceeding, and forecloses
claims from most private individuals and many poorer governments.").
88. Not all countries permit contingent fee arrangements, particularly where a client may be a
government. See Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga:A ComparativeandInternationalLaw Analysis
of Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 29-30
(2002) (citing JOHN H. MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA,

AND EAST ASIA 1026 (1994)); see also Briefing: Third Party Litigation Funding, INT'L DIsPs.
(Simmons & Simmons, London), May 6, 2008, at 4-5, http://www.elexica.com/download.aspx?area
=crms&resource=IntDisputes052008.pdf (describing funding lawsuits on a conditional basis in the
U.S., England, Germany, France, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Hong Kong).
89. Salacuse, supranote 59, at 142; see Hena Schommer, EnvironmentalStandardsin U.S. Free
Trade Agreements: Lessons from Chapter 11, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 36, 36 (2007)
("[Mexico] had to cover the costs and expend resources for two years to defend itself . . . . The
potential expenditure of resources in international arbitration could prove to be a burden to developing
countries." (footnote omitted)); see also LUKE ERIC PETERSON, ALL ROADS LEAD OUT OF ROME:
DIVERGENT PATHS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 18 (2002),
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_nautilus.pdf ("[S]ubstantial costs make
contestation of an arbitral claim an unattractive option for poorer developing countries.").
90. Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement ofInvestor Rights under Investment Treaties:
Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 86-87 (2005)
[hereinafter Franck, Bright Future]; see also infra note 255.
91. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 21-22 (discussing three maritime arbitration
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lack of uniformity in the outcome of cost decisions need not destroy
legitimacy if there are respectable reasons for the divergence. Should IIAs
and their dispute resolution provisions form part of an effort to promote
rule-of-law institutions, there will be challenges where otherwise
"reasonable" or other cost allocations are made without justification. 93
If stakeholders deem the overall costs 94 of ITA to be too high, a range
of responses is possible. Countries may abandon arbitration altogether,
mandate other forms of dispute resolution (perhaps as a precursor to
arbitration or as an alternative), use arbitration strategically in conjunction
with other processes, return to international diplomacy, or reject the
creation of IIAs.95 Assessing the costs and benefits of ITA, the arguable de

decisions, one shifting all costs to the loser, one shifting some costs to the loser, and the last deciding
each bore its own costs).
92. See Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 1] Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
213, 221 (2001) ("Arbitrations that have broad and far-reaching public policy implications tend to
draw attention from media and nongovernmental organizations. Maintaining a shroud of
confidentiality over proceedings and documentation simply draws intense criticism and does harm to
the legitimacy of the process."); Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment
Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301,
324 (2004) ("A lack of transparency leads to 'a legal morass that complicates court proceedings ...
[lending to the] random and arbitrary nature of court decisions."' (alterations in original) (quoting
Rudolf Hommes, Institutional Reliability and Development, in JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM
IN LATIN AMERICA 48 (E. Jarquin & F. Carillo eds., 1998)); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in
International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1308 (2006) ("[T]he right of public
access seems self-evident in the context of WTO proceedings and investor-state arbitration, where
transparency is important to the institutions' perceived legitimacy.").
93. See Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 119 (discussing 1976 UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules). It may be possible, however, that the decision to not offer any reasoning or to offer
minimal reasons is an effort to retain tribunal net discretion over an award. For example, if tribunals
engage in compromise adjudicative outcomes in the substantive phase of the case, tribunals may
implicitly be using their discretion as regards costs (and possibly interest) to permit some kind of
strategic decisions or negotiated log-rolling related to the net outcome of the dispute. See, e.g., LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (discussing Epstein and Knight's

research and independently looking at assessing consistency of judicial behavior); Frank B. Cross &
Blake J. Nelson, Strategic InstitutionalEffects on Supreme CourtDecisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1437, 1446-47, 1485-91 (2001); David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and InternationalInvestment
Arbitration: Seeking an Explanationfor Conflicting Outcomes, 30 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 383, 40304 (2010) (referring to scholarship by Epstein and Knight to consider the strategic aspects of
adjudication); Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role ofldeologicalHomogeneity
in Generating Consequential ConstitutionalDecisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 369-71 (2008)
(considering the affects of tribunal homogeneity and compromise decisions by the "median Justice").
This theory, however, would benefit from thoughtful empirical study-perhaps in the context of a
survey instrument or series of case studies.
94. "Overall costs" incorporates hard, fiscal costs like PLC and TCE, but may include other
aspects. Supra notes 47-48, 60-65.
95. These options were considered during the United States' review of its model investment
treaty. ADVISORY COMM. ON INT'L ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING THE MODEL BILATERAL

INVESTMENT TREATY 9-14, 16-17 (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/
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facto dispute resolution mechanism, is critical. A richer understanding of
"bargaining in the shadow of arbitration" 96 can aid effective management
of investment treaty conflict and aid negotiation of dispute resolution
terms in international economic agreements.
3. Existing Data on ITA
The growing empirical literature on ITA makes several points. First,
governments can (and did) win investment disputes. Governments were
more likely than investors (57.7% versus 38.5%) to win cases and have no
damages awarded for alleged treaty breaches. 97 Second, the average
amount awarded (approximately US$10 million) was a fraction of what
investors typically requested (approximately US$343 million).98 In other
words, investors lost more than they won; and when investors did win,
they usually received less than claimed. Dispute resolution risk is about
more than outcome and damages. PLC and TCE are key variables, as they
reflect the cost of obtaining a beneficial outcome at both the outset99 and

131098.htm; see also Gus VAN HARTEN ET AL., PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT REGIME (2010), http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public statement/documents/Public%20
Statement.pdf (critiquing the IIA and ITA systems).
96. See, e.g., Mark L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158 (2000); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997
(1979); Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration,and the TransnationalShadow of the Law, 18
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 449 (2008).
97. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 49. There is other research that mirrors the
general pattern of this research but uses different data and methodology. See Linda A. Ahee & Richard
E. Walck, ICSID Arbitration in 2009, TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MAN. (2010), http://www.gfa-llc.com/
images/tdm 2010_-article006.pdf ("Claimants were successful in less than one-half of the matters that
went to an award"); see also UNCTAD, IIA ISSUES NOTE No. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3,
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 3 (2010), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/ docs//webdiaeia20l03 en.pdf ("[B]y the end of 2009, 164 cases had been
brought to conclusion. Out of these, 38 per cent were decided in favour of the State (62) and 29 per
cent in favour of the investor (47), while 34 per cent (55) cases were settled."); Daphna Kapeliuk, The
Repeat Appointment Factor:Exploring Decision PatternsofElite Investment Arbitrators,96 CORNELL
L. REV. 47, 81 (2010) (suggesting that for an analysis focused on "elite" arbitrators, tribunals denied
recovery to claims in 60.5% of the cases, and only 7% of investors were awarded 100% of amounts
claimed).
98. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 57-62; see also Susan D. Franck, International
Investment Arbitration: Winning, Losing and Why, COLUM. FDI PERSP., No. 7 (June 15, 2009),
http://vcc.columbia.edu/documents/SusanFranckPerspective-Final.pdf.
99. Ben Hamida, supra note 20; see also Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 654 ("[T]he
decision to arbitrate will depend on a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the potential
outcome of the arbitration and the damages the investor expects to recover, as well as the risks and
liabilities incurred by engaging in investor-State arbitration. An important aspect of this cost-benefit
analysis is the allocation of the costs of arbitration, both the costs of the proceedings in the strict sense,
like the arbitrators' fees, and the costs of legal representation.").
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the end of a case.' 00 Yet, there is little empirical analysis on point.'0 1
II. DOCTRINAL AND POLICY BASES FOR SHIFTING COSTS
Understanding the doctrinal landscape of ITA costs is vital. This
section explores historical issues, policy, and underlying doctrine.
A. Normative Baselines of Cost Shifting
Norms in international dispute resolution come from various places,
such as international conventions, national laws, institutional rules, and
international practices. International arbitration costs trace their roots to
norms from Roman, U.S., and Swedish law.102
The first normative approach traces its roots to Roman law. 0 3 The
"loser-pays" rule-also known as "costs follow the event"-requires
losers to compensate winners for their costs.1" Various civil law
jurisdictions use this principle in court litigation and arbitration. 05 In

100. Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30.
101. See Franck, Development, supra note 61; Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1; see also
Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals-An EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 301 (2008) (comparing interpretive modalities of ITA tribunals with other international
adjudicative bodies). ICSID and UNCTAD express concerns about costs. UNCTAD, 2009 IIA
MONITOR, supra note 1, at 11-12; UNCTAD, ISDS, supra note 1, at 8-12; Press Release, UNCTAD,
UNCTAD Reviews Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases and Draws Implications for Developing
Countries (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6967&
intItemlID=1634&lang-l (identifying the cost of ITA as an area of concern); see also Anoosha
Boralessa, The Limitations of Party Autonomy in ICSID Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 253,
292-93 (2004) (discussing the benefits of hiring elite law firms, but explaining that "[a] barrier to
hiring such law firms is the cost: in the law firms' defense it should be pointed out that investment
arbitration requires an enormous amount of time and work by the team of attorneys on the case to
succeed"); Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, The Role ofADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID
Experience, 34 NEWS FROM ICSID, no. 2, 2005 at 12, 14; Roberto Dafiino, Making the Most of
InternationalInvestment Agreements: A Common Agenda, TRADE OBSERVATORY (Dec. 12, 2005),
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfn?reflD=78365 (An "issue of concern has been the
growing cost of arbitration. This is particularly true for the low-income countries, and for a few small
companies, which cannot afford being represented by the most experienced and sophisticated law
firms in the field, as claimants usually are.").
102. The rules emanating from the doctrine have independent significance beyond pure national
rules, but rather come to represent paradigmatic normative approaches in their own right.
103. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 5; Werner Pfennigstorf, The European
Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 40-42 (1984).
104. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 654. Even in the "costs follow the event" rule, there
are various rules and exceptions in national jurisdictions that follow this rule. Bilhler, supra note 68, at
252; see Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 6-7 (quoting France's and Germany's civil
codes).
105. Pfennigsorf,supra note 103, at 44 ("[M]ost European countries (1) regard the objective fact
of defeat as sufficient ground for imposing the costs on the losing party, without requiring any
evidence of fault or bad faith, and (2) include in the costs to be reimbursed to the winner by the loser
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England, although costs were initially not available at common law,1 0 6 this
changed 07 and courts of equity permitted judges 08 and arbitrators 09 to
shift costs." 0 Jurisdictions following this approach"' strive to (1)
indemnify successful parties; (2) discourage frivolous actions, defenses, or
motions; and (3) put parties who have been wronged in the position that
they would have been in if the wrong had not been committed."12
A second norm reflects a "pay-your-own-way" approach. Under the socalled "American rule,""' parties bear their own costs for adjudication
irrespective of the outcome.11 4 Although there may be supplementary, nonpreempted state law,' 15 U.S. law generally presumes there is no cost
shifting unless expressly permitted by contract, statute, or arbitration
rules.11 6 Even the "pay-your-own-way" approach has exceptions" 7 and

not only court fees and related costs but also the attorney fees and other expenses incurred by the
winner.").
106. The Bailiffs and Burgesses of the Corp. of Burford v. Lenthall, (1743) 26 Eng. Rep. 731, 732
(holding that common law courts have no inherent jurisdiction to order costs but holding courts of
equity did, and proceeding to make a costs award on that basis).
107. Arthur L. Goodheart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-55 (1929) (discussing the history of
attorney's fees in England).
108. Andrews v. Barnes, [1888] 39 Ch. Div. 133 at 138 (Eng.). In 1875, the English court rules
provided express discretion to determine amounts awarded to litigants, including attorney's fees. John
F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation. The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1993).
109. Mordue v. Palmer, [1870] 6 Ch. App. 22 at 32 (Eng.) ("[W]hen a reference as to costs is
made by a Court of Equity, the Court gives the arbitrator jurisdiction to award costs as between
solicitor and client if he shall think fit.").
110. In many common law jurisdictions, authority to order costs in litigation only rises to orders
that shift the full legal costs of representation in those cases of misconduct, fraud, or corruption. Murry
L. Smith, Costs in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 30, 31 (2001) [hereinafter
Smith, Costs].
111. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 6 ("Most jurisdictions allocate costs and fees
in litigation according to the principle that costs follow the event.").
112. Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 30.
113. Other jurisdictions use this method. Infra note 128 (describing China and Japan).
114. Bil3hler, supra note 68, at 250; see also Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 10
("[T]he parties in litigation must generally bear their own expenses, including attorneys' fees.");
Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 109-10 (describing the "costs follow the event" and
"American rule" approaches).
115. While some states may prohibit shifting of PLC-related expenses (i.e. attorney's fees) in the
context of domestic arbitration, they may permit it in the context of international arbitration. See
Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 12. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.318 (West
2009) ("(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the costs of an arbitration shall be at the discretion
of the arbitral tribunal. (b) In making an order for costs, the arbitral tribunal may include as costs any
of the following: (1) The fees and expenses of the arbitrators and expert witnesses. (2) Legal fees and
expenses. (3) Any administration fees of the institution supervising the arbitration, if any. (4) Any
other expenses incurred in connection with the arbitral proceedings."), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § I569.2 1(b) (2009) (permitting arbitrators to award "reasonable expenses of arbitration" and allowing
"reasonable attorneys' fees" in limited circumstances).
116. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 123:01 (1999); Bihiler, supra note
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gives courts discretion, in extreme circumstances, to shift costs where
there is bad faith during the adjudication."' The policy choice helps
provide access to justice given three key concerns. 119 First, where
litigation is uncertain, it is unfair to penalize the loser if there was a goodfaith basis for bringing or defending a lawsuit. 120 Second, there is a desire
to not unjustly discourage the poor from vindicating their rights and
defending their conduct. 12 1 Third, seeking administrative convenience,
detailed proceedings related to cost would create an unnecessary burden
on adjudicative administration.122
Lars Welamson, a Swedish academic who later became a judge on the
Swedish Supreme Court, championed the third normative approach, where
parties pay for costs on the basis of relative success and conduct. This
approach allocates costs
on a sliding scale proportionate to the assessment by the court of
claims made by the parties; the introduction of such a rule would
provide both parties with an incentive to make the claims/offers as

68, at 257; Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 280-82; see also Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch
Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 583 (3d Cir. 2005) (permitting recovery of attorneys' fees where
permitted by party agreement); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J.
425, 453 (1988) (explaining that the Uniform Arbitration Act permits an award of costs but does not
permit shifting without contractual authorization).
117. See e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730, 755-57 (D. Colo. 1982) (listing statutory
exceptions to the American Rule); see also Vargo, supranote 108, at 1578-90 (discussing exceptions).
118. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat'l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1991); WMA Sec. Inc. v.
Wynn, 105 F. Supp. 2d 833, 839-40 (S.D. Ohio 2000); see also Gotanda,Awarding Costs, supra note
69, at 13; John W. Hinchey & Thomas V. Burch, An Arbitrator'sAuthority to Award Attorney Feesfor
Bad-FaithArbitration, 60 DIsP. RESOL. J., May-July 2005, at 10-17; Wetter & Priem, supra note 67,
at 282-86.
119. See Vargo, supra note 108, at 1575-87 (providing various exceptions to the pay-as-you-go
approach); see also Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fightfor Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 297-98, 298 n.22 (1990) (discussing the
importance of access to justice and citing authorities about the lack of access to justice when parties
are denied access to courts by excessive attorneys' fees, particularly when compared to the value of the
underlying claim).
120. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 249-50 (1975) (In Arcambel, "the inclusion of attorneys' fees as
damages was overturned on the ground that '[t]he general practice of the United States is in oposition
(sic) to it."' (footnote omitted) (alteration in original)); Vargo, supranote 108, at 1575-78 (describing
the evolution of the American Rule).
121. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also
Vargo, supra note 108, at 1593-96, 1634-35 (arguing that the ultimate justification for the American
Rule is access to justice).
122. Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 83 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872));
Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 11.
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realistic as possible and thus would be the best conceivable method
by which to promote settlement on reasonable terms.123
In an effort to allocate costs on the basis of certain factors (i.e. "factordependent"), the more in parity the amounts claimed and awarded are, the
more likely that the claimant will receive full compensation for its costs.
This gives parties incentives to make precise damage arguments,124 while
opening the doors to meritorious claims, preventing inflation of damages,
and providing compensation where dispute resolution strategies were
efficacious.
These different approaches are grounded in rules, tradition, and policy.
Despite suggestions that the Roman (i.e., "loser-pays") approach is
universal1 25 or "axiomatic,"1 26 this claim is disputed; 12 7 or it is at least
worthy of empirical verification. The reality is that there are multiple
acceptable methodologies for addressing costs. 12 8 As existing scholarship
has not empirically confirmed whether a particular practice is uniform, the

123. Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 274; Lars Welamson, Principerom rattegangskostnader
under debatt, in FESTSKRIFT TILL OLIVECRONA 684-709 (1964); Lars Welamson, Svensk rattspraxis:
Civil-och straffprocessratt 1980-1987, 74 SVENSK JURISTTIDNING 497, 531 (1989). After Professor
Welamson joined the Swedish Supreme Court, the Swedish court system adopted this approach to
costs. Wetter & Priem, supranote 67, at 274-75.
124. But see Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 275 (suggesting a complex approach that may
require "[c]omputer models . . . to properly master the intricacies of the system").
125. See Bithiler, supra note 68, at 259 ("Some recently published arbitral decisions hold that
'according to general principles' or 'in accordance with basic procedural principles followed in
arbitration', (sic) the costs of arbitration should be borne by the party which loses arbitration."); see
also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
176, art. 25 (2004) [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES] ("25.1. The winning party ordinarily
should be awarded all or a substantial portion of its reasonable costs. 'Costs' include court filing-fees,
fees paid to officials such as court stenographers, expenses such as expert-witness fees, and lawyers'
fees. 25.2. Exceptionally, the court may withhold or limit costs to the winning party when there is clear
justification for doing so."); JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 654 (2003) (suggesting there is an emerging trend for tribunals to order losing parties to
bear TCE and PLC).
126. Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 109; see Marc J. Goldstein, Some Thoughts
About Costs in InternationalArbitration, INT'L ARB. NEWS, Summer 2003, 16, 18 ("International
arbitral practice generally follows the principle that, as a first approximation, costs should 'follow the
event,' . . . . This may now be said (with some trepidation) to be a general principle of international
law."); Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 32; see also FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supranote 68, at 686.

127. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 815.
128. The "loser-pays" rule is followed by common and civil law jurisdictions. The "American
rule" (i.e., "pay-as-you-go") is applied in countries like the U.S., Japan, and China, which are major
economies that it would be unwise to ignore or minimize. ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note
125, at 67; Bihler, supra note 68, at 250. There is also a robust economic literature that considers that
the utility of following either a "loser-pays" or "pay-as-you-go" approach is most appropriate. See,
e.g., Clinton F. Beckner III & Avery Katz, The Incentive Effects of LitigationFee Shifting When Legal
Standardsare Uncertain, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 205, 205 (1995).
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possibility of variance must be acknowledged. To the extent that this
variability is written into ITA, it is perhaps unsurprising that variation in
doctrinal foundation may create variation in arbitration cost decisions.
This variation may, in turn, create difficulties in forecasting cost outcomes
and underscore the critique that cost decisions may seem unpredictable. 12 9
B. SharedPolicy Considerationsfor Cost Shifting
Despite these different doctrinal approaches, it is critical to remember
that there is nevertheless a commonality both in approach and policy. The
"loser-pays," "pay-as-you-go," and "factor-dependent" paradigms tend to
follow a standard approach by establishing presumptive rules with
exceptions and room for discretion to foster policy objectives. 3 0 What
they also have in common is the objective of creating incentives for
appropriate party behavior while incorporating systematic concerns of
justice.13 ' Although the balance weighs differently in different doctrinal
approaches, the goal is to promote party welfare in light of the overall
public benefit. In the context of ITA, this involves encouraging desirable
behavior (i.e., admissions and settlement opportunities),13 2 discouraging
waste (i.e., tactical delays or bad-faith arguments),3 3 and minimizing

129. See Bfihler, supra note 68, at 249 ("[A]rbitral precedent [exists] to support nearly any
approach a tribunal may wish to apply to its cost decision. Even cost awards rendered under the same
arbitration rules sometimes vary fundamentally without any apparent reason. The bottom line is that it
is often impossible to predict with any satisfactory degree of certainty how the costs will be
awarded.").
130. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 660, 662-63 ("In recent decades, the American rule . . . has come under
increasing questioning and criticism. At the same time, the rule has been riddled with ever more
numerous exceptions.").
131. Rowe discusses: (1) "fairness" considerations arising from a "loser-pays" approach, (2) an
indemnity approach to provide "full compensation for legal injury", and (3) "punitive emphasis" to
deter or punish misconduct rather than to compensate. Id at 653-61; see also BOhler, supranote 68, at
251 (discussing the value of providing compensation-i.e., "full value" for cost shifts); Gotanda,
Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 5-6 (explaining the value of indemnifying the winning party to
provide full compensation for the legal wrong); Smith, Costs, supra note I10, at 33 ("The party who is
put to the cost of prosecuting a claim should be able to recoup those costs and likewise a party that is
put to the cost of defending a claim which is not meritorious should be made whole by an award of full
indemnity costs"). By not punishing good-faith, well-managed, or well-intended arbitration claims, the
public benefits by not inhibiting critical claims, ensuring equality of arms, and promoting access to
justice while minimizing the administrative burdens. Pfennigsorf, supra note 103, at 61-64; Rowe,
supranote 130, at 662, 675.
132. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 5-6; see also Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at
330 (explaining that shifting costs permits successful parties to regain expenses incurred in pursuit of
their properly brought legal claims and defenses).
133. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supranote 69, at 5-6; Pfennigstorf, supranote 103, at 41-43.
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C. The Law of Cost Shifting
Given the variance in normative approaches, some suggest that there is
"no general practice as to the treatment of costs" in international
arbitration.134 This section explores the applicable law of costs.
Arbitral tribunals can and should be considering applicable law. The
key is to understand the panoply of legal sources for costs. This section
addresses key sources implicating cost allocation in ITA, including: (1)
express party agreement, (2) institutional rules, (3) national law on
arbitration, 35 (4) rules from international courts and tribunals, and (5)
practices (i.e., customs and usage of trade). These sources matter as
different choices of law modalities could result in different applicable laws
and outcomes.' 36 As some tribunals have "routinely award[ed] [costs and]
attorneys' fees, usually without discussing questions of applicable law,"' 3 7
it begs a fundamental question about conflict of laws-namely, what law
is applicable to costs.
Where not made clear through international law, there is likely to be
confusion about the law applicable to costs. Dean Gotanda's seminal work
observes that different laws may apply to different applicable law
issues,138 and arbitrators may need to undertake a complex choice-of-law

134. Bihier, supra note 68, at 250; ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 406 (3d ed. 1999).
135. FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra

note 68, at 685-86. The Second Circuit held the FAA governs the issue of whether attorneys' fees can
be awarded and the arbitrators' power. PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996);
William M. Howard, Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Connection with Arbitration, 60 A.L.R. 5TH 669
(1998); see also Peter Schlechtriem, Attorney's Fees as Part of Recoverable Damages, 14 PACE INT'L
L. REV. 205, 207 (2002) ("If the proceedings are governed by an (arbitral) procedural law which gives
the court or tribunal the power to grant reimbursement for costs of litigation and the pursuit of a claim
according to its own discretion, these same principles should govern its deliberations."). But see Schill,
Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 657-58 (arguing that uncertainty comes from discretion in arbitration
rules).
136. ICSID Convention is a self-contained, exclusive forum that requires consideration of parties'
agreement and treaty rules. ICSID Convention, supra note 58, art. 42. ITA under other doctrinal
regimes (for example, ICSID-Additional Facility cases, ad hoc, or ICC arbitrations under the New
York Convention) have a different approach on applicable law. But see Smith, Costs, supra note 110,
at 31 ("In most cases the lex arbitri does not restrict the award of legal fees and often expressly
authorizes indemnity for costs in the nature of legal fees.").
137. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 17-18 (second alteration in original) (quoting
GARY B. BORN, INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 626 (1994)).

138. See Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 15-17 (identifying the conflict issues in
costs and potential substantive and procedural elements); Veijo Heiskanen, Forbidding Depeqage:
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analysis to determine the governing law.' 39 For international commercial
arbitration, these difficulties can mean costs are awarded "'usually without
discussing questions of applicable law."'l 40 To the extent that ITA is a
rule-of-law institution, arbitrators should (1) cite to legal authority, (2)
explain their legal reasoning, and (3) have reliable links between legal
reasoning and cost outcome. It is currently an open question whether these
normative aspirations are empirically accurate descriptive statements.
1. PartyAgreement
Parties generally can agree on cost issues and allocation.14 1 Given
international arbitration's focus on party autonomy, tribunals and courts
tend to enforce the party agreement.142 Parties have various opportunities
to agree on cost allocation. Parties might agree in advance about cost
allocation through an express contract, reference to institutional rules with

Law Governing Investment Treaty Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 367, 375-76 (2009)
(describing different types of applicable law in arbitration).
139. The first concern will be what choice-of-law rules apply. The next challenge is whether costs
are substantive or procedural, provided that characterization is relevant under the choice-of-law
method. Next, issues of how to assess the proper law may require consideration of the law of the
arbitral seat, arbitrators' home countries, country of enforcement, or location of institutions with
supervisory

authority.

See OKEZIE

CHUKWUMERIJE,

CHOICE OF

LAW

IN INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 34-35 (1994); Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 16-18; Ole
Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, 2 ARB. INT'L 104, 107 (1986); Peter Nygh,
Choice of Forum and Laws in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, FORUM INTERNATIONALE, no.
24, 1997, at 13; Jaffrey A. Parmess, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further
Substance/ProcedureProblems under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 394-95, 399-401,
442 (1988); Michael Pryles, Choice of Law Issues in InternationalArbitration,63 ARB. 200 (1997).
But see Nurick, supra note 32, at 58 (declining to consider applicable law); Wetter & Preim, supra
note 67, at 333 ("[U]niversally, the allowability of costs and their allocation is regarded as a matter of
procedural law. . . .").
140. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 18 (quoting GARY B. BORN, INT'L COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 626 (1994)).

141. This may depend on the institutional rules and substantive law applicable to the arbitration.
In Ireland, parties "are free to agree on how the costs of the international commercial arbitration are to
be allocated and on the costs that are recoverable." Klaus Reichert, Ireland's New International
Commercial ArbitrationLaw, 11AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 379, 382 (2000). The national arbitration laws
of other countries, which might apply as the place of arbitration or provide the lex arbitri, may place
limitations on parties' capacity to agree on costs. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, §§ 60-61, sch.
1 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/section/60 (permitting tribunals to
make cost awards but providing that party agreements on costs can only be made after a dispute has
arisen and making that rule mandatory); Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 14-15; Vargo,
supra note 108, at 1578.
142. There may be reasons to disregard party choice. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat'l
Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2009); Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of Law Versus Party
Autonomy in InternationalArbitration, 14 J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1997, at 23-24, 40; Gotanda, Awarding
Costs, supra note 69, at 30.
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cost guidelines, or rules provided in an IIA's offer to arbitrate.143 The
treaty in Eureko provided that each party "shall bear the cost of the
arbitrator appointed by itself and its representation. The cost of the
chairman as well as the other costs will be borne in equal parts by the
Parties."44 To provide a degree of predictability, express agreements offer
a clear mandate and cap tribunal discretion.
The empirical reality of how often parties agree to costs in advance is
uncertain, and agreement may be a rare phenomenon. 145 While parties can
be intractable and unable to agree on costs, agreement is a theoretical
option. In Lemire v. Ukraine, the award embodying the settlement
agreement made each party responsible for its own costs.146 Without an
express choice, tribunals must consult the applicable arbitration rules to
assess how the rules supplement (or supplant) the otherwise applicable
law.
2. InstitutionalRules
Guidance on how costs must or may be allocated also comes from
institutional rules. This might be done through express incorporation in a
treaty. The 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), for
example, permits tribunals to award "costs and attorneys' fees in
accordance with this Treaty and the applicable arbitration rules."l 4 7 Cost
rules may also become implied terms of the parties' agreement,' 48 to
provide guidance to parties and arbitrators about addressing costs.1 49 yet

143. See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J.
232, 236-A1, 250-51, 255-66 (1995) (arguing that IIAs are offers to arbitrate-irrespective of privity
and a direct contractual relationship-that nevertheless permit qualifying investors to pursue direct
action against states).
144. Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland on
encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments, Neth-Pol., Sept. 7, 1992, 2240 U.N.T.S. 387,
399,400.
145. Bilhler, supra note 68, at 253.
146. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/1, Award Embodying Settlement
Agreement (Sept. 18, 2000), reprintedin 15 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 530, 537, 541 (2000),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Lemire-Award.pdf
147. Model Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of [Country] Concerning the Encouraged and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 34(1), Nov.
2004, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/l 17601.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S.
Model BIT]. As the U.S. is in the midst of considering changes to its Model BIT, it may be useful to
consider cost provisions in greater detail.
148. Susan D. Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and
Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP.L. 1, 49 (2000) (explaining how
institutional rules can become implied terms of arbitration agreements).
149. See Bilhler, supra note at 68, at 254 ("Ifthe parties have adopted a certain set of arbitration
rules, it must be assumed that such reference includes the provisions therein relating to the
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rules diverge on treatment of costs.s 0 For ICSID Convention cases, the
Convention, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, and the Financial Regulations
govern costs.' 5 ' Originally, the draft ICSID Convention provided parties
(1) would cover their own PLC and (2) bear TCE equally.152 As enacted,
the distinction was less precise and tribunals have general discretion to
assess costs. Article 61 provides:
(2) In the case of arbitration proceedings the Tribunal shall, except
as the parties otherwise agree, assess the expenses incurred by the
parties in connection with the proceedings, and shall decide how
and by whom those expenses, the fees and expenses of the members
of the Tribunal and the charges for the use of the facilities of the
Centre shall be paid.'53
Rather than only addressing costs at the end, the ICSID Arbitration Rules
permit tribunals to be proactive. Arbitration Rule 20 permits tribunals to
consult the parties as to "the manner in which the cost of the proceeding is
to be apportioned." 5 4 Although tribunals can assess costs and
proportionate allocation 55 "at any stage of the proceeding," final awards
must contain any decision regarding costs.15 6 The ICSID Rules do not

determination and allocation of costs."); see also Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int'l Corp., 322 F.3d
115, 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding arbitrability of attorney's fees and costs must be decided by an
arbitrator, because the parties agreed that "[a]ll disputes ... concerning or arising out of this
Agreement shall be referred to arbitration to the [ICC]," and ICC rules required an arbitrator to make
the initial determination of arbitrability).
150. Some rules do not distinguish between PLC and TCE; others do not expressly permit party
autonomy; others vary in what standards tribunals use to decide costs. See infra notes 153, 158, 16163, 165-69 and accompanying text.
151. ICSID Convention, supra note 58. The ICSID Financial Regulations refer to "direct costs of
individual proceedings," which involve the fees and expenses of arbitrators. ICSID, FINANCIAL
REGULATION 15, compiled in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, at 62 (2006), available

at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR
152.

English-final.pdf.

CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 112 (2001); see also

Nurick, supra note 32, at 59-60 ("[T]here was extensive debate on the subject of costs . . . . All
[propoals] were rejected in favor of giving the tribunal discretion in cost allocation . . . .").
153. ICSID Convention, supra note 58, art. 61; ICSID, FINANCIAL REGULATION 14, compiled in
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, at 60 (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR English-final.pdf. Article 61(2) arguably demarcates: (1)
expenses incurred by parties, (2) tribunal expenses, and (3) ICSID's charges. SCHREUER, supra note
152, at 1222-23; see also LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 93 (2004).
154. ICSID, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, Rule 20(1)(j), compiled in
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES, at 99 (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES].
155. Id. art. 28(l).
156. Id. art. 27(2).
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provide standards that guide tribunals about how to exercise their
authority.s 7 ICSID's Additional Facility Rules have a similar approach.
The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, generally used for ad hoc
arbitration, provide specific rules about compensable costs.159 In any
award, regardless of the phase of the case, the 1976 Rules permit an award
on costs. 160 They demarcate costs related to TCE'6 1 as well as the "costs
for legal representation and assistance of the successful party." 62 The
1976 UNCITRAL Rules provide tribunals guided discretion about how to
allocate TCE by using a "loser-pays" approach that takes into account "the
circumstances of the case." 6 3 The recent 2010 revisions to the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have a similar demarcation in different
types of costs, namely, the costs of the tribunal and institution as well as
the parties' own legal fees.IM PLC decisions, in contrast, offer tribunals
more discretion to consider "the circumstances" and reasonableness.16 5

157. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supranote 69, at 23.
158. The Additional Facility Rules require tribunals to consult the parties on cost allocation and
provide cost decisions in the award but do not provide standards for cost allocation. ICSID,
ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, at 58, 67, 69 (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
staticfiles/Facility/AFR English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID/AF RULES]. ICSID fact-finding and
conciliation rules require that fees from third-party neutrals and ICSID be "bome equally by the
parties" and make each party responsible for "any other expenses it incurs." ICSID/AF RULES 22, 42.
159. 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 71.
160. See id arts. 32, 38 (providing the tribunal authority "to make interim, interlocutory, or partial
awards" and stating that the tribunal "shall fix the costs of arbitration in its award"). The 2010 rules
express that the tribunal "shall in the final award or, if it deems appropriate, in any other award,
determine any amount that a party may have to pay to another party as a result of the decision on
allocation of costs." U.N. Comm'n Int'l Trade [UNCITRAL], Arbitration Rules, art. 42(2) (2010),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/revisedarb-rules-revised20 10-e.pdf [hereinafter 2010 UNCITRAL Rules].
161. 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 71, art. 38 ("The term 'costs' includes only: (a) The fees
of the arbitral tribunal to be stated separately as to each arbitrator and to be fixed by the tribunal itself
in accordance with article 39; (b) The travel and other expenses incurred by the arbitrators; (c) The
costs of expert advice and of other assistance required by the arbitral tribunal; (d) The travel and other
expenses of witnesses to the extent such expenses are approved by the arbitral tribunal; . . . [and] (f)
Any fees and expenses of the appointing authority as well as the expenses of the Secretary-General of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.").
162. Id. art. 38 ("(e) The costs for legal representation and assistance of the successful party if
such costs were claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal
determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable.").
163. Id. art.40(l).
164. 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 160, arts. 40-41.
165. 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 71, art. 40(2). The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules are
somewhat similar and require costs "shall in principle be bome by the unsuccessful party" and that the
tribunal can apportion costs as it determines is "reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of
the case." 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 160, art. 42. They also, however, require separate
accountings for arbitrators, reasonableness for arbitrator fees, and arbitrators "inform[ing] the parties
as to how it proposes to determine its fees and expenses." Id. art. 41.
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The SCC makes clear demarcations between TCE and PLC,16 6 permits
parties to retain autonomy about how costs are apportioned, and provides
tribunals with limited guidance on allocating costs. For the last element,
SCC Rules permit the tribunal to decide TCE and PLC "having regard to
the outcome of the case and other relevant circumstances."' 6 7 The SCC
neither particularizes how to exercise discretion nor suggests
circumstances relevant to cost decisions. Other major arbitral institutions,
like the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)16 and the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),169 have somewhat similar
approaches.
3. National Laws
Recognizing that there is no international convention on the treatment
of costs in investment treaty arbitration,'7 the next key source is national
law.'71 National laws can grant arbitrators authority to address
international arbitration costs 72 and run the gamut of cost approaches. One

166. Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), Arbitration Rules, art. 43 (2007), available at
http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/2/21686/2007 arbitration-rules eng.pdf [hereinafter SCC
Rules] (providing that "Costs of the Arbitration" include tribunal and institutional fees and describing
separate rules for party costs, which can include "any reasonable costs incurred by another party,
including costs for legal representation").
167. Id. arts. 43(5), 44.
168. Although the LCIA has highly detailed cost rules, none of the cases in the data set used them.
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Arbitration Rules, art. 28.2-28.4 (1998), available
at http://www.1cia.org/Dispute-ResolutionServices/LCIA_Arbitration Rules.aspx [hereinafter LCIA
Rules].
169. Similar to ICSID, the ICC fails to clarify how tribunals should exercise their discretion.
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Rules of Arbitration (1998), available at http://www.
iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules-arb english.pdf [hereinafter ICC Rules]; W.
LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 91-96 (3d ed.

2000) ("Rules authorize the arbitral tribunal to decide that 'costs follow the event' [but] they do not
compel this solution"); see also ICC Rules, supra, art. 31; Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supranote 28,
at 112 (suggesting the ICC approach to costs "do[es] not differ substantially" from ICSID).
170. The ICSID Convention is the only exception, but ICSID Convention cost-shifting rules only
apply via party agreement through consent where: (1) states assent to ICSID-Convention arbitration,
and (2) investors elect this form.
171. This national law may apply by virtue of: (1) the place of arbitration (i.e. lex arbitri
applicable to the arbitration), or (2) the law that may form part of the substantive law applicable to the
agreement to arbitration. If these are different, the applicable law is a complex question beyond the
scope of this Article.
172. See, e.g., John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Damages under the UnitedNations Convention on the
InternationalSale of Goods: A Matter of Interpretation, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 95, 132 n.168 (2005)
(collecting the law of various countries on issues of cost shifting in international commercial
arbitration); Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 5-8. A comprehensive comparative assessment of
national law is beyond the scope of this Article, yet it is prudent to offer a flavor of the orientation as,
where it applies, national law can affect cost decisions when: (1) providing supplementary provisions
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option is silence on costs, exemplified by the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration.'
Another option is unfettered
discretion. Neither Swiss Private International Law nor the French New
Code of Civil Procedure guides or restrains arbitrators' approach to
costs.174 Some countries, like Germany 75 and England,' 76 give more
guidance but tend to prefer a "loser-pays" approach. At the other end of
the spectrum, the U.S. and Japan' 77 follow the "pay-your-own-way"
model.
4. InternationalCase Law
The Statute of the International Court of Justice suggests other relevant
authority on costs,"7 including decisions of international judicial bodies. 7 9

where the parties' arbitration agreement or arbitration rules (if any) are silent on costs, (2) arbitrators
consult the parties' home jurisdictions to consider party expectations, and (3) the law of the place of
arbitration that may trump party agreement as in Reliastar.See Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC
Nat'l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding, despite party agreement to split costs, to shift
costs to sanction bad-faith behavior); Btthler, supra note 68, at 256 (describing the role of party
expectation from national law).
173. The 1985 Model Law did not address costs, perhaps given normative variations. UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17/Annex I (June 21, 1985),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf; see also
UNCITRAL First Working Group Report, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/460,
106-13 (Apr. 6, 1999)
(suggesting costs were an inappropriate subject for the Model Law); PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 356-57

(2d ed. 2005) ("[W]ide support was expressed for the view that costs should not be dealt with in the
text.. . .[I]t was preferred that the issue be left to the individual states."). The 2006 Model Law did not
address assessment or apportionment of PLC or TCE. UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, art. 17G, U.N. Sales No.

E.08.V.4 (2008).
174. Bilhler, supra note 68, at 253-54.
175. BORGERLICHEs GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIvIL CODE], Jan. 1, 1998, b. X, c. VI, ZPO, § 1057(1)
(Ger.), translatedin Georges R. Delaume, Germany: Act on the Reform of the Law Relating to Arbitral
Proceedings, 37 1.L.M. 790 (1998) (giving tribunals discretion to allocate costs but requiring them to
"take into account consideration of the circumstances of the case, in particular the outcome"); see also
Guido Santiago Tawil & Rafael Mariano Manovil, Argentina, 2005 INT'L COMP. LEGAL GUIDE TO:
INT'L ARB. 40, 43, available at http://www.bomchil.com/cas/articulos/2005-01 -01 -IntlArbitration.pdf
(describing the Argentine approach to costs as "arbitrators may award fees and costs .... The general
principle is that the winning party is entitled to recover its fees and costs as regulated in the law, which
basically provides for fees as a percentage of the award.").
176. The English Arbitration Act gives tribunals the power to award costs "on the general
principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the
circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs." English Arbitration
Act, 1996, § 61(2), c. 23, sch. I (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/
section/60.
177. See supra note 128.
178. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1946, 59 Stat. 1055, 8
U.N.T.S. 993.
179. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1611-12 nn.434-37.
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This Article focuses on two international law entities with developed case
law, namely the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).
IUSCT's mandate to resolve disputes related to investors and states has
drawn upon the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules (in a slightly modified form) to
resolve disputes 80 and address costs and cost shifting.'8 ' As Iran and the
U.S. pay TCE, the key cost issues relate to PLC and limited administrative
expenses. 182 The rules presume that the unsuccessful party, in principle,
will bear administrative costs, but the tribunal will "tak[e] into account the
circumstances of the case" to determine what apportionment is
reasonable.183 Irrespective of the rules' default preference for the "loserpays" approach, part of the IUSCT's calculation of reasonableness also
involves party conduct. The IUSCT has shifted costs to make winners pay,
particularly in cases involving process abuse or misuse. While this Article
does not provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the IUSCT,184
IUSCT has focused upon inhibiting dilatory tactics, promoting compliance
with tribunal decisions, or avoiding inappropriate conduct.' 85 The net

180.

ALAN

REDFERN,

MARTIN

HUNTER

&

MURRAY

SMITH,

LAW AND

PRACTICE OF

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 50-51 (2d ed. 1991) (describing history of the IUSCT);
Background Information, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.org/backgroundenglish.html (last visited on Feb. 27, 2011).
181. See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL 16-20, 760-62 (1998) (referring to modified use of UNCITRAL Rules for costs).
182. Article 38(c) refers to the costs for "legal representation and assistance" to the extent that
they are "reasonable." Articles 38(a),(b) refer to administrative costs-for experts and other
witnesses-requested by the tribunal. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Tribunal Rules of Procedure art. 38,
May 3, 1983, available at http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-rules.pdf
183. Id. art. 40.
184. An article analyzing one year of tribunal cost decisions (n-41) found that only ten awards
adjusted costs and "[m]ost often, no analysis is offered to explain the award or denial of costs."
Nurick, supranote 32, at 65.
185. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 818. Reasonable costs might depend upon party
behavior, the amount at stake, and the degree of success. In Behring, a failure to respond to tribunal
orders justified an award of US$60,000. Behring Int'l Inc. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran Air Force et al., 27
IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 218 (1991). In Sylvania, where an investor prevailed on a central contract
claim against Iran but lost on other contract issues, the Tribunal required Iran to pay Sylvania's
"reasonable" US$50,000 in legal fees given that the case "involve[d] factual and legal issues that
[we]re neither of extreme nor of quite ordinary complexity in comparison to other cases before the
Tribunal." Sylvania Technical Sys., Inc. v. Iran, 8 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIm. REP. 298, 323-24 (1985).
Judge Holtzman articulated specific factors to guide cost assessments: (1) whether costs were claimed;
(2) whether lawyers were necessary in light of the issues of fact and law at stake and existing
international practice; (3) whether costs were reasonable given the time spent, case complexity, and
from where the lawyers originated; and (4) the circumstances of the case, including relative success.
Id. at 329, 332-36 (asserting reasonable costs were US$265,000); see also Nurick, supra note 32, at
66-68.
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effect suggests that, as a practical matter, the IUSCT employs a "factordependent" approach.
The ICJ approach is less about discretion and more about precision.
The rule itself is concise: "Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each
party shall bear its own costs." 1 86 For litigation among states, the rule
appears to prefer the "pay-your-own-way" approach, although tribunals
retain a degree of discretion. The ICJ could exercise this discretion to
foster policy goals such as seeking indemnification of parties where states
have acted wrongfully. 1 7
5. Sources of Soft Law and Practice

Sources of law may also be relevant to cost analyses, such as the
commentary of academics, international practice, and other arbitral
awards.188 Commentators offer guidance via scholarship related to
international commercial arbitration, 89 ICSID arbitration, 190 and investorstate arbitration.191 As the research was not designed to investigate ITA
disputes and costs on a holistic basis, it is a useful starting point for future
inquiry. Nevertheless, for the targeted objective of studying ITA costs,
given concerns of external validity, it is useful to identify methodological
limitations related to: (1) under-inclusivity,1 92 (2) over-inclusivity,' 93 (3)
temporal gaps, 19 4 (4) failure to explain methodology,' 95 and (5) sample

186. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supranote 178, art. 64.
187. Draft Articles on State Responsibility art. 42(1), Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 48th Sess.,
May 6-July 26, 1996, at 63, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996),
reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1; see also The
Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgement, 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) ("[A]s
far as possible, [reparation must] wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if the act had not been committed.").
188. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1611-12 nn.434-42 (discussing standards
promulgated by the ICJ and possible application to treaty arbitration).
189. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69.
190. Nurick, supranote 32.
191. Ben Hamida, supra note 20; Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28.
192. Professor Ben Hamida's analysis is underinclusive and focuses only on awards rendered
against the investor rather than those against the investor and the state. Ben Hamida, supra note 20;
see also MEG N. KINNEAR ET AL., INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO

NAFTA, art. 1135 (2006) (looking systematically at cost awards for NAFTA arbitrations-not ITA
generally).
193. See Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 112-24 (providing overinclusive analysis
that includes cases arising under investment treaties as well as investor-state disputes from traditional
commercial agreements); see also Nurick, supra note 32, at 58 (same); UNCTAD, ISDS, supra note 1,
at 3-9 (failing to offer methodology and referring to a US$824 million case, CSOB v. Slovak Republic,
when the compensation was not based upon breach of an IIA).
194. Nurick, supra note 32, at 60-64 (referring to eight different ICSID cases-AINE, LETCO,
Klockner, Amco, Benvenuti, AGIP, AAPL, and SOABI-but only AAPL arose under an investment
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bias.196 The last aspect is noteworthy as cognitive biasesl 9 7 create a
possibility of inadvertently selecting unrepresentative samples or examples
that do not reflect plausible counternarratives.' 98 Using data and
hypotheses directed toward ITA, this research attempts to address
methodological differences and explore the treatment of cost in ITA.
.

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Costs in ITA do not appear to be completely rationalized. It is not clear
that cost decisions follow a predictable pattern, rely on legal authority, or
use consistent rationales. There has been no empirical research about how
and why tribunals in ITA make cost determinations. War stories and

treaty).
195. Compare Ben Hamida, supra note 20 (failing to explain data selection process and to define
certain terms), and Goldstein, supra note 126, at 10 nn.21-25 (discussing an "informal survey"
without disclosing methodology), and Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30 (failing to provide
underlying data or methodology), and Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 673 (failing to identify
the sample and unit of analysis), with Franck, Empiricism, supra note 8, at 786-88 (gathering sources
to articulate good social science practices).
196. See Bilhler, supra note 68, at 261 (using potentially unrepresentative sample); Tai-Heng
Cheng & Robert Trisotto, Reasons and Reasoning in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 409, 427-29 (2009) (using Metalclad to analyze ITA costs); Goldstein, supra
note 126, at 5, 10 nn.21-25 (describing "an overall sense that law and practice are moving in the
direction of more generous awards of legal costs to deserving prevailing parties," citing two cases and
no counter-points); Salacuse, supra note 59, at 142-43 (failing to explain sample selection); Schill,
Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 659 (stating that tribunal reasoning on costs is scarce and only citing
Metalclad).
197. Cognitive biases include: (1) confirmation bias, namely, the tendency to search for and
interpret information in a way that confirms one's perceptions; (2) expectation bias, namely,
publishing information that agrees with expected outcomes and downgrading data that appear in
conflict with one's expectations; (3) selective perception, namely, the tendency for expectations to
affect perceptions; (4) the projection bias, namely, the tendency to assume unconsciously that others
share similar thoughts, beliefs, or positions; and (5) blind spot bias, namely, the tendency to not
compensate for one's own cognitive biases. See, e.g., SCoTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT

AND DECISION MAKING (1993); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, CategoricallyBiased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Justin Kruger &
David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own
Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1121 (1999);
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:
A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money:
The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among ProfessionalAthletes, 71 BROOK. L.
REv. 1459, 1468-81 (2006).
198. See Peterson & Gallus, supra note 82, at 72 (stating, without comprehensive data, that "BIT
disputes often last several years, in which time, lawyer, arbitrator and institutional fees can amount to
several million dollars" but offering a useful baseline for future empirical analysis (footnote omitted));
Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at 30 ("An informal survey indicates that many North American
arbitrators are overly influenced by litigation precedents and only award full legal fees and other party
expenses on rare occasions. At the same time, there is anecdotal evidence that some of the most
experienced intemational arbitrators from the United States commonly award legal fees . . . .").
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related generalizations are insufficient, as it can be unclear whether these
instances are representative of the larger whole. Moreover,
uncontextualized examples do not permit parties to anticipate where,
when, why, and how tribunals will use and apply their authority to shift
costs. The information void prevents parties from accurately calculating
dispute resolution risk. This gap adversely affects parties' capacity to
make informed decisions about how to conduct their dispute resolution
process, which might involve basic choices such as the decision to initiate
arbitration, raise particular arguments, or engage in other forms of dispute
resolution. The aim of this research is to begin providing systematic
information of the international practice to promote appropriate doctrinal
and normative choices about the use of investment treaty arbitration.
A. Methodology
This research used existing archival data collected according to
previously described methods' 99 to explore PLC and TCE. The data came
from the population of 102 investment treaty awards from 82 different
cases that were publicly available before June 1, 2006. As identified in
previous literature and this Article, there are inevitable limitations that
derive from the data collection process.2 00
Nevertheless, using this data-which is the only data set known to the
author that describes the process of data selection, coding, and inter-coder
reliability assessmentS201-the objective of this quantitative research was
to assess hypotheses about cost amounts, cost allocations, justifications for
cost determinations, and other associated costs variables. The research
explores three questions using a combination of descriptive and
associative modalities. First, the research considers whether there is one
uniform approach for cost determinations. It then explores the actual
decisions, dollar amounts involved in PLC and TCE awards, and
percentage of shifts for PLC and TCE. It also explores whether a shift of
either PLC or TCE is reliably associated with winning an ITA dispute.
Second, the research considers the extent of the justification for cost
decisions by exploring (1) whether there is any rationalization for the
decision, (2) what legal authority (if any) is used to justify the decision,
199. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 24, 52; see also Codebook [hereinafter
Codebook]. The largest sub-segment of the data set was from ICSID awards (n=60), whereas there
were also awards from the SCC (n=5) and ad hoc awards (n=17). Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra
note 1, at 38-41.
200. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1; infra notes 327-33.
201. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 16-23.
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and (3) what rationale (if any) is relied upon to explain the decision. Third,
the research assesses links to cost variables and considers whether there
were reliable links between (1) PLC and TCE outcomes, (2) amounts
claimed and TCE, and (3) amounts awarded and TCE.
B. Scope of Cost Decisions
Out of the 102 total awards in the pre-2007 population analyzed, eighty
awards involved some analysis of PLC, TCE, or possibly both types of
costs. 20 2 Out of the 102 awards, there were fifty nonfinal awards, and of
those nonfinal awards, nineteen were silent on the issue of costs, twentysix reserved cost decisions for the future, and five made substantive cost
determinations. Out of the 102 awards, there were fifty-two final awards,
and of those awards, three lacked decisions on costs, and forty-nine made
substantive cost decisions. See Table 1.
TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF TREATMENT OF COSTS IN ARBITRATION
AWARDS AND AwARD FINALITY
Treatment of Costs

Award Finality
NonfinalAward
FinalAward

Total

Substantive
Decision Made
5

No Costs
Reference
19

Cost Decision
Reserved
26

3

0

49

52

22

26

54

102

Total
50

202. Of the eighty awards, approximately fifty contained TCE decisions, and a subset (n-17)
quantified TCE. Of the same eighty awards, fifty-four contained PLC decisions, and a subset (n= 11)
quantified PLC shift. Id. at 68-69. Of the original 102 awards, the remaining twenty-two did not refer
to, reserve, or make a substantive determination of costs. See Codebook at 10 (defining "Treatment of
Costs").
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Although tribunals made substantive cost determinations in nonfinal
awards, they did so in a limited number of cases.203 The lack of substantive
cost decisions in the nonfinal awards was striking. While there may be
practical reasons for failing to issue a cost decision at an early stage,204
tribunals were not doctrinally prohibited from making cost determinations
before a final award.
The provision of early cost decisions could, however, provide useful
guidance to the parties about the ultimate cost implications, insights for
ongoing settlement opportunities, and feedback for modulating parties'
tactical choices during arbitration. This might include, for example, a
statement that certain activities-such as success on aspects of a claim,
deleterious tactics, or "best practices" for lawyer conduct-may result in
particular consequences. Likewise, it might involve clarifying whether, in
accordance with the applicable law, the tribunal will follow a "loser-pays,"
"pay-your-own-way," or "factor-dependent" model. 20 5 By providing
advance guidance to parties about the possible pay-off matrix for their
behavior, although it would not guarantee constructive conduct, tribunals
could create incentives for productive and efficient party activity. The gap
suggests that arbitral tribunals may be missing a critical opportunity to
provide incentives to encourage appropriate behavior during the dispute
resolution process, give parties information for their dispute resolution risk
calculus, manage expectations, and enhance legitimacy by being clear
about when, where, why, and how they will exercise their adjudicative
discretion.

203. The nonfinal awards were Wena, UPS, Eureko, Ethyl, and CME. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of
Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005), reprinted in 12 ICSID REP. 335
(2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf;
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award (Sept. 13, 2001), reprinted in 9 ICSID
REP. 121 (2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf; United
Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (NAFTA Ch. 11 Consolidation Trib.
2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/UPS-Jurisdiction.pdf; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award on Merits (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896
(2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Wena-2000-final.pdf; Ethyl Corp. v. Canada,
Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998), available at
http://Ita.law.uvic.cal documents/EthylOAward.pdf
204. Tribunals may find it easier to assess costs in the final award because the parties' and
tribunal's costs are fixed and the tribunal has fulfilled its obligations of impartiality.
205. The tribunal may not, for example, know who the "loser" is or be able to estimate the parties'
"relative success" until the final determination. Nevertheless, tribunals might offer guidance to
parties-even in a jurisdictional award-regarding how behavior, success, or other factors (either
related to the jurisdiction or other phases) may affect the ultimate treatment of costs. Given the
doctrinal ambiguity and discretion, advance notice can promote incremental management of party
expectation and related behavior.
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C. Hypothesis 1: Descriptive Scope of Cost Decisions
1. Substantive Outcomes ofPLC and TCE
One of the controversial areas in the literature is whether there is a
"traditional" approach to cost shifting and, if so, what format that
approach follows.2 06 As ITA is a hybrid of public international law
disputes (where two states litigate on the basis of the "pay-your-own-way"
approach) and commercial arbitration involving private parties (arguably
following a "loser-pays" or "factor-dependent" approach), the research
hypothesis was that tribunals would vary in how they addressed costs.
Overall, the data supported the hypothesis that tribunals diverged in
their approach to costs. There were seven different theoretical
permutations for allocating PLC and TCE, and tribunals used nearly every
one. While there was no one uniform approach to cost allocation in the
pre-2007 data set, certain themes emerged suggesting some systemic
balance in cost awards.
First, the majority of awards did not involve either a shift in PLC costs
or a deviation from the baseline that parties equally shared TCE (n=33).
This generally occurred. irrespective of which party ultimately won.
Second, there were equivalent numbers of cases shifting both PLC and
TCE to claimants (n=6) or respondents (n=6). Third, in those few cases
where tribunals only shifted TCE, the claimants and respondents were
successful in reasonably equal measure. See Table 2.

206. See supranotes 103-28.
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TABLE 2: AWARDS MAKING COST DECISIONS ON PLC AND TCE AS A
FUNCTION OF THE ULTIMATE WINNER (N=52)

Cost Decisions

Number of Ultimate Winner:
Awards
Substantive Result

ClaimantPays PLC Shift
and more than 50% of TCE

6

Respondent wins=5207
Nonfinal awards=1

Respondent Pays PLC Shift
and more than 50% of TCE

6208

Claimant wins=4 209
Nonfinal awards=2

33

Claimant wins=12
Respondent wins=19
Settlements=2

No PLC Shift
but Claimantpays more than 50% of TCE

2

Respondent wins=2

No PLC Shift
but Respondent pays more than 50% of TCE

4

Claimant wins=3
Respondent wins= 1

ClaimantPays PLC Shift
and TCE sharedEqually

0

Not Applicable

Respondent Pays PLCShift
and TCE sharedEqually

1

Claimant wins= 1

No PLC Shift
and TCE Shared Equally

207. Ethyl Corp. v. Canadawas a jurisdictional award that did not involve a final determination of
the merits of the treaty claim but did provide a determination on costs. Ethyl Corp., 38 I.L.M. at 708.
208. Wena Hotels v. Egypt was coded as only involving a PLC decision in an award with a
Claimant win, but is referred to here as a case involving both PLC and TCE decisions for the sake of
convenience. Wena Hotels Ltd., 41 I.L.M. at 896.
209. The two "nonfinal" awards both involved a determination on the merits in favor of the
claimant that the respondent had breached the relevant IIA; but as there was not yet a damage award to
specify the degree of loss, the claims were ongoing and could not be coded as an "Ultimate Win." See
Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005), reprinted
in 12 ICSID REP. 335 (2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Eureko-PartialAward
andDissenting Opinion.pdf; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award (Sept. 13,
2001), reprinted in 9 ICSID REP. 121 (2006), availableat http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/CME-2001
PartialAward.pdf; infra note 294 (defining that variable).
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The initial analyses from the pre-2007 data contradicted certain
existing academic commentary 210 about the existence of a "traditional" or
"universal" approach to ITA costs. There was variation in the population,
and the variation was not applied in an asymmetric manner. This suggests
that stakeholders should be aware that there is more than one way in which
tribunals can and will allocate costs. It also suggests that, while the "payyour-own-way" baseline was dominant, future analysis should consider
whether additional data exhibits enhanced variation and suggests a
different baseline (i.e., a "loser-pays" or "factor-dependent" approach).2 1'
2. TCE and PLC in Dollar Values
There are various suggestions about the scope of costs and their
purported allocations in some international arbitrations. Some suggest that
because there are "large amounts of money involved,"2 12 costs are
"prohibitive" or "practically limit[] access" unless investors are "very
wealthy humans or [] multinational enterprises."2 13 At a recent conference,
Professor Philippe Sands observed that legal costs arising in investment
arbitration "can be jaw dropping in terms of amount, having regard to the
nature and scope of the issues and proceedings involved." 2 14 Dean

210. See supra notes 125-26.
211. Although this analysis is based on pre-2007 data, later data does not appear to be markedly
different from this baseline. See Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 1, 12-14 (describing similar
permutations in cost awards from 2008-2009 where the "pay-your-own-way" approach dominates);
David Smith, Note, Shifting Sands: Cost-and-FeeAllocation in InternationalInvestment Arbitration,
51 VA. J. INT'L L. 749, 755-56 (2010) [hereinafter Smith, Shifting Sands] (replicating aspects of this
research with 2008-2009 data from cost decisions in final awards and revealing similar results,
particularly with regard to some variability in cost shifting but with a majority of cases resulting in no
shift of costs). But see Uzma Balkiss Sulaiman, New ICSID Award States Rule on Costs "May be
Changing," GLOBAL ARB. REV., Oct. 16, 2009 ("[I]nvestment tribunals are indeed looking at the
question of costs more seriously, and perhaps using a loser-pays rule more often . . . ."); see also EDF
(Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award and Dissenting Opinion (Oct. 8, 2009),
availableat http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/EDFAwardandDissent.pdf (finding for the majority that a
"loser-pays" approach is "growing [in] application to investment arbitration" and having the dissent
articulate that "some recent ICSID cases have shown a certain tendency to move in the direction of
commercial arbitration in assessing costs, though it is too soon to know whether a different approach
may be taking hold" and preferring the "pay-your-own-way" approach).
212. Nurick, supranote 32, at 57.
213. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 37, at 138; see also Gottwald, supra note 70, at 274
("Due to a lack of relevant legal expertise within their own government ministries, many developing
nations are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms at a cost of millions per year.
Meanwhile, those who cannot afford outside counsel face scattered, incomplete sources of precedent
and have nowhere to turn for affordable legal assistance." (footnote omitted)); cf REED ET AL., supra
note 153, at 91-93 (suggesting, at ICSID, the costs of TCE are low, but PLC is high).
214. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Keynote Address at University of Sydney Law School International
Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration Conference, Conflict and Conflicts: Challenges and Prospects
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Gotanda meanwhile refers to cases with total costs (i.e., complete
information on PLC and TCE) in the order of US$21 million and US$19
million.215 In another instance, commentators suggested US$1.35 million
in arbitrator fees denied access to justice "because investors must pay half
of the cost of an investment arbitration, and the cost is prohibitive . . . [and

this] practically limits access to those investors who have a significant
monetary interest in the outcome of a dispute."216
The data suggests that, although not inconsequential, tribunal costs
were not necessarily exorbitant. The average TCE was US$581,333. The
minimum was US$31,088 and maximum was US$1,500,000 (n=17;
SD=512,553). TCE was paid, on average, in reasonably equivalent
amounts by investors (US$289,753) and states (US$291,580).217 Paying
approximately US$600,000 for a tribunal is different from paying a
minimal filing fee of under US$500 in a national court 218 but may
arguably be cheaper since (1) defenses of sovereign immunity may be
available in national courts but not treaty arbitration, (2) there may be
concerns with the independence and integrity of the judiciary, and (3)
enforcement of arbitration awards is doctrinally streamlined as compared
to court judgments.
The average PLC shift was in the order of US$655,407. The minimum
was US$22,200 and the maximum was US$2,989,424 (n=l;
SD=873,178). 2 19 This meant, beyond a party's own legal expenses and the
risk of losing a case, parties arguably risked an additional US$1.2 million
(i.e., possibly paying for 100% of the tribunal and a portion of the other

for Investment Treaty Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/events/
2010/Feb/ITAbrochureFebl0_for WEB.pdf.
215. Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 5; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/24, Award, %310-12 (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Plama
BulgariaAward.pdf; see also Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2-3 ("It is not uncommon for
such [commercial arbitration] costs to run into millions of dollars, sometimes even exceeding the
amount in dispute." (footnote omitted)).
216. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 37, at 138 (footnotes omitted); see supra note 81
(discussing unpublished UNCTAD data related to the possible scope of costs for certain states).
217. For Claimant's TCE, the standard deviation was 371,382; and for Respondent's TCE, the
standard deviation was 305,618.
218. The filing fee in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York is
US$350. Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 3; Representing Yourself in FederalCourt, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrulesprose.php?prose=fees (last visited Mar. 6,
2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006).
219. The data was limited given the standard deviation and size of the pre-2007 then-known
population. One hypothesis is that PLC amounts against investors was higher as states were required to
engage in greater effort to particularize their costs in affidavits as there were not hourly bills since
government lawyers may not have been paid by the hour. This may not hold true if private law firms
represented states. See also infra notes 224-34 (discussing limitations of data).
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side's lawyers). Considering that this is more than 10% of the average
amount awarded, these costs were not irrelevant, particularly when
compared to the US$194,000 average costs for just one side's PLC in U.S.
domestic antitrust litigation. 22 0 The combined costs-namely, paying for
both a tribunal and one's own legal fees, particularly as this is the most
prevalent baseline-may prove troubling. It suggests that where attorney's
fees and tribunal costs exceed the possible damages (i.e., for smaller
investments), those fiscal costs may deter investors with legitimate claims
of international law violations from arbitrating their claims. In other
words, cost decisions can be critical to assessing the utility of arbitration
and its efficacy in promoting access to justice and the rule of law.
3. PercentageofPLC and TCE Allocation
Although some have suggested PLC awards in international
commercial arbitration are 1/3 of party costs, 221 the data did not support
that hypothesis in investment arbitration. For awards where PLC shifts
(n=8) were available, there were a range of shifts. None of the awards
reflected a 33% shift. Rather, three awards contained a 100% shift,
whereas the remaining awards shifted PLC 80%, 76%, 75%, 15.4%, and
13.5%. While there was missing data, the existing data showed a broad
range of PLC shifts, which suggests an approach more consistent with the
"factor-dependent" approach. See Table 3.
TCE allocations also varied. The largest number of awards (n=34) was
concentrated on a 50%/50% split of costs, which was consistent with the
"pay-your-own-way" approach. A small cluster contained a 100%/0% split
in favor of the claimant TCE (n=4) and similar 100%/-0% split in favor of
the respondent (n=4). There is a degree of balance for whether investors or
states paid more than 50% of the TCE. Respondents contributed more than
50% to TCE in only nine awards, and investors contributed more than
50% in six awards. See Table 3.
220. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis ofPrivateAntitrust Litigation,
74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1012-14 (1986) (collecting data and finding average settlements were
US$1,244,000, but a party's mean costs were US$194,000 (median=US$59,000) in 1984 dollars); see
also Robert T. Duffy, Awards of Costs to Taxpayers: A Reform Proposalfor Section 7430, 48 TAX
LAW. 937, 944-45 (1995) (finding tax litigation costs between 1982 and 1992 averaged US$220,000
annually or US$6,300 per award).
221. Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 292-93.
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TABLE 3: PERCENTAGES OF COST SHIFTING FOR PLC AND TCE FOR THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF AWARDS (N= 102)

Frequency

Valid PercentofA wards
with Available Data

1
1
1

12.5
12.5
12.5

76%

1

12.5

80%
100%

1
3

12.5
37.5

0%
27%

4
1

8.0
2.0

33%

Cost Issue
Percentage of PLC Shift (n=8) 222
13.5%
15.4%
75%

Percentage of Claimant
Responsibility for TCE (n=50) 223

1

2.0

40%
42%
45%
50%
67%

1
1
1
34
1

2.0
2.0
2.0
68.0
2.0

75%

1

2.0

90%
100%

1
4

2.0
8.0

It would be remiss not to observe that the data related to quantified
dollar values and percentages were based upon a small subset of the
overall data set. Out of the 102 awards in the eighty-two different cases in
the dataset, 224 twenty-one awards (in twenty different cases) offered
express quantification for one or more of the following: (1) percentage of a
PLC shift, (2) dollar value of the PLC shift, (3) dollar value of claimant
TCE contribution, and (4) dollar value of respondent TCE contribution. 2 25

222. In ninety-four awards, this data was unavailable.
223. In fifty-two awards, this data was unavailable. This data reflected the claimant percentage of
responsibility; the respondent's percentage was the reverse (100%-Claimant%).
224. This set of 102 awards includes fmal (n=52) and nonfinal cases (n=50).
225. This subset (n=21) also includes eight awards addressing the percentage shift of PLC, eleven
awards providing the amount of PLC shifted, and seventeen awards providing the amount of TCE to
be paid by both the investor and state. Because certain awards contained multiple, but not all of these
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Only five cases had awards with full details for all four variables.226 Given
the missing data within the existing data set, inferences should be made
with caution, and any normative recommendations based upon the results
must recognize the inherent limitations and need for replication before
making definitive statements. There were key aspects of the subset of
cases that have quantitative data on PLC or TCE similar to the overall data
set, such as the reasonably equivalent win rates,227 the variation in the pool
of arbitrators,228 and the similarity in the development background of the
investorS229 and the respondent state. 230 There were, however, a few facial
differences in the subset, including (1) underlying HAs tended to involve
the United States and/or European states, particularly states from Eastern
Europe; 231 (2) awards tended not to be rendered by ICSID tribunals; 2 32 (3)

data points, in total there were twenty-one awards (out of a total of 102 in the data set, fifty-two of
which were final awards). There were, however, fifty awards that provided information about the
percentages of allocating TCE among the investor and state. Eureko v. Poland only contained
information about the degree of PLC shift. CME v. Czech Republic also contained two different cost
awards.
226. This included data on: (1) percent of PLC shift, (2) amount of PLC shifted, (3) percent of
TCE allocation for claimant and respondent, and (4) amount of TCE allocation. But see supra note 202
(describing the broader scope of ITA cost data in the data set).
227. The set of final awards has thirty respondent wins (57.7%), twenty claimant wins (38.5%),
and two settlement agreements (3.8%). Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 49-51, 84. The
subset of costs had seven respondent wins (33.3%), twelve claimant wins (57.7%), and two awards
with system-missing data (9.5%).
228. For final awards, most wing-arbitrators had a single appointment, whereas a small group had
two, three, or-in the case of one chair-five appointments. See Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra
note 1, at 77-79 (discussing arbitrator pool). In the subset of costs awards, for the first arbitrator, only
one arbitrator had two appointments in multiple awards (Schwebel: CME v. Czech Republic and
Eureko v. Poland); the remaining arbitrators had one appointment. For the second arbitrator, only one
(Ivan Zykin: CME v. Czech Republic) appeared in two awards, and those two awards involved one
case. All the remaining wing-arbitrators had a single appointment. The situation of the Chair was the
same (i.e., Wolfgang Kilhn: chair in CME v. Czech Republic).
229. For final awards, forty-six (88.5%) of the claimants were from OECD countries, and six
(11.5%) were from non-OECD countries. In the subset, twenty (95.2%) were OECD claimants and six
(4.8%) were not.
230. For final awards, nineteen (36.5%) respondents were OECD countries and thirty-three
(63.5%) were not. In the subset, there were nine (42.9%) OECD respondents and 12 (57.1%) nonOECD states.
231. NAFTA forms the basis of awards in final (n=13; 25%) and costs (n-4; 19%) awards. The
ECT was involved in final (n=2; 3.8%) and costs (n=2; 9.5%) awards. In the final awards, the
remaining awards exhibited broad geographical scope. The subset has a heavy focus (n=10; 47.5%) on
treaties between the United States, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe (i.e., Czech Republic,
Germany, Latvia, Moldova, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, United States, and United Kingdom); and
only five awards (24%) involve treaties with states from Latin America, Egypt, Sri Lanka, or the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
232. In the final awards, there were thirteen ad hoc (25%), thirty-four ICSID (65.4%), and five
SCC (9.6%) awards. Ad hoc and SCC arbitrations represented the majority of awards in the subset (ad
hoc=12 (57.1%); ICSID=5 (23.8%); SCC-4 (19%)), which suggests that in the subset of twenty-one
awards, non-ICSID awards were more heavily represented than the general data set of final awards.
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certain industries, such as telecommunications, had a higher proportion of
cases; 233 and (4) awards contained a larger proportion of separate
opinions.234 These differences may not generally prove troubling, but,
given the prevalence of publicly available ICSID awards in the overall
data set, it is noteworthy that ICSID awards were underrepresented in
terms of awards expressly quantifying the dollar values and/or percentages
of cost decisions. This creates challenges for uniform policy reform as it is
prudent to suggest reforms that have a requisite nexus between the data
and the legal architecture. While implementing structural safeguards may
prove useful for SCC and ad hoc proceedings (given that the express
quantifications of cost primarily originate from those institutions), it is
more challenging to suggest that equivalent solutions be implemented at
ICSID when it is uncertain whether ICSID cost awards were equivalent or
systematically different. Further research should therefore gather data on
ICSID ITA disputes, particularly as regards quantitative information
related to parties' legal fees and the tribunal/administrative costs, the
shifted amounts, and percentages shifted. This will promote a more
considered assessment of cost implications for ICSID ITA disputes.
D. Hypothesis 2: Legal Justificationfor Costs Decisions
ITA involves states, public resources, and adjudicative processes that
can demonstrate the rule of law in an international context. A key
normative aspiration is that arbitrators should explain decisions related to
international legal obligations with financial implications. The research
hypothesis (and normative hope) was that tribunals would rationalize their
decisions and provide consistent legal authorities and rationale.
Commentators suggest that arbitration awards lack justification. Nurick
suggests arbitrators "rarely discuss in detail the reasons for their decisions
on costs." 2 35 Schill asserts that "reasons for adopting a certain cost
decision are rarely given" as awards do not make "reference to specific

233. For final awards, there were fifteen sectors represented, including top categories such as
Energy (n=9; 17.3%); Food and Beverage (n=6; 11.5%); Waste Management (n=6; 11.5%); Real
Estate (n=5; 9.6%); Chemical-Mining (n-4; 7.7%); Financial Services (n-4; 7.7%); Industrial Supplies
(n-4; 7.7%); and Telecommunications (n-4-7.7%). In the twenty-one award cost subset, there were
thirteen industries, including: Energy (n=3; 14.3%); Real Estate (n=3; 14.3%); Industrial Supplies
(n=2; 9.5%); and Telecommunications (n-4; 19%).
234. For final awards, there were twelve awards (23%) with separate opinions and forty (77%)
without. In the subset, there were ten awards (52.4%) with separate opinions and eleven awards
(57.6%) with no separate opinion.
235. Nurick, supra note 32, at 57; see also Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30 ("[Costs] give
rise to significant difficulties at the end of a case . . . .").
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policy considerations."236 This leads to the descriptive inquiry: how often
do tribunals justify their cost decisions, if at all? The related question is:
presuming there is some justification, is there any regularity to the
rationale?
Some argue that there is no general approach to ITA costs. Finding "no
uniform pattern," 23 7 they assert cost awards are "often arbitrary and
inconsistent." 23 8 Three other groups suggest that there is a pattern, but
disagree on its shape. 2 39 One group-following a "pay-your-own-way"
approach-argues for regularity and asserts that there is a "traditional
rule" about equal allocation of costS2 4 0 where (1) parties pay their own
way, and (2) tribunals otherwise divide costs equally between the two
parties. 2 4 1 The "loser-pays" advocates posit that approach is increasingly
the normative benchmark for costs. 2 4 2 Similarly, relying on analysis that

236. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 659; see also Newman & Zaslowsky, supra note 30
(noting that "although arbitrators have applied careful and thoughtful reasoning to resolution of such
matters as jurisdiction, standing and the application of international law, they do not seem to have
applied the same kind of rigorous analysis to the factual and legal bases on which they have assessed
costs"); Wetter & Priem, supra note 67, at 261 (expressing concern that, despite how critical costs are,
they have received little scrutiny).
237. Nurick, supra note 32, at 58; see also Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2-4
(suggesting in international commercial arbitration, awards "have no uniform approach for awarding,"
and this unpredictability makes disputes more difficult to settle and "undermines the legitimacy of the
arbitral process"); Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 (stating that "no general costshifting rule appears to have emerged for investment arbitration"); Schreuer, supra note 152, at 1225
("The practice of ICSID tribunals in apportioning costs is neither clear nor uniform.").
238. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 2; see also Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 2
(finding treaty "awards of costs and fees are arbitrary and unpredictable").
239. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 21-23 (describing various approaches).
240. See, e.g., Steven Smith et al., International CommercialDispute Resolution, 42 INT'L LAW.
363, 393 (2008) ("Parties to investor-state arbitrations have traditionally borne their own attorneys'
fees and costs.... [T]ribunals still tend to favor an equal division of costs in the absence of
'exceptional circumstances,' [and] several awards in 2007 reflected an apportionment more explicitly
tied to the merits of the arbitration." (footnote omitted)); see also SCHREUER, supra note 152, at 123132 (suggesting that awards generally split costs and parties pay their own expenses); Kevin Tuininga,
International Commercial Arbitration in Cuba, 22 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 571, 617 n.385 (2008)
("[E]qual division of legal costs appears to be standard in arbitration awards.").
241. See REED ET AL., supra note 153, at 91-93 (suggesting that parties bear their own PLC but
equally split TCE); Nurick, supra note 32, at 58 (stating that "costs are usually shared equally");
Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 ("[M]ore often than not [tribunals] divid[e] the
arbitration costs equally between the parties, and, more frequently yet, order[] each party to bear its
own legal fees. In particular, awards of costs or legal fees against unsuccessful claimants in investment
arbitration cases appear to be exceedingly rare.").
242. See UNCTAD, 2009 IIA MONITOR, supra note 1, at 10 (observing that some "losers" paid
higher costs but acknowledging that other cases "seem to adopt the traditional approach"); Goldstein,
supra note 126, at 10 nn.21-25 ("[T]here is an overall sense that law and practice are moving in the
direction of more generous awards of legal costs to deserving prevailing parties. . . ."); Smith, supra
note 240, at 393 ("Recently, however, tribunals have been increasingly inclined to consider the socalled "loser-pays" principle."); see also SCHREUER, supra note 152, at 1231-32 (suggesting that if
one party has overwhelmingly prevailed on the merits, a losing party may have to bear the majority of
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has arguable methodological shortcomings,24 3 Schill describes an
"emerging pattern" where losing investors do not pay costs, but losing
respondents do. 24
Recognizing the possibility of variation, "factor-dependent" advocates
identify different variables impacting cost decisions. First, they consider
party behavior during the arbitration process. In its common, negative
variation, commentators focus on whether parties have "acted frivolously,
in bad faith or otherwise irresponsibly." 2 45 Taking a more positive tack,
commentators also suggest tribunals consider parties' cooperativeness and
efficiency. 2 46 Second, tribunals can focus on economic efficiencies,247

arbitration costs and part or all of the winner's expenses); Rowe, supra note 130, at 653-59
(articulating the need to provide fair compensation and indemnity to successful parties).
243. The article cites a dissent that "extensively document[s]" a particular position, namely, that
"tribunals in general do not shift costs incurred by the respondent government to the losing investor."
Schill, Cost-Shifing, supra note 33, at 660; see also Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico,
Separate Opinion of Prof. Thomas W5lde, %126-39, Annex (NAFTA Ch. I1 Consolidation Trib.)
(citing Ben Hamida, supra note 20), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Thunderbird
SeparateOpinion.pdf. The opinion and article rely on a "synthetic table" critiqued earlier. Supra notes
192, 195.
244. See Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 660 ("In case the investor's claim is dismissed,
arbitral tribunals in general do not shift costs incurred by the respondent government to the losing
investor."); see also id at 672 ("[T]he practice of allocating costs by investment tribunals can be
described as a one-way, pro-investor cost-shifting approach."); Smith, Shifting Sands, supra note 211
at 756 (providing some data in support of Schill's claims during the 2008-2009 time frame of
investment arbitration awards). But see Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 657 (making an
exception for frivolous claims).
245. Nurick, supra note 32, at 58; see also RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 818-19
(indicating that party behavior, like no grounds for bringing the claim or frivolous or vexatious
conduct, is a reason to shift costs); Paul D. Friedland & Lucy Martinez, The UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules: A Commentary, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 523 (2007) (book review) (suggesting cost shifting,
"particularly where the unsuccessful party has presented its case in an inefficient or obstructive
manner."); Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 673 (discussing how "spurious" or "frivolous"
behavior affects cost shifts). Such conduct might involve: (a) gross exaggeration of claim, (b)
unsatisfactory party conduct, (c) unreasonable or obstructive conduct that protracts proceedings or
increased costs, or (d) extravagance in the conduct of the hearing. Wetter & Preim, supra note 67, at
327; see also Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 660-61 (articulating a punitive rationale to deter
aggravated misconduct including "raising baseless claims and defenses generally and in the use of
unjustified tactics"); Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 (indicating a need to punish
"dilatory or otherwise uncooperative behavior[,] . . . obstruction of discovery, delay of proceedings,
raising frivolous claims and defenses, and other apparent bad-faith behavior").
246. REED ET AL., supra note 153, at 93 (suggesting that "arbitrators' perception of the
reasonableness with which the parties pursued their claims and defenses [and] the parties' general
cooperativeness in achieving cost-effective results" affect cost decisions); see also FOUCHARD,
GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 68, at 686

(suggesting, without explaining the basis for the assertion, that it is "increasingly common" for
tribunals to shift costs to the party that loses on the merits and observing that the arbitrators "may take
into account the attitude of the parties during the arbitral proceedings" in making their determinations).
247. See Salacuse, supra note 59, at 142 ("[C]osts will vary depending on the complexity of the
case, the amount in controversy, and the extent of time needed to resolve it.").
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parties' relative success248 in the overall dispute, individual claims or
defenses, procedural motions, or other matters.249 Considerations of
relative success in cost shifting are designed to allocate costs in proportion
to relative success to encourage both parties to make their claims as
realistic as possible and to facilitate settlement. 25 0 Third, reasonable offers
of settlement might result in economic efficiencies that could influence
cost-shifting decisions.251
Another group of factors relates to access to justice. Fee shifting can be
based upon the public interest. Like a private attorney general, costs
should create incentives for dispute resolution that further the public
interest or a private interest with implications for multiple stakeholders .252
This rationale might be critical in cases with special social importance or
253
where government resources do not assure adequate public enforcement.
Similarly, novel claims or good-faith arguments for modification of
existing law-whehther as regards claims or defenses-might affect a
tribunal's willingness to shift costs or to maintain the status quo. To the
extent that claims are new, the scope of liability is uncertain or defenses
are being scrutinized in a unique manner, this factor permits tribunals to
take into consideration the parties' arguable good faith in bringing a claim
or defense.254 Another factor might involve the relative strength of the
parties involved in the claim (including their relative fiscal, economic, or
25 5
political advantage) and the need for equality of arms in the dispute
resolution process. This may occur when one side of the arbitration248. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 819 (suggesting that improperly inflating claims
affects costs).
249. See Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at 126 (focusing on the proportion of success
"including the percentage of damages requested that were actually awarded, as well as recognition of
the validity of particular defenses or objections"); Wetter & Preim, supra note 67, at 327 (focusing on
factors including outcome of legal claims, disputed factual and other issues, and the relative prima
facie strength of the parties' cases).
250. See supra note 123.
251. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 68, at 815 ("[A] good reason not to award the costs
to the winning party may be due to the defendant having offered to pay to the claimant the amount
which in the end was awarded to it or an amount in that range."); Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 66566, 670 (suggesting a need for economically efficient dispute settlement).
252. Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 662-63.
253. Id. at 653, 662-63.
254. REED ET AL., supra note 153, at 93; see also Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supra note 28, at
126 (suggesting that confusion is "reasonable or understandable, given that little or no legal guidance
as to the interpretation of treaties and customary international law was available").
255. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets DomesticCriminal-ProcedureRealism, 59 DuKE L.J. 637, 667, 676-79 (2010) (discussing equality of arms and
relative procedural strengths in international criminal law); Franck, Bright Future, supranote 90, at 86
n. 149 (discussing equality of arms and the value of a balanced dispute resolution process).
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whether the state or the investor-has superior resources.256 Tribunals
might also rely upon basic notions of justice related to the equities of the
situation or the reasonableness of the costs assessed.25 Other elements
may involve concerns for fundamental justice and the breadth of tribunal
discretion to effectuate its arbitral mandate.258 Another factor might
involve. a substantive concern, perhaps about the purported gravity or
seriousness of the alleged conduct. 259
To assess the literature's descriptive accuracy, this research analyzes
PLC and TCE decisions to explore tribunals' rationalization of cost
decisions. It first assesses how many awards referenced cost decisions. It
then considers, for both PLC and TCE, whether awards cited legal
authority to justify the decision. Finally, it examines what legal rationales
tribunals offered to justify cost decisions. Further research (presumably
with more data on the fiscal aspects of costs) should explore this conflux
to consider which variables are reliably associated with specific
quantitative cost outcomes.
1. The Pre-2007Data Set: Overall and as a Function ofFinality
Using the total data set of 102 awards from the pre-2007 population,2 60
there were stark findings about tribunals' rationalization of cost decisions,
namely the lack of (1) legal authority or (2) rationale. Overall, for PLC26 1
and TCE,262 tribunals failed to offer legal authority for costs in nearly 75%

256. Rowe, supra note 130, at 653, 663-65.
257. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 24-25; Rubins, Allocation of Costs, supranote
28, at 128-29 ("Considerations ofjustice and equity may play some role in the cost allocation process,
particularly when the losing party is not ordered to pay the winner's expenses.").
258. Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supranote 69, at 24-25.
259. Id. at 42-43 (suggesting costs are shifted when there are special reasons); Rubins, Allocation
of Costs, supra note 28, at 128-29 ("[T]he seriousness of the respondent's illegal conduct towards the
successful claimant ... where a host state has behaved with particular malice towards the claimant
[means] the arbitrators may be more likely to order the respondent to cover a larger proportion of costs
and legal fees.").
260. This amount includes both final and nonfinal arbitration awards; it also means that the data
includes the seventeen disputes that spawned multiple awards. See Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at
10; see also Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 24 ("The 102 awards came from eighty-two
separate cases. Seventeen cases spawned multiple awards. There were sixty-five cases with one award,
fifteen cases with two awards, and one case with three awards. Only one case-Pope & Talbot v.
Canada-hadfour awards separately addressing jurisdiction, merits, damages, and costs.").
261. For PLC, 76.5% of the data set (n=78) lacked any reference to legal authority. Only 53.9%
provided a rationale (n=55) for the PLC decision.
262. For TCE, nearly three-quarters of the data set (n=75) failed to provide any reference to legal
authority. Only 26.5% of awards (n=27) cited legal authority. Tribunals also failed to cite to rationale
nearly 50% of the time.
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of the awards, even when such authority was readily available in
arbitration rules.
Although costs can be assessed at various stages, as a practical matter,
they were most likely to be fixed definitively in the final award. It is
perhaps, therefore, not surprising that there were statistically significant
differences in how tribunals addressed both PLC and TCE in nonfinal and
final awards.263 It is therefore prudent to assess failure to cite to authority
and rationale in awards through the lens of finality. The overall picture
was of a lack of rationalization generally, but the problem was noticeably
prevalent in nonfinal awards.
Another theme was that tribunals appeared to rely upon legal rationale
more often than they provided legal authority. Nevertheless, tribunals
failed to offer rationale for costs in nearly half the awards-even when it
was as simple as saying that costs could be made in the future or on the
basis of tribunal discretion. The lack of a thorough explanation casts doubt
on the credibility of tribunals making decisions with crucial implications
on the efficacy of arbitration. It is, however, theoretically possible that
tribunals may "hold in their mind" the basis of their legal authority and
their rationale for cost decisions yet refrain from putting the proverbial pen
to paper.2 64 Nevertheless, given critiques related to legitimacy, an evolving
need for transparency in international ajudication, and the increasing value
of coherent results, it is prudent for tribunals to provide clear justifications
and to offer explanations that promote coherent and predictable outcomes.
This should be a relatively straightforward exercise for costs, particularly
as the issue is largely depoliticized. This section therefore explores, both
for PLC and TCE, the rationalizations tribunals offered (if any) for their
cost decisions.
2. PLC Justifications:Legal Authority and Rationale
For PLC, lack of legal authority was problematic. For the final fiftytwo awards, less than half (n=21) contained reliance on legal authority,
263. See infra notes 265, 266, 296, 297 and accompanying text (analyzing differences between
final and nonfinal awards).
264. This may be equivalent to tribunals relying on "unobservable forms of precedent." See
Weidemaier, supra note 11, at 1901 ("We might therefore describe the arbitration system as
'precedential' even if it produces awards that obscure the operation of precedent and even if the
disputants themselves are unaware that precedent exists."). It is also possible (but not analyzed in this
Article) that tribunals use cost determinations to control the net result and ultimately use costs
discretion to prevent compromises in the substantive determinations from being apparent. See infra
note 93 and accompanying text.
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and only 6% (n=3) of the fifty nonfinal awards relied upon authority.265
The rationale of a tribunal's PLC decision was slightly better. For final
awards, 81% (n=40) of awards provide a rationale; whereas, only 30%
(n=15) of nonfinal awards provide a rationale.266 See Table 4.
Remembering that each award could cite multiple authorities, it is
interesting that the maximum number of authorities cited in a single award
was four, while the mean number of authorities cited was .65 (SD=.99)less than a single citation to authority for the mean award.26 7
TABLE 4: PRESENCE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY AND RATIONALE FOR PLC
DECISIONS AS A FUNCTION OF AWARD FINALITY

Tribunal References
PLC Justification

Present

Not Present

Total

3
15

47
35

50
50

21
40

31
12

52
52

Treaty Claim Not Final
Reliance on Legal Authority
Rationale Explained
Treaty Claim Final

Reliance on Legal Authority
RationaleExplained

Given the gaps and lack of regular citation to authority, it is useful to
consider-where tribunals did bother to provide a justification-what the
authority was. For legal authority, the most heavily cited source was the
1976 UNCITRAL Rules, followed closely by the ICSID Convention,
ICSID Arbitration Rules, the applicable investment treaty, and decisions
of other tribunals. Only about 25% (n=6) of ICSID Convention cases cited
to the Convention; not quite 10% (n=1) of ICSID Additional Facility
awards cited to those rules; and 20% (n=1) of the SCC cases cited SCC
265. There was a statistically significant difference in citation to legal authority for PLC at a final
and nonfinal stage of the proceedings, where there was more of a reliance on authority in a final
award. V(1)-16.749; p<.O1; r-102]. The effect size was r-.405, suggesting a large effect of award
finality on a tribunal's willingness to cite legal authority. See Franck, Development, supra note 61, at
457-58 (explaining that an effect size greater than r-.30 is "medium" and anything over r-.50 is
considered "large").
266. These differences were statistically significant. The pattern of the relationship was that more
nonfinal awards than final awards failed to provide a PLC rationale [(1)-22.588; p<.01; n-102]. The
effect size was large [r-.47 I].
267. For nonfinal awards, the maximum number of authorities cited in an award was 1.0 and the
mean was .06 (SD=.24; n-50). For the subset of twenty-one final awards that did cite to any legal
authority, the mean number of citations was 1.62 (SD=.92; n-2 1).
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rules. In contrast, 91% (n=10) of cases using the 1976 UNCITRAL rules
offered those as authority. See Table 5.
TABLE 5: LEGAL AUTHORITY RELIED UPON BY
TRIBUNALS FOR PLC DECISIONS INFINAL AWARDS
(MORE THAN ONE AUTHORITY POSSIBLE FOR EACH AWARD)
Tribunal References
PLCJustification
ICSID Convention
ICSID ArbitrationRules268
ICSID Additional Facility Rules269
SCC Rules270
1976 UNCITRAL Rules271
Investment Treaty
Investment Treaty Awards
InternationalTribunals
National Courts
Other

Present

Not Present

Total

6
3
1
1

46
49
51
51

52
52
52
52

10

42

52

4
4
2
0
3

48
48
50
52
49

52
52
52
52
52

It is somewhat unfortunate that--even though available to explain and
analyze cost-shifting determinations-tribunals did not cite or use
arbitration rules and other sources of legal doctrine to rationalize cost
decisions.272 This finding is striking when compared to empirical studies
that observe the use of, and arguably meaningful increase in reliance on,
arbitral precedent.2 73 The gap in reliance on authority for cost issues is

268. Twenty-four awards arose under the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules.
269. Eleven awards arose under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.
270. Five awards arose under the SCC Arbitration Rules.
271. Eleven awards arose under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
272. Even in the subset of fifty nonfinal awards, only three contained references to legal authority
for PLC decisions (whether to shift costs or defer the matter). All three awards cited the 1976
UNCITRAL Rules. Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 510 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Saluka-Partialaward Final.pdf; Methanex Corp. v.
United States, Partial Award, T 170 (NAFTA Ch. II Arb. Trib. 2002), availableat http://ita.law.uvicca
/documents/Methanex-IstPartial.pdf, CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
619 (Sept. 13, 2001), reprinted in 9 ICSID REP. 121 (2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.cal
documents/CME-2001 Partial Award.pdf.
273. See Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 24 J. INT'L ARB.
129, 149 (2007) (analyzing decisions, awards, and orders rendered by ICSID and finding mean
citations of .33 in 1990, 2.55 in 2001, and between 7 and 11.25 in 2006); Ole Kristian Fauchald, The
Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals-An EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 301, 304, 310, 312,
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troubling given what is potentially at stake; namely, absorbing the costs of
one party's legal costs and possibly even two sets of lawyers' fees from
both domestic and multinational law firms over the course of several
years.
In contrast to the citation of less than one type of legal authority,
tribunals were nearly twice as likely to offer a legal rationale for a
decision.274 It is helpful to assess what tribunals did offer to justify cost
determinations. For final awards, the most common rationales influencing
PLC decisionS275 were: (1) parties' relative success or failure related to the
claim (n=19), 27 6 (2) considerations of equity and reasonableness (n= 17),277
(3) efforts to encourage appropriate behavior (n=12),278 (4) substantive
reasons underlying the claim (n=l1),279 and (5) the discretion of the
tribunal (n=10).280 At the other end of the spectrum, no tribunal referenced
the need to make an informed decision; 281 and only a few referenced

314, 335 (2008) (analyzing ninety-eight decisions by ICSID tribunals between 1998 and 2006 and
finding they used case law (n=92), the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n=35), customary
international law (n=34), and general principles of law (n=8)). But see Gabrielle Kaufiann-Kohler,
Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 362 (2007) (describing
literature in international commercial arbitration that (1) out of a set of 100 awards involving the
Vienna Sales Convention, only six referred to past awards, and (2) and out of 190 International
Chamber of Commerce awards, about 15% cited other awards).
274. See supra table 3 (legal authority (n=2 1) and rationale (n-40) in the fifty-two final awards).
275. Mentioning a factor was not defined as "influencing" the decision. Factors were only coded
as being present where the factor affected the tribunal's ultimate determination about how it addressed
the PLC by itself or in conjunction with the TCE decision.
276. The Codebook operationalized the "Welamson" variable to reflect parties' relative success
(i.e., they might have won some arguments but lost others) where the tribunal determined that "costs
should be allocated inter partes on a sliding scale proportionate to the assessment by the [tribunal] of
the claims made by the parties." Codebook at 18, 24 nn.40, 56 (citing Wetter & Preim, supra note 67,
at 274).
277. The Codebook operationalized "equity" as expressing a desire to be based upon principles of
fairness, justice, equity, appropriateness or reasonableness. For PLC, "reasonableness" also related to
the PLC amount charged. Codebook at 19, 25 nn.49, 65.
278. The Codebook defined encouraging appropriate behavior as expressing a desire to praise or
reward appropriate behavior, including (1) professionalism of parties and their attorneys, (2)
constructive nature of parties' pleadings or proof, (3) efficiency in making arguments, (4) efficiency in
the administration of the arbitration, and (5) the absence of inappropriate behavior. Id. at 18, 24 nn.42,
58.
279. The Codebook defined the "substantive" variable as the tribunal expressing concern with
party conduct related to underlying substantive disputes including a concern that parties won or lost
based upon procedural issues (i.e., burdens of proof or evidentiary rules) or there was an issue
regarding the inappropriate nature of a party's substantive conduct. Id at 18, 25 nn.42, 64.
280. The Codebook defined a decision based upon "discretion" as "more than a mere reference to
a rule that references the possibility of a tribunal exercising discretion; rather the award must
demonstrate that the tribunal was exercising that discretion." Id. at 19, 25 nn.50, 66.
281. The Codebook defined the need for "Informed Decisions" as indicating "a desire to make a
full and informed decision on costs or asks for information about costs." Id at 19, 25.
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considerations such as equality of arms (n=1), 2 82 stare decisis (n=3), 2 83
public interest (n=3),2 84 or party settlement efforts (n=3). 285 Meanwhile, a
handful (i.e., between 12-18% of tribunals) referenced factors like novelty
of a claim (n=9),286 deterring inappropriate behavior (n=9),287 rewarding
the winner (n=6),2 88 or making the loser pay (n=5). 2 8 9 See Table 6.290 The
maximum number of rationales cited in a single case was seven, but the
mean number of rationales cited was 2.12 (SD=1.99). 2 9 ' This means that,
while the average number of reasons relied upon for PLC decisions was
small, as a facial matter, it appeared marginally better than citation to PLC
authority.

282. The Codebook operationalized equality of arms as "inequalities between the parties, whether
based upon power, size or finances." Id. at 19, 25.
283. "Stare decisis" was defined as an effort "to adhere to previous cases" and, beyond mere
citation to other materials, involved "an interest in adhering to established precedent and principles of
stare decisis (i.e., treating like cases alike), or analyzes the application of or distinctions from previous
investment treaty awards." Id. at 19, 24 nn.46, 62.
284. Public interest was a concern that "the public, issues of policy, or matters of public
importance are implicated by the claim and/or the issues raised in the arbitration." Id. at 18, 24, nn.45,
61.
285. The Codebook operationalized settlement efforts influencing cost decisions as "(1) references
that parties have made settlement efforts whether through mediation, negotiation or some other
facilitative process or (2) the parties' recorded settlement agreement." Id. at 18, 24 nn.43, 59.
286. "Novelty" rationale was present when the "claim or argument made is novel and/or is
challenging to establish." Id. at 18, 24 nn.44, 60.
287. The Codebook defined deterring inappropriate behavior as "prevent[ing] or sanction[ing]
inappropriate behavior including: (1) bad faith conduct in adjudicating the proceedings, (2) poor
pleadings or proof, (3) delays in making arguments, (4) inefficient administration of the arbitration, (5)
repetitive or unfounded conduct, (6) unwillingness to produce documents, (7) reliance on annulled
cases, or (8) lack of cooperation with the tribunal." Id. at 18, 24 nn.41, 57.
288. The Codebook operationalized rewarding the winner for "making winning arguments and/or
compensat[ing] the winner and making them whole for either: (1) needing to expend legal fees to fully
compensate their losses, or (2) put[ting] the party in the position they would have been but for the need
to bring the claim." Id. at 18, 23 nn.39, 55.
289. The Codebook defined the "loser-pays" rationale as expressing "a desire to have the loser
pay for making losing arguments." Id. at 17, 23 nn.38, 54.
290. Nonfinal awards (n=50) exhibited similar patterns with one exception. Nine tribunals that
addressed PLC (whether in terms of an affirmative decision or reservation of the issue) cited a desire
to make an informed decision. Otherwise, there were minimal considerations of equity (n-4),
encouraging appropriate behavior (n=3), and deterring inappropriate behavior (n=2). Other rationale
(Welamson's relative success approach, loser-pays, rewarding the winner, and claim novelty) were
cited once each.
291. The minimum number of rationales cited in final awards was zero. For the subset of forty
final awards that contained any kind of PLC rationale, the mean number of rationales provided was
2.75 (SD=1.836). For nonfinal awards, the maximum PLC rationale was four and the mean was .44
(n=50; SD=.88).
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TABLE 6: FOR ALL FINAL AWARDS, TYPE OF RATIONALE
RELIED UPON BY TRIBUNALS FOR PLC DETERMINATIONS
(A SINGLE AWARD CAN CITE TO MULTIPLE RATIONALES)

Tribunal References
PLC Justification
Loser Pays
Rewarding Winner
Welamson (Relative Success/Failure)
Deter InappropriateBehavior
EncourageAppropriate Behavior
Party Settlement Efforts
Novelty of Claim or Defense
Public Interest Considerations
Stare Decisis
Party EqualityofArms
Substantive Reasons
Equity Considerations
Discretionof Tribunal
Making Informed Decisions
Other

Present

Not Present

Total

5
6
19
9
12
3
9
3
3
1
11
17
10
0
2

47
46
33
43
40
49
43
49
49
51
41
35
42
52
50

52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52

Although previous commentators did not distinguish clearly between
how these rationales could-or should-apply differently to issues related
to the parties' versus tribunals' costs, one thing was clear: those sources
that commentators have used to justify cost decisions were not those most
commonly relied upon in this research. While there was reliance on factors
such as "loser-pays"29 2 and punishing negative behavior,29 3 tribunals used
a plethora of other rationales more frequently.
On that basis, it is perhaps unsurprising that, for final awards and
excluding pairwise cases when a value was missing, there was no reliable
statistical relationship between the ultimate winner of ITA and the party
responsible for making a PLC contribution (r=-.13;p=.38; n=49).2 94 This

292. See supra notes 242-44.
293. See supra notes 245-46.
294. The bivariate correlation analyzed the ultimate winner of ITA ("UltimateWin") and the PLC
contributor (plcN). "UltimateWin" was defined as: 1=Respondent win where Claimant was awarded
US$0 or Respondent was awarded any amount; 2=lnvestor win where Claimant was awarded more
than US$0; 3=Settlement Agreement. "plcN" was defined as: l=No shift of PLC, 2=Respondent is the
Contributing Party and makes a contribution to the Claimant's PLC; 3-Claimant is the Contributing
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finding, namely, the lack of a reliable relationship between the ultimate
winner and PLC, also undercuts the idea that "loser-pays" has been the
normative baseline for ITA.
These results begin to suggest that advocates of a "factor-based"
approach to cost shifting 295 were descriptively accurate about the state of
play. Yet,-there was a lack of focus on factors such as equality of arms,
stare decisis, public interest, and settlement efforts as a descriptive matter.
That lack of focus may be undesirable as a normative matter, particularly
given the focus on the public interest in ITA, the desire to encourage
settlements, and the value of promoting efficient dispute resolution. One
might imagine that tribunals' failure to focus on those factors is linked to
the parties' approach to dispute resolution and perhaps inhibits parties
from actively considering the use of alternative modalities, such as
mediation or negotiation, as part of their viable dispute resolution options.
3. TCE Justifications:Legal Authority and Rationale
For TCE, much like PLC, there was a general lack of reliance on legal
authority, but the gap was more pronounced in nonfinal awards. For
nonfinal awards, 94% (n=47) lacked a reference to authority for possible
or actual cost-shifting decisions. In final awards, more than 50% of the
awards (n=28) failed to cite to legal authority for their conclusions.296 In
contrast to legal authority, there was a greater reliance on rationale. For
nonfinal awards, 74% (n=37) contained no rationale; whereas for final
awards, 22% (n=l 1) did provide some explanation for the tribunal's

Party and makes a contribution to the Respondent's PLC. Using a power table to conduct a post hoc
power analysis indicates that the power of that bivariate relationship (r.13; n=49) is around .20,
which suggests an 80% possibility of a Type II statistical error and the need for replication of the
research with expanded data. Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 461 n.132; see also JACOB
COHEN,

STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL

SCIENCES 3-6

(2d ed.

1988).

Analyzing the relationship of pure respondent wins (Rwins=l) versus claimant wins and settlement
agreements (Rwins=0) and excluding cases pairwise where a data point was missing, there was
likewise no significant relationship between PLC allocation (plcN) and respondent wins (r-.09; p=.54;
n=47). A Chi-Square analysis comparing "UltimateWin" and the existence of any PLC shift (i.e.,
combining respondent and claimant contributions) failed to reveal a statistically significant pattern of
relationship V(2)--.832; p<.66; r-.13; n-49]. Given the effect sizes and size of the last two tests, a
post-power analysis would also suggest that the power of those analyses is .20 or less, suggesting there
is a .80 statistical likelihood of having committed a Type II Error.
295. See supra notes 245-59.
296. Twenty-four (46.2%) final awards relied on legal authority, whereas only twenty-eight
(53.8%) final awards lacked authority for TCE. When compared to nonfinal awards, the pattern of
relationship between citation to legal authority for TCE decisions was significantly different; tribunals
were more likely to cite legal authority in final awards and less likely to cite authority in nonfinal
2
awards [X(l)-21.116; p<.01; 1-.46; n-10 ].
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approach to allocating its own expenses.297 See Table 7. For final
awards,298 the mean number of citations to TCE legal authority was .67
(SD=.92; n=52),299 with a maximum of four legal authorities cited in a
single award and a minimum of zero.3 oo
TABLE 7: PRESENCE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY AND RATIONALE FOR TCE
DECISIONS AS A FUNCTION OF AWARD FINALITY
Tribunal References

TCE Justification

Present

Not Present

Total

3
13

47
37

50
50

24
41

28
11

52
52

Treaty Claim Not Final
Reliance on Legal Authority
RationaleExplained

Treaty Claim Final
Reliance on Legal Authority
Rationale Explained

As tribunals considering TCE decisions were (much like their PLC
counterparts) nearly twice as likely 301 to cite a rationale rather than
authority,3 0 2 understanding which rationales were used is vital to

297. These differences were statistically significant. Nonfinal awards were likely to lack a
reference to rationale, whereas final awards were more likely to provide a rationale for TCE decisions
[V(I)=28.574; p<.01; r-.53; n=102].
298. The situation for nonfinal awards and legal authority was more dire, with a maximum
number of citations at I and a mean of.06 (SD=.24; n=50).
299. When considering the subset of twenty-four final awards that include some citation to legal
authority for TCE decisions, the mean was 1.46 (SD=.83; n=24).
300. For final awards, the facially equivalent mean citation for PLC (.65) and TCE (.67) suggests
reasonable parity in terms of authority provided for cost issues generally.
301. See supra table 5 (legal authority (n=24) and rationale (n-41) for final awards).
302. The legal authority cited by tribunals in final awards (n=52) for TCE decisions was
reasonably equivalent to the authorities cited for PLC decisions in Table 5. In particular: (1) for the
twenty-four ICSID Convention awards, six cited to the ICSID Convention (25% of total ICSID
Convention awards); (2) three cited to the ICSID Arbitration Rules (12.5% of the total ICSID
Convention awards); (3) for the eleven ICSID-Additional Facility awards, one cited to the ICSID
Additional Facility rules (9.1% of the Additional Facility awards); (4) for the five SCC cases, four
cited to the SCC rules (80% of the SCC awards); (5) for the eleven awards under the 1976
UNCITRAL rules, ten cited to the UNCITRAL Rules (91% of the UNCITRAL awards); (6) four cited
to the IIA; (7) three cited to investment treaty awards; (8) one cited to an international tribunal; (9)
none cited to national court decisions; and (10) three cited to other forms of authority, such as a law
review article.
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understanding what affects decisions about TCE allocation. For final
awards, the most common rationales for TCE decisions were: (1) parties'
relative success or failure related to the claim (n= 18), (2) considerations of
equity and reasonableness (n=13), (3) substantive reasons underlying the
claim (n=12), (4) efforts to encourage appropriate behavior (n=9), (5)
efforts to discourage inappropriate behavior (n=9), (6) the discretion of the
tribunal (n=9), and (7) the novelty of the claim or defense (n=7). At the
other end of the spectrum, less than 10% of final awards relied upon
"loser-pays" (n=5), rewarding the winner (n=5), party settlement efforts
(n=4), stare decisis (n=2), public interest (n=2), or equality of arms (n=1).
No tribunals relied upon the need to make informed decisions. See Table
8.303 The maximum number of rationales cited in a single case was six, and
the mean was 1.88 (SD=1.70). 3 0 This means that, while the average
number of citations to legal rationale for final TCE decisions was still
small, it appeared marginally better than citation to TCE authority. But,
comparatively, they may still be statistically equivalent.30 5

303. Like the counterpart for nonfinal PLC awards, the most frequent rationale mentioned in
nonfinal awards (n=50) for TCE decisions was the intent to make an informed decision (n=9).
Otherwise, nonfinal TCE awards cited similar rationale to TCE final awards: equity (n=3),
encouraging appropriate behavior (n=2), deterring inappropriate behavior (n=2), rewarding winner
(n=l), loser-pays (n=1), and novelty (n=1). There were no references to relative success or failure in
those awards.
304. The minimum number of rationale cited was zero. For those forty-one awards that did rely on
some rationale for the cost decision, the mean was 2.39 (SD=1.563).
305. For nonfinal awards (n=50), the maximum rationales cited was four, and the mean was .38
(SD=.81). For the final awards (n=52), the facially equivalent mean citation for PLC (2.12) and TCE
(1.88) suggests parity for rationale provided for cost issues generally.
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TABLE 8: FOR FINAL TREATY CLAIMS RELYING ON SOME RATIONALE, TYPE
OF RATIONALE RELIED ON BY TRIBUNALS FOR TCE DETERMINATION
(A SINGLE AWARD CAN CITE TO MULTIPLE RATIONALES)
Tribunal References
TCE Justification
Loser-Pays
Rewarding Winner
Welamson (Relative Success/Failure)
Deter InappropriateBehavior
EncourageAppropriateBehavior
PartySettlement Efforts
Novelty of Claim or Defense
Public Interest Considerations
Stare Decisis
PartyEquality ofArms
Substantive Reasons
Equity Considerations
Discretionof Tribunal
Making Informed Decisions
Other

Present

Not Present

Total

5
5
18
9
9
4
7
2
2
1
12
13
9
0
2

47
47
34
43
43
48
45
50
50
51
40
39
43
52
50

52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52
52

The implications for TCE were similar to its PLC counterpart. For the
tribunal costs, there was a gap in the tribunal's citation to legal authority.
This gap is not without critical implications. One need only recall Eureko.
v. Polan 06 and the lack of citation to legal authority that facilitated an
outcome prohibited by the treaty. Failure to confirm legal authority can
lead to legal error, and although it may be correctable by the tribunal itself
in subsequent awards,307 appeal or annulment for legal error is not
presently a doctrinal feature of ITA.308

306. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion (Aug. 19, 2005),
reprinted in 12 ICSID REP. 335 (2007).
307. The tribunal issued a supplementary award retracting its decision on cost. Press Release,
Ministry of Treasury of the Republic of Pol., Information Concerning the Decision Made by the
Arbitration Tribunal on Introduction of a Correction to the Partial Ruling it Had Issued (Oct. 3, 2005),
available at http://www.msp.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=en&dzial= 16&id=3 11 &search=8216.
308. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law
Sphere: The Standardof Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283, 299 (2010);
Noemi Gal-Or, The Concept ofAppeal in InternationalDispute Settlement, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 43, 5253 (2008); see also Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 7, at 1547-55 (discussing means for
reviewing arbitration awards).

RATIONALIZING COSTS

2011]

831

Legal authorities-including rules, conventions, and treaties-are
available for free on the Internet and can be quickly inserted into an award
where applicable. One wonders why activity that involves such minimal
cost-but provides the profound benefit of preventing errors and
enhancing perceived legitimacy-is nevertheless ignored by some
tribunals. If first-year law students can find, cite, and use authority to
analyze legal questions with critical financial implications, why should
international law specialists be exempt from engaging in a similar, basic
analysis when the stakes are higher and they are paid for their services?
The lack of a cogent answer creates an area of potential concern. As Lord
Denning observed,
It is of course true that [an adjudicator's] decision may be correct
even though he should give no reason for it or even give a wrong
reason: but, in order that a trial be fair, it is necessary, not only that
a correct decision should be reached, but also that it should be seen
to be based on reason; and that can only be seen, if the judge
himself states his reasons. 309
This citation to legal authority should be contrasted with the legal rationale
provided for TCE decisions. The number of awards offering some form of
rationale was higher, and the scope of rationales offered was also greater.
Nevertheless, there was still little reasoning offered in support of cost
decisions, which might have a critical financial impact and the potential to
affect parties' overall dispute resolution strategy. Similar to the use of
rationale for PLC decisions, there were a set of legal rationales that
tribunals did not use, such as equality of arms, stare decisis, public
interest, and settlement efforts. To the extent that parties wish to
understand factors guiding tribunals' decisions, the current data
demonstrated that tribunals appeared more influenced by factors such as
the parties' relative success, substantive concerns related to the claim, and
equity. Unlike the arguments presented by previous commentators,
considerations of "loser-pays" 310 or punishing poor conduct3 I did not
appear to be the key motivators. They were, however, part of an overall
mix.
For final awards, there was also no reliable statistical relationship
between the ultimate winner of ITA and which party was responsible for

309.

SIR ALFRED DENNING, THE ROAD TO JUSTICE 29 (1955).

310. See supra notes 242-44.
311. See supra notes 245-46.
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paying more than 50% of TCE (r=-.20; p=.17; n=48).312 This finding,
namely, the lack of a reliable relationship between the ultimate winner and
a shift of TCE, undercuts the suggestion that the "loser-pays" approach
was the normative baseline. It also creates initial evidence that "factorbased" approaches to cost-shifting decisions3 13 are worthy of expanded
research. Additionally, there could be value in isolating variables or
variable combinations that are reliably linked to cost decisions. Future
research in this area might usefully explore those aspects.
E. Hypothesis 3: RelationshipsAmong Costs and Other Variables
Based on the foregoing, one might begin to imagine a scenario where a
lack of guidance on legal authority and rationale combined with a variety
of substantive approaches creates confusion. This narrative finds some
support in the data that reflected the existence of various cost outcomes,
minimal citation to legal authority for cost decisions, and a broad spectrum
of different rationales. Nevertheless, as the data suggested, the
predominant approach of tribunals reflected a "pay-as-you-go" approach,
and there is a plausible counternarrative about pockets of potential
coherence and reliability in cost awards. This next section explores three
areas of arguable rationality: (1) the intertwined relationship of PLC and
TCE decisions, (2) the relationship between TCE and amounts claimed
(versus amounts awarded), and (3) uncertainty begetting a form of
certainty.
1. Relationship Between PLC and TCE
PLC and TCE are doctrinally different types of arbitration costs-the
costs of parties' attorneys versus the cost of adjudicators and associated
administration. It is possible that tribunals might wish to use different cost
aspects to signal different things to parties. Tribunals could, for example,
312. The bivariate correlation considered the variables "UltimateWin" and the TCE contribution.
"UltimateWin" was defined previously. See supra note 294. TCE contribution (TCEcontribN) was
defined as: 1=No TCE shift, each party bears 50% of tribunal costs; 2=Respondent contributes more
than 50% to tribunal costs; 3=Claimant contributes more than 50% to tribunal costs). Using a power
table to conduct a post-hoc power analysis indicates that the power of that bivariate relationship (r-.20; n=48) is approximately .30, which suggests a 70% possibility of a statistical error and the need for
future replication of the research. Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 461 n.132; see also COHEN,
supranote 294, at 3-6. In any event, a Chi-Square analysis comparing "UltimateWin" and existence of
a TCE shift was also not statistically significant [J(2)-.880; p<.64; n-48]. There was likewise no
bivariate relationship comparing respondent wins versus claimant wins plus settlements ("Rwins") and
TCE contribution (r=.16; p-.29; n=46).
313. See supra notes 245-59.
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allocate TCE equally in an effort to make arbitration follow a "pay-as-yougo" approach that prevents imbalance in the cost of adjudicators.
Similarly, to promote a "factor-dependent" approach that retains tribunal
discretion to provide strategic incentives for prudent or inappropriate
behavior, they could be more aggressive with a PLC shift. Given this
theoretical distinction and the utility in signaling a specific payoff matrix
for the parties, the research hypothesis was that there would not be a
reliable link between the PLC and TCE decisions.
In contrast to the research hypothesis, however, there was a reliable
relationship between PLC and TCE decisions. As indicated previously,
there was some parity in the number and type of rationales offered for both
PLC and TCE.3 14 But the relationship was more substantial. A bivariate
correlation between the party making a contribution to PLC was linked to
the party responsible for paying more than 50% of TCE, and the effect
was statistically large (r-.74; p<.01; n=48)." In other words, if the
respondent paid a portion of PLC, the respondent was likely to be
responsible for more than 50% of the TCE. Likewise, if the claimant was
responsible for a portion of the respondent's PLC, there was a statistically
significant likelihood of being responsible for paying more than 50% of
TCE. Yet as PLC and TCE measure aspects of the same constructnamely, arbitration costs-even with the doctrinal distinction, the colinearity is perhaps unsurprising.
The lesson is, on the basis of the existing data, that where tribunals are
in for a penny, they are in for a pound. Shifts (or lack thereof) of the
parties' legal expenses and the tribunal's costs generally occur together,
and a treatment of one cost variable may be a useful predictor for other
aspects of a tribunal's treatment of the other cost variable. 3 16 Although it is
theoretically useful (and perhaps required in some circumstances) to
consider cost variables separately given their different doctrinal bases, the
reliable link suggests that it would be prudent for parties to consider the
risk factors for the two distinct costs concurrently. The data did not

314. See supra notes 267, 291, 298, 303, 305.
315. See supra note 265; Cohen, supra note 294 at 113-16. This bivariate correlation included
final awards but excluded pairwise cases if there was a missing value (i.e., either PLC or TCE was
unavailable). The variables analyzed were plcN and TCE contribution, defined in supra notes 294 and
312. The bivariate correlation for those two variables using nonfinal and final awards, which excluded
pairwise cases where there was a missing value, was similar (r-.77; p<.01; n=51).
316. The test of a bivariate relationship is not, however, a predictive or causal model. Rather, it is
a test of association looking for reliable relationships. MILDRED L. PATTEN, UNDERSTANDING
RESEARCH METHODS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ESSENTIALs 9 (7th ed. 2009) (articulating the difference
between causal and correlation research).
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support the hypothesis that tribunals would use distinct cost aspects to
differentiate strategically in an effort to create incentives to promote
different norms or party behavior.
2. Relationship with TCE, Amount Claimed, andDamage Awards
There is also value in considering what cost-related variables might be
reliably linked with the ultimate fiscal cost of ITA. For that reason, the
next section considers the link between certain other fiscal data-namely,
amounts claimed and amounts awarded-in an effort to identify potential
reliable relationships. The objective would be, in the first instance, to
create a descriptive model to consider those variables linked with net costs
for ITA with the hope being that, in the future, a predictive model might
permit parties to begin to estimate the fiscal cost of ITA. While such an
approach might not be able to address the more generalized "cost" related
considerations addressed earlier,m it may preliminarily begin to identify
tangible fiscal costs.
The next two research hypotheses focused exclusively on the
relationship of TCE and other fiscal variables for key reasons. First, as
coded on the basis of the available data, PLC was a partial variable that
only addressed the amount of the shift of legal fees. PLC was not the total
scope of a single party's own lawyer's fees, let alone the lawyer's fees for
both parties, which necessarily means that the scope of fiscal risk
measured is limited. Second, there were more awards that provided
quantitative data on TCE totals, and on the amounts paid by both the
investor and the state. This means that the TCE variable is a more
complete measure of the scope of financial risk associated with arbitration
costs. Particularly, as some anecdotal evidence suggests that the scope of
actual risk for parties' attorneys' fees is substantially larger than TCE
alone,m future research can and should usefully isolate the full scope of
the parties' legal costs (for both investors and states). In the interim, it is
useful to consider the relationship that TCE has with both the amounts
claimed and the amounts awarded.

317. See supra notes 59-65 (considering social, political, and economic costs).
318. UNCTAD, ADR 1,supra note 34, at 16-17 (explaining that "costs for conducting arbitration
procedures are extremely high, with legal fees amounting to an average of 60 per cent of the total costs
of the case").
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The first analysis examined the bivariate relationship between amounts
investors' claimed and total TCE costs. The test reflected that there was a
significant, positive relationship between the amount claimed and TCE
totals.319 On the theory that large infrastructure energy projects might have
large values and skew the results, a partial correlation was run to control
for the effect of awards related to the energy sector. Even controlling for
the effect of energy disputes, there was still a significant and positive
relationship between the amounts claimed and TCE totals.320 In other
words, as the amount investors claimed increased, so did total TCE. See
Chart 1.

319. Recognizing that the amounts claimed incorporated some partially and fully quantified
amounts claimed, this was true irrespective of whether amounts claimed by investors were analyzed
using raw data [r(l 1)=.88; p<.01; n=13], winsorized data to eliminate the effect of outliers [r(l1l)=.83;
p<.01; n--13], or even data that was transformed using log transformations to minimize the positive
skewing data [r(11)=.93; p<.01; n=13]. The original skewness of the claimed damages was 6.792,
which was large. After winsorizing, the skewness for claimed amounts was -1.034; after log
transformations the skewness was .088. Reliance on the log transformation is likely most appropriate
as it reduces the skewness and promotes the analysis of data that most closely conforms to the
underlying assumption of the statistical tests (i.e., normally distributed data) and enhances statistical
conclusion validity. The TCE Total variable did not require transformation as skewness was .753 (i.e.,
under +/- .80) and there were no outliers in the upper or lower bands. In essence, the raw TCE totals
were reasonably approximate to the normal curve.
320. This was again true for: (1) the raw data [t(10)-.87; p<.01] that included statistical outliers
on claimed damages, (2) winsorized data [r(10)-.84; p<.01] that eliminated outliers, and (3) data
subject to log transformations [r(l0)-.93;p<.01] to minimize positive skewing.
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CHART 1: SCATTERPLOT OF TOTAL TCE COSTS (U.S. DOLLARS)
AND TRANSFORMED DAMAGES CLAIMED
Transformed Claimed Damages and Total TCE Amount
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This relationship has potential implications when one considers that, as
a doctrinal matter, only investors have the initial capacity to estimate, and
to articulate, their claims of damages. 32 1 There is a vast difference between
suggesting that a reliable link exists between variables and demonstrating
that one variable causes a particular result. Further analyses are necessary
both to replicate this existence of the bivariate relationship and to explore
whether the variance persists in a more complex multivariate model that
controls for potentially co-linear variance, such as the length of the case,
presence of electronic discovery, scope of motion practice, challenges to
arbitrators, and the type of law firms involved.322

321. Under the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, for example, the notice of arbitration must include a
"general nature of the claim and an indication of the amount involved." 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, supra note 71, art. 3.3(e). Respondents can dispute the amount claimed and scope of damage
thereafter. HAs do not, however, typically grant an independent set of substantive rights (or a claim for
damages related to breach) to states; rather, IIAs grant rights to investors and investments. See
UNCTAD,

UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3,

INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON

INVESTMENT RULEMAKING 7-30 (2007) (explaining who is entitled to bring claims under HAs),
availableat http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf.
322. These are, for example, variables that are linked to increased litigation costs in quantitative
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The reliable relationship between amounts claimed and TCE totals
takes on particular salience when compared to another critical variablethe amount awarded by the tribunal. Using data that conformed to the
underlying assumptions of the statistical tests, bivariate analyses between
awarded amounts and TCE totals failed to reveal a reliable statistical
relationship between those two variables. 3 Even for partial correlations
controlling for disputes in the energy sector, there was still no reliable
relationship between TCE and the damages tribunals awarded.324 See
Chart 2.
CHART 2: SCATTERPLOT OF TOTAL TCE COSTS (U.S. DOLLARS)
AND TRANSFORMED DAMAGES AWARDED
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research in the U.S. federal courts. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 44.
323. TCE Total was normally distributed. See supra note 319. The raw data of awarded damages
was positively skewed (5.311); after winsorizing the data, the skewing was still 1.414, and an inverse
log transformation resulted in skewing of -.40. Transformed data best adheres to the statistical
parameters underlying the test. Transformed data did not reveal a reliable statistical relationship
[r(12)-.35; p=.22; n=14]; winsorized data also did not reveal any statistically significant association
63
[r(12)-.14; p=. ; n-14]. There was a slight difference in the raw data, which did suggest the
3
existence of a reliable statistical relationship [r(12)-.568; p=.0 ; n=14]. But as that data exhibited
skewing and contained outliers, inferences drawn from it must be done with extreme cautionparticularly given the small nature of the subset of data. In any event, the arguable concerns about
statistical power (.20 or less) can and should be addressed by replicating this research2 4in the future.
324. There was no reliable relationship using transformed [r(11)=.35; p=. ] or winsorized
comport with assumed
[r(11)-.15; p=.64] data for amount claimed. Raw data, which failed to
4
statistical normality, exhibited a correlation but is suspect [r(l l)=.568; p=.0 ].
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This lack of a relationship is not per se troubling and offers an
interesting perspective on the arguable integrity of the arbitration process.
There was no reliable statistical relationship between the amounts awarded
and the amounts paid to the tribunal for their services, which provides
some initial evidence to suggest that arbitrators were not "self-dealing."
The lack of a relationship means that, based upon the limitations of the
data, measures, and models, the amount awarded appeared to operate
independently from remuneration received. While in need of replication
with a larger size beyond the pre-2007 population and a more complex
model to assess potential moderating variables, the findings offer initial
evidence supporting a narrative that arbitrators made awards based upon
something other than a desire for a large personal pay day-and that
perhaps the cause of a substantive award was due to other factors, possibly
even including the actual or relative merits of claims and defenses.
Particularly when compared with the statistical significance of amounts
claimed-a variable entirely in the hands of claimants-the difference in
the relationship between TCE and amounts awarded was pronounced and
is worthy of further study.
3. The Certaintyof Uncertainty
Although the data offered some evidence of areas of predictability and
even a primary reliance on the "pay-your-own-way" model, there is still
much that is unknown regarding costs. The existence of pockets of
uncertainty in how and on what basis tribunals will decide costs, in some
respects, begins to suggest that there will be wide variance on cost-related
issues. The question, however, is whether in light of the current data, the
existing degree of uncertainty is normatively desirable. Historically, there
may have been a sense that the time was not "ripe for laying down clear
guidelines for the treatment of costs.,, 3 25 Yet this has implicationsnamely, at the price of predictability, determinacy, coherence, and
consistency-particularly where arbitrators, parties, and their lawyers may
come from different legal backgrounds and have different expectations.3 26
This lays the seeds for a clash of cultures, a clash of law, a clash of
expectations, and an ambiguity of result that-in an area of significant
public international importance-is a lurking problem that can serve as the
basis for discontent. The question we now face is whether we wish to

325. Bihler, supra note 68, at 253.
326. Id.
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change our practice going forward in light of normative objectives or if we
are content with the status quo.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Full rationalization of costs in ITA is not yet possible. Nevertheless, we
can and should begin the process of systematic analysis while
understanding the implicit limitations of both the data and the evolution of
the ITA system. This section, therefore, addresses the limitations of the
data before discussing, within that context, where we might consider
heading in light of certain normative objectives.
The current data and associated analyses were necessarily limited.
Replication and convergence of research with more data and enhanced
modeling is both necessary and appropriate. As suggested in previous
research using the current database, recognizing the limitations is
fundamental to understanding the scope of reasonable inferences that can
and should be drawn from the data; 32 7 they inevitably have implications
for the integrity of potential normative reforms.328 First, there are issues of
case selection bias in the study of publicly available awards that may
mean, for example, that private awards might vary on critical issues
pertaining to cost outcomes and justification. Second, particularly as
regards the quantification of PLC and TCE data, there are pockets of
missing data where tribunals failed to provide any quantitative information
about the actual dollar values involved. This necessarily raises the
question of whether the tribunals that did provide data offered adequate
information or suffered from systemic bias. Although preliminary analysis
in this research suggests there were some key similarities to the larger data
set, 32 9 given the potential underrepresentation of ICSID cases, replication
with expanded data would be particularly prudent to reassess these
preliminary results. Third, there are issues as the data comes from the
then-known population of awards from before June 1, 2006. There is a
possibility that the data has a temporal limitation (i.e., an issue related to
external validity and generalizability to the current and future population).
Supplemental data may (or may not) conform to the initial baselines
identified in this research. In the interim, the research provides a useful

327. Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 440, 459 n.129, 472, 474-76, 478 n.187; Franck,
Evaluating Claims, supra note 1, at 17, 24 n.109, 39 n.170, 62, 68, 73, 83.
328. Franck, Empiricism, supra note 8, at 811-12.
329. See supranotes 225-34.
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baseline for future evaluation.33 0 Finally, the strength of the statistical
inferences is limited, may not reflect population parameters, and may,
theoretically, be the result of variation that is due to chance alone. While
the overall data set is arguably limited-in the sense that it is not a study
with, for example, over 1,500 cases 331-this does not mean that the data
set itself is unworthy of quantitative study. To the extent that ITA is a
relatively recent phenomenon in international law, there were simply no
awards available in the past to analyze; 33 2 but particularly as there are now
awards and more disputes in the pipeline, some sense of where the data are
now is vital to create baselines for future consideration.
Nevertheless, it is always critical to remember that (1) systematic
analysis must describe its methodology to promote the reliability of data
collection, reliability of coded measures, validity of statistical modelling,
and integrity of related statistical inferences; (2) research must be subject
to replication in the future; and (3) expanded analysis with more
sophisticated models and statistical control is prudent. While no
quantitative research is perfect, provided it is methodologically sound ex
ante, it is normatively preferable to no research at all or to the substitution
of personal opinion or political power that is not grounded in a tested
academic approach.333
Even with these limitations, some preliminary rationalization of the
existing data may be helpful if, for nothing else, to provide insights for
future research. The data suggested that while there were small pockets of
convergence and reliable relationships, the overall picture was of
variability.

330. It is for this reason that the author is in the process of expanding the data set to include data
for the time period before June 1, 2009. Research on final arbitration awards from 2008-2009 also
appears to confirm the default baseline that most awards did not shift costs. See Smith, Shifting Sands,
supra note 211 at 767 ("Of the thirty-one decisions in the sample, the majority (58.1%) do not shift
costs.").
331. See Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 461 n.132 (suggesting that, given the nature of
the effect in a particular model, a sample of 1,562 investment treaty disputes would be required to
definitively accept or reject a research hypothesis for the evovolved population that would permit
conclusive statements for all small, medium, and large effects).
332. Small numbers of investment treaty disputes is perhaps not surprising. The population of
treaty disputes was small in the first place given that ITA is a recent international law phenomena.
Moreover, empirical evidence for a related area-namely, international trade law disputes at the
WTO-suggests that, under the GATT era, there were approximately nine cases a year but there are
now approximately thirty to thirty-five per year. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 15-16
(1999); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence and InternationalTribunals, 93 CALIF.
L. REv. 1,46 (2005).
333. Franck, Empiricism,supra note 8, at 784-90.
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On the side of divergence, the data suggested ITA costs were marked
by a degree of unpredictability and a gap between what tribunals were
anticipated to do as a matter of normative policy and what they did do as a
matter of descriptive reality. Although there was a preference for the "payas-you-go" approach, various approaches to cost shifting in a variety of
permutations were utilized. Similarly, the data did not reveal any reliable
relationship between a shift of costs (either for parties' legal fees or
tribunal/administrative costs) and the ultimate case outcome. Moreover, in
some instances, there was wholesale abandonment or scant justification
for decisions that involve key financial risks and implicate institutional
legitimacy. The wide variation in types of rationale cited was also
noteworthy.
There was, however, partial rationalization and pockets of coherence.
These data points refute the blanket claim that "awards of costs and fees
are arbitrary and unpredictable" for ITA.334 Data showed that (1) tribunals
could have made cost decisions at early stages of the dispute, although
they often did not; (2) tribunals exhibited reasonable parity between cost
allocations between investors and states; (3) tribunals were twice as likely
to provide reasons than to cite to authority; (4) PLC and TCE decisions
tended to occur together and in the same direction; and (5) there was a
relationship between the amounts claimed and tribunal costs. The
remainder of this section synthesizes the data, analyzes the implications,
and offers normative recommendations to integrate norms of efficiency
and fairness.
A. Costs Matter, Need Early Consideration,andRequire Additional Data
It was concerning that most of the cost-shifting decisions occurred in
final awards. This was a missed opportunity. As it is doctrinally permitted
to render cost decisions prior to the final award, tribunals did not capitalize
on an opportunity to influence party behavior by incentivizing or
"nudging" desired behavior.335 Recognizing that, in the past, tribunals
have awarded costs prior to final awards, tribunals should look for
strategic opportunities to award costs, such as at jurisdiction or during
preliminary challenges to the merits of a claim. 336 The failure to make such

334. Gotanda, Fees, supranote 39, at 2.
335. See generally ARIELY, supra note 33; RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).

336. Various treaties and rules permit states to bring a preliminary challenge to arbitration claims.
See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 154, art. 41; 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supranote 147, art. 28(4);
see also infra Part VI.B-C (discussing possible reforms).
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costs awards means that parties lack information about the potential costs
of ITA that could facilitate full consideration of the costs and benefits of a
dispute resolution strategy. 337 If parties act rationally to assess the costs
and benefits of pursuing ITA, possible settlement opportunities are
arguably lost.338 Given the increased attention to settlement and alternative
modes of resolving treaty disputes, this is concerning.339
The data also help contextualize claims that the costs of ITA were
relatively high. 34 0 The average cost of a tribunal was more than
US$600,000. That is not insignificant-but it must also be remembered
that the fiscal data comes from a limited data set that requires expansion
and replication of the research. Likewise, the availability of data on PLC,
suggesting that average shifts were also in the order of US$600,000,
suggests that the costs could be critical, namely, (1) paying 100% of
US$600,000 for a PLC shift, (2) paying 100% of the US$600,000 TCE,
and (3) any lawyer's fees the losing party also experiences. This suggests
three things. First, it is difficult to ascertain "full" costs without expanded
data on both parties' legal costs. Indeed, presuming that parties briefed
tribunals on cost issues, it is curious that tribunals, more often than not,
failed to provide a full explanation of claimed and awarded costs. 3 4 1

337. Resources matter particularly for the developing countries, which are the majority of
respondents. See Franck, Development, supra note 61, at 446-47. Defending claims may require
advance budgeting to allocate specific line items for conflict management. Without understanding the
scope of arbitration risk, governments may not be in a position to make fully informed decisions about
the value of IAs.
338. In international commercial arbitration, the inability "to predict with any degree of certainty
the outcome of a claim for costs . . . impairs the ability of parties to fully evaluate the case and
consequently settle the dispute." Gotanda, Awarding Costs, supra note 69, at 38; see also Michael
Bilhler, Costs in ICC Arbitration: A Practitioner'sView, 3 AM. REv. 116, 117 (1992) ("[I]t must be a
prerequisite to any international arbitration that the parties know well in advance what to budget for
costs, and that the cost system of the administering institution is fully transparent from the outset, so
that clients and their counsel know how their money will be spent, and if they can expect to recoup it
fully or in part.").
339. See UNCTAD, ADR I, supra note 34; UNCTAD, ADR II, supra note 34; Washington & Lee
University School of Law & UNCTAD, Joint Conference on International Investment and ADR,
WASHINGTON & LEE (Mar. 29, 2010), http://investmentadr.wlu.edu; Investor-state mediation: when is
mediationsuitable and should the legalframeworkfor settling, investment disputes be strengthenedto
include procedures supporting the mediation of such disputes?, MEDIATION NEWS (Int'l Bar Ass'n,
London), Oct. 2009, at 8; see also Salacuse, supra note 59, at 153 ("If, on the other hand, host
countries and international investors can find and develop effective altematives to international
investor-State arbitration for the settlement of treaty-based investment disputes, the costs of investment
dispute settlement for both states and investors may decline while working relationships between
investors and host governments may improve."). But see Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 692
(suggesting that the purpose of IIAs is not to facilitate bargaining but to create a predictable legal
regime).
340. See supranotes 212-16.
341. Based upon data in the publicly available awards, it is unclear whether the tribunals were

2011]

RATIONALIZING COSTS

843

Second, this can create difficulties in accessing justice and fully pursuing
claims and defenses if parties are unable to pay their lawyers, unable to
pay the tribunal, or the fiscal cost of pursuing arbitration substantially
outweighs the amount in dispute. This suggests that investment treaty
conflict may be lurking beneath the surface, but it may simply be
unaddressed given that the fiscal reality of ITA may inhibit access to
justice. This may prove particularly troubling for investors or states with
limited budgets to pursue adjudication. Third, uncertainty about cost
allocation can prevent parties from fully appreciating the scope of their
arbitration risk. All of these concerns suggest the need for doctrinal shifts,
particularly in terms of encouraging tribunals to provide more complete
data and to address cost issues at early stages of the dispute.342 More
information at an earlier stage holds the potential to manage stakeholder
expectations (and presumably party resources) more effectively and to
offer more complete empirical data for the future.
B. Signs ofBalance Even Without a "Universal" Approach to Costs
Current data suggests that there was a relative degree of parity between
investors and states regarding costs. Most typically, the parties equally
shared TCE and there was no shift of PLC. Meanwhile, there were an
equivalent number of states and investors that experienced both a shift of
PLC and a payment of more than 50%. As regards the actual dollar values
of cost decisions, there was parity among investors and states for the
payment of TCE; but there was less equilibrium on PLC shifts, which was
arguably due to the small number of awards reporting dollar values for
PLC shifts. Percentages of PLC shifts exhibited broad divergence; and
although the largest proportion of TCE allocations were 50%/50%, there
were various approaches to cost decisions.
Overall, while there was a degree of parity among investors and states,
there was nevertheless variability in the fiscal outcome of cost decisions
that refutes the supposition that there is a "universal" or "loser-pays"

fully briefed on costs. Tribunals should include information on PLC and TCE in the award to aid in the
assessment of this data and provide a more nuanced picture of ITA costs. See supra notes 224-26
(discussing the missing data related to costs).
342. See Reichert & Hope, supra note 21, at 30 ("[Alrbitrators and parties should consider costs at
the beginning of an arbitration. Arbitrators should make it clear from the outset that the parties'
conduct throughout the proceedings will be [considered] .. .. Parties should clarify the basis on which
costs will be awarded and assessed, and the procedure to be used."); Smith, Costs, supra note 110, at
32 (The "arbitrator may wish to address the ambit of costs authority at a preliminary hearing. This
would avoid any dispute as to the extent of the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to award costs at the end of
the day.").
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approach to costs. 3 43 There was no reliable statistical relationship between
(1) losing and PLC shifts, and (2) losing and TCE allocation. Although a
"loser-pays" approach is doctrinally permissible and possibly a "trend" for
analysis with a historical lens, data did not demonstrate a reliable-let
alone causal-link between losing and cost outcomes. This suggests that it
is inappropriate for parties to assess cost risk on the "loser-pays" variable
in complete isolation; rather, the data seemed to suggest that a "factordependent" or "pay-your-own-way" approach was descriptively dominant.
While more data and developed modeling may offer additional insight in
the future, as a normative matter, stakeholders should recognize the degree
of variability and consider what this could mean for their dispute
resolution choices. Policy makers should likewise assess whether this
unpredictability is normatively desirable and consider shaping their policy
choices related to IIAs and their legal options for dispute resolution
accordingly.
C. Gaps in Legal Authority and RationaleSuggest Needfor
Rationalization
There is a plethora of legal authority from which tribunals could draw
to justify cost decisions. 3 44 It is troubling that even when sources are easy
to locate (and arguably readily known), tribunals fail to provide authority
for cost decisions. Although this gap was most prominent in nonfinal
awards (and perhaps not unexpected), even final awards exhibited the
failure to offer authority (i.e., less than one authority on average). Such an
approach is troubling if ITA is a rule-of-law demonstration project. If IIAs
provide incentives for investors and states to engage in rules-based
decision making, then arbitrators should adhere to the same credo. Simply
presuming authority is inappropriate. It can lead to legal errors, such as
Eureko, which must then be corrected (provided that is even doctrinally
permissible). Particularly when references are straightforward, easy to
include, and guide decisions, a citation gap creates challenges for
perceived legitimacy and procedural justice.345 For those cases citing

343. See supra notes 125-26.
344. See supra Part IIA, I.C.
345. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in
Negotiation: Procedural Fairness,Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAw & SOC.
INQUIRY 473, 476, 477 (2008) (describing how disclosure of information can facilitate value creation
and explaining how, irrespective of the outcome in terms of distributive justice, stakeholders "care,
independently, about the fairness of the process by which those outcomes were obtained"); Tom R.
Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of FairDecisionmakingProcedureson the Legitimacy of
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authority, it was unfortunate that institutional tribunals, particularly
ICSID, failed to cite their own rules. Nevertheless, there is a degree of
good news that, for ad hoc arbitrations, tribunals regularly cited 1976
UNCITRAL Rules. This is a step in the right direction for promoting the
legitimacy of ITA. Future tribunals should follow that example and cite
legal authority, particularly from the governing law.
Another step in the right direction was for tribunals to offer a legal
rationale. For both PLC and TCE, tribunals offered rationales nearly twice
as often as authority, averaging one or two reasons per final award. For
both PLC and TCE, the awards exhibited variation in rationale. The most
frequently cited factors were parties' relative success and failure,
considerations of equity, and underlying substantive concerns. Concerns
about encouraging appropriate behavior and discouraging inappropriate
behavior also held some sway. But issues related to party equality, public
interest, and settlement efforts had little impact on cost decisions. If
stakeholders wish to create a dispute resolution system with cost
implications that promote fairness and efficiency, this latter finding
requires both attention and redress. 346
There is irony in that commentators suggest that we need not worry
about "flooding investment tribunals with trivial disputes" largely because
investors will make a rational assessment of "the cost risk connected to
investment treaty arbitration" prior to initiating claims.347 But how can
investors make such an assessment if a key variable-which may entail a
large portion of the overall commercial, economic, and political risk-is
unknown and potentially unknowable given the lack of predictability and
guidance?
The lack of coherence in rationale is unsurprising in certain respects.
Treaties and arbitration rules that form the bulk of the governing law are

Government, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 809, 827 (1994) (finding "that the use of fair decisionmaking
procedures does enhance the legitimacy of national governmental authorities").
346. See Wetter & Preim, supranote 67, at 333 (arguing that "a much increased awareness of the
impact and proper allocation . . . (including the proper methods of their assessment) is desirable ...
[and] much greater care and time must be devoted in arbitral proceedings to the presentation of cost
claims and to their determination").
347. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering,supra note 73, at 96; see also Salacuse,supra note 59, at
153 ("[A] rational investor will not lightly resort to [arbitration] and will examine other options for
redress of its grievance before doing so. The final and perhaps most important reason for increased
recourse to investor-State arbitration may be that aggrieved investors, having undertaken that search
for other options, have concluded that they have no more cost-effective, reliable remedy for the
settlement of disputes than investor-State arbitration.").
348. Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 659 ("The discretion conferred upon arbitral tribunals
accounts for a considerable amount of uncertainty in the allocation of costs in investment treaty

846

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:769

often silent or fail to address costs in detail. Key institutions-like
ICSID-are silent on cost guidelines or vaguely reference factors such as
the "outcome of the case" or "other relevant circumstances." 349 It is then
little wonder that tribunals pick reasons at their leisure to justify decisions.
One might reasonably suggest that arbitrators simply give parties what
they requested. If stakeholders create an ITA system that fails to address
costs clearly, stakeholders should hardly be surprised when the system
they created-and the individuals to whom they have outsourced their
adjudicative responsibility-do not provide clear results.350
The broader normative question is whether clarity is desirable. In the
context of ITA, given the overall problems related to inconsistency,
incoherence, and gaps in determinacy, there is value in providing pockets
of predictability and clarity. Costs are tangible, and, as a structural matter,
the risks arguably affect investors and states in equal measure. Costs
implicate the utility of arbitration as opposed to other dispute resolution
mechanisms, and understanding the scope of ITA costs could aid dispute
resolution strategy to promote (but not guarantee) greater efficiency
overall. As cost issues should be relatively politically neutral, costs could
be an area to begin to bring clear rules-or at least improved normative
guidance-about how tribunals can and should exercise their discretion.
There are different types of choice architectures for approaching ITA
costs. First, states might articulate a clear rule that they prefer, such as a
"loser-pays," "pay-your-own-way," or "factor-dependent" approach.
Second, states could provide for cost rules in line with the original ICSID
approach, namely, providing clear rules in advance of a dispute detailing
how costs will be addressed (i.e., the "pay-your-own-way" approach
where parties pay their own lawyers and split the costs of arbitrators
equally). Third, states might take a "factor-dependent" approach that
requires tribunals to use standards that are normatively desirable. For
example, to the extent that states wish to encourage settlement in ITA,
they may require tribunals to consider party settlement efforts.
Particularly, as tribunals did not regularly cite settlement efforts,
introducing this factor clearly into the normative baseline may affect
tribunal, and possibly party, behavior. Likewise, to the extent that states

arbitration. What makes it additionally difficult to discern a structure in the cost decisions of tribunals
is the fact that reasons for adopting a certain cost decision are rarely given.").
349. See supra notes 157-58, 163, 167-69.
350. See generally William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields Lecture-Arbitration's Protean
Nature: The Value ofRules and the Risks ofDiscretion (The 2002 Freshfields Lecture), 19 ARB. INT'L
279 (2003) (discussing the costs and benefits of specific rules in international arbitration).
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may be concerned about the inequality experienced by small investors or
states with smaller amounts of legal capacity, expressly requiring states to
take issues of public interest or party equality into account may encourage
parties and arbitrators to be more proactive in addressing these issuesand perhaps even treat different costs issues differently in an effort to
optimize different opportunities to signal the likely pay-off matrix. While
the choice to include a particular approach is a policy choice that reflects a
treaty negotiation dyad, the last two options (namely, "pay-your-ownway" and "factor-dependent") are most attractive.
The first option-"loser-pays"-is less desirable at present. Given the
inconsistency and breadth of the case law, it may be difficult to know in
advance which party will "win" and which party will "lose." This makes a
"loser-pays" approach susceptible to variance and injects an avoidable
(and arguably unnecessary) degree of uncertainty into ITA, which creates
greater challenges in predicting costs. Rather than engaging in a highstakes poker game where there are risks of both an adverse substantive
award and a related cost decision, it is preferable to enhance determinacy
and coherence by promulgating clearer guidelines about cost decisions.
This is not to say that an indemnification objective is undesirable. Rather,
the issue might be whether policy makers can create standards that direct
tribunals on how to incorporate that factor into cost decisions.
The value of the second option-the "pay-your-own-way" approachis that it provides a degree of up-front certainty. Parties have advance
warning that they will be responsible for half of TCE and be responsible
for their own PLC. This gives parties an incentive to be "good stewards"
and manage their expenses effectively, knowing they will not be able to
recoup their fees from the other side at the end of the case (or earlier). To
the extent that parties can reasonably anticipate tribunal costs, know they
will be responsible for one-half of TCE, and keep their own costs under
control, that knowledge provides a reasonable degree of advance clarity.
The weaknesses of the approach, however, are that if parties engage in
deleterious behavior during the course of arbitration, that behavior cannot
be penalized, and tribunals cannot use cost awards to encourage efficient
arbitration conduct. It also potentially inhibits parties' access to justice and
implicates fairness considerations, particularly when there is a relationship
between the amounts an investor claims and the ultimate scope of TCE.
Moreover, it fails to provide indemnification for a party that has been
brought to the dispute resolution table and has expended costs to defend

351.

Dean Gotanda favors this approach. Gotanda, Fees, supra note 39, at 2-3.
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the case. Using this approach inevitably creates sunk costs for dispute
resolution. Should they wish to include treaty language to require this or
adopt institutional rules that would support such clarity, stakeholders need
to appreciate those drawbacks in light of the overall benefits.
The third option-the "factor-dependent" approach-may be the most
normatively useful. This approach permits stakeholders to prioritize
behaviors that they wish to encourage and to nudge efficient and desirable
conduct.352 In other words, if states wish to caveat the scope of arbitrator
discretion-providing more guidance to tribunals and increasing
certainty-they can and should do so in the text of HAS 35 3 when they
negotiate treaties or when there is an opportunity to renegotiate. 35 4 In such
a case, states must make a normative choice about those factors that they
find to be most appropriate. The data suggests that the most "naturally"
occurring factors were considerations of relative success, equities of the
situation, and concern about underlying substantive behavior. Should
states wish to reinforce these factors and encourage the addition of other
default rationales for arbitral decisions, they can expressly articulate these
standards in treaties. If, however, states wish to incentivize other aspectssuch as the role of access to justice, social justice, or other fairness
considerations-this suggests states may need to incorporate express
requirements that tribunals consider other factors, such as public policy or
equality of arms. Likewise, if states wish to increase settlement
opportunities, they could require tribunals to consider the cost implications
of meritorious arguments or the social utility of claims or defenses during
the proceedings.
One might imagine the text of an IIA's investor-state dispute settlement
chapter that incorporates specific provisions for costs. It would
specifically define both PLC and TCE. It would grant parties authority to
agree about costs. It would then provide a default that, in the absence of

352. See, e.g., Schill, Cost-Shifting, supra note 33, at 666 (suggesting cost shifting can "channel
the behavior" to preserve arbitral efficiency); see also Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the
Implementation ofPublic Policy,47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 208 (1984).
353. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitration Decisions as Jurisprudence
Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265
(Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008) ("[D]ecisions regarding ... allocation of costs play an increasingly
important role in investment arbitrations but are also not addressed thoroughly in the treaties."). Other
options may involve the revision of institutional or UNCITRAL arbitration rules to address cost
shifting in ITA. The current reforms at UNCITRAL and ICC do not suggest this is currently likely.
Another option, presuming it forms a part of the applicable law, includes revising national arbitration
laws on cost, but this may be difficult.
354. See UNCTAD, HA MONITOR, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2008/1,
No. 2, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS

IN INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

(discussing the increasing number of renegotiated flAs).

AGREEMENTS (2007-2008),

at 4-5

(2008)
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choice, tribunals would have authority to assess costs at any stage of the
proceedings but, in any event, must do so in the final award. It would
require that the tribunal provide reasons for its cost decisions and then
require the tribunal to take certain factors into account expressly, such as:
(1) the parties' relative success, (2) whether cost shifting would be
equitable given the parties' behavior during the arbitration, and (3) the
parties' settlement efforts. Factors could be added or eliminated depending
upon the normative choices of the treaty partners.
Although this "nudging" approach cannot guarantee behavior or
eliminate all forms of discretion, it can encourage stakeholders to take key
variables into account.355 By establishing normatively desirable standards
that reflect empirical knowledge about existing behavior, stakeholders can
begin to move beyond a baseline of unbridled discretion or
unpredictability to encourage useful behavior and generate enhanced
certainty. Putting parties on notice about the utility of their behavior and
the potential merits of their claim may provide parties with an incentive
and opportunity to settle or consider other dispute resolution mechanisms.
While tribunals must maintain their independence and impartiality, where
they are also required to take factors into account through express treaty
language, the guidance can create a level playing field that offers useful
information and incentives. It will, moreover, aid the continued
rationalization of costs in ITA and promote greater systemic legitimacy.
356
wl
While arbitrator discretion will remain,
it will be directed toward
streamlined variables that the parties can anticipate and use to plan their
conduct.
D. Links with Cost Variables Suggest Needfor Caution and
Rationalization
Although the preceding discussion of gaps in legal authority and
reasoning suggests a lack of coherence, cost variables exhibited small
pockets of reliability that aid the rationalization of cost awards. There was

355. See generally ARIELY, supra note 37; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 335; Anne C. Dailey
& Peter Siegelman, Predictionsand Nudges: What Economics Has to Offer the Humanities, and ViceVersa, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 341, 343 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) and
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008) and discussing the value of cognitive psychology and
behavioral economics for socio-legal issues).
356. Eliminating all discretion on costs may create perverse incentives or prevent the exercise of
judgment to make good decisions in difficult cases. There is nevertheless utility in guiding discretion
to aid incremental advances toward improved rationalization.
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a reliable relationship between a shift of PLC and TCE such that, if there
was a shift in the parties' costs, the same party would also be likely to pay
for more than 50% of TCE and vice versa. Similarly, where there was no
shift in TCE, there was no shift in PLC. In other words, awards linked
decisions related to lawyer's fees and tribunal costs. As both PLC and
TCE relate to ultimate ITA costs, this seems reasonably appropriate, and
there seems little to do except clarify that the relationship exists and advise
clients accordingly. If, however, stakeholders wish to make a normative
choice to parse costs differently and finely tune their policy objectives for
different types of costs, they can do so. If, for example, there is a particular
desire to increase access to justice and consider party equality of arms,
perhaps stakeholders may require tribunals to address PLC early on the
basis of equality of arms, and public interest as ongoing payment of
lawyers' fees may affect party capacity to continue with protracted ITA
claims. In such a case, TCE could perhaps be allocated on a "pay-yourown-way" basis on a different timetable. Such a choice could reflect the
normative concerns of parties related to efficiency and fairness.
There was also a reliable relationship between amounts claimed by
investors and the amount of the tribunal's total cost. As the amount
claimed was lower, the cost of the tribunal was lower; but as the amount
claimed by the investor increased, so did the total tribunal cost. Thiswhen contrasted with the lack of a reliable relationship between amounts
awarded and tribunal costs-has implications for how and when investors
might uniquely influence ultimate arbitration costs. It means that when
investors initiate arbitration-as they are often the only parties with the
legal right to initiate claims-the amount of damages they request
implicates the baseline of ultimate costs, fees, and expenses of the entirety
of the ITA process. It must be remembered that a reliable statistical
relationship does not necessarily denote cause; and it is possible that a
high-damage claim denotes a serious case, a case that has been protracted,
or a case where major multinational law firms are involved. In serious or
protracted cases, arbitrators rightly take more time to decide the dispute,
thereby resulting in increased costs.357

357. This may also be a function of institutional rules. ICSID, LCIA, and ad hoc arbitrations often
pay arbitrators by the amount of time spent. See LCIA, SCHEDULE OF ARBITRATION COSTS (2010),
available at http://www.lcia.org/Dispute ResolutionServices/LCIA Arbitration Costs.aspx (paying
arbitrators by the hour); see also ICSID, SCHEDULE OF FEES, art. 3 (2008), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSIDIFrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH8actionsVal=ShowDocument&Schedu
ledFees=True&language=English (setting fees for arbitrators on the basis of a daily rate). The ICC
pays based upon the amount in controversy. ICC Rules, supra note 169, at app. III. Given that the data
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If there is a causal relationship-namely, that investors set the amount
in controversy and the higher their request, the higher the ultimate costthat has serious implications. It suggests a need for clarity, at the outset, of
how arbitration costs will be allocated. It suggests a need for procedural
safeguards to minimize the harms (namely, increased costs and decreased
settlement opportunities) that result from arguably inflated claims. Such a
procedural safeguard might, for example, take the form of requiring
investors to accompany their request for arbitration with a preliminary
expert report. Particularly, as there is no equivalent of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 sanctions in international arbitration and parties are
free to claim any amount, there may be value in making changes to
pleading requirements and encouraging more accurate assessments of
damages at the outset. 5 Changing pleading obligations or using costshifting standards strategically offers incentives for party behavior that
foster norms of efficiency and fairness. Using these process tools imposes
a discipline that may lower the overall arbitration costs for both parties. It
may also decrease arbitration-based buyer's remorse by focusing clients
and counsel on the relative worth of arbitration. 3 59 Likewise, it may
facilitate negotiation within realistic zones of possible agreement 360 and,
similar to early damage assessments in asbestos litigation, aid settlement
opportunities.361 Nevertheless, policy choices based upon inferences from
this data must be done with caution in light of the size of the subset of the
data set and variations even between the subset and the larger pre-2007
population.362
There may be opportunities to rationalize cost beyond legal solutions,
such as (1) encouraging tribunals to address costs early, often, and with

subset came from ICSID or ad hoc tribunals, a more complex case requiring more hours would
increase overall TCE.
358. Damage assessments would be preliminary and would evolve in light of the evidence and
arguments presented during the proceedings.
359. Although possibly unrepresentative, the former CEO of a company that won an award
against Mexico suggested that the experience was "so dissatisfying that he wished he had merely
entrusted his company's fate to informal mechanisms," including political options, given the lost time
and arbitration costs. Coe, supranote 73, at 8-10.
360. See WATKINS & ROSEGRANT, supra note 35, at 31-33 (discussing the functioning of
ZOPAs); see also Michael L. Moffitt, Will this Case Settle? An Exploration ofMediators'Predictions,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 39, 44-52 (2000) (discussing ZOPAs and their impact on dispute
settlement).
361. Asbestos litigation has benefitted from addressing damages early. See Drury Stevenson,
Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 213, 218 (2008) (analyzing early assessment of damages in
asbestos litigation and concluding it "fosters settlements; it generally yields verdicts more reflective of
the merits of a case; and it discourages frivolous litigation"); Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation:
ProceduralInnovations and Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 374-75 (2006).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 199-234.
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reasons; (2) providing enhanced clarity in the terms of treaties; or (3)
offering further guidance in arbitration rules. Another form of
rationalization may be to create a market for "legal expense insurance" to
help both investors and states address their costs risks in ITA.3 63 The
challenge, however, would be making sure that actuaries had something to
work with to assess and to predict that risk to price policies properly. As a
result, even insurers would likely want to have data from tribunals.
Promoting informed cost assessments and access to justice to permit
cost-effective dispute resolution is critical. The objective should be to
work with the pockets of coherence and balance that already exist and then
begin to rationalize the treatment of costs to provide enhanced
predictability and consistency on an incremental basis. Encouraging states
(when drafting IIAs), parties (when engaging in dispute resolution), and
arbitrators (when making cost assessments) to be clear, transparent, and
precise (in light of the overriding policy objectives) would facilitate the
incremental rationalization of costs in investment arbitration.
CONCLUSION

ITA can be a useful tool for resolving investment treaty disputes, but
issues of cost-should they continue in their present state-will create
challenges for using ITA in the most fair and efficient manner possible.
More attention to matters of cost-by parties, arbitrators, policy makers,
and scholars conducting empirical research-is a desirable outcome.
Promoting transparency, clarity, and determinacy in the costs will enhance
the efficacy and legitimacy of IIAs and ITA. In a time of transition in
international investment, the normative approaches suggested in this
Article may offer an opportunity to provide the stability and
rationalization necessary for the creation of international economic justice
and sustainable dispute resolution systems.

363. Legal expense insurance can cover risks related to bringing protracted and potentially
expensive claims or can cover policyholders against the potential costs of legal action against them.
See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF BUSINEss TERMs (2010), available at http://www.

yourdictionary.com/business/legal-expense-insurance.

